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*to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

FRANSEN	•	LINDBECK	•	STEIN	•	CHOURAQUI
WRIGHT	•	O'HANLON	•			GILLIGAN

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PRUDENCE, CONSCIENCE AND FAITH

Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience

WALTER STEIN

Calculating Incalculables

IF THE ARGUMENT of this book is valid, any large-scale use of nuclear weapons would be wicked. Further, any re-

The accompanying article was not written with any topical considerations in mind, and should be read as a Christian contribution to the question of modern war. The author, Prof. Walter Stein, is professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds. He has edited a symposium by English Catholic intellectuals, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (Merlin Press, 112 Whitfield St., London W1, 12s 6d). CROSS CURRENTS is happy to present Prof. Stein's concluding chapter, and hopes that the entire work will be made available in America. It contains a foreword by Archbishop Roberts, S.J., "The Defense of the West," by Walter Stein; "War and Murder," by Elizabeth Anscombe; "Conscience and Deterrence," by R. A. Markus; "Conscience in Commission," by P. T. Geach; "The Witness of the Church," by Roger Smith, as well as the material here reproduced.

Our readers may already be familiar with the arguments of pacifists and advocates of unilateral disarmament, but they may still find profit in the statement of a non-pacifist who both rejects atomic weapons (even as a deterrent) and does not underestimate the dangers of such a position. Unfortunately, the formal presentation of many of the presuppositions of Prof. Stein's essay is contained in other sections of the symposium, but the main directions of his argument can be easily enough worked out from careful study of the article even in its detached context.

hance on these weapons as "deterrents" must also be wicked, since this not only involves risks of their eventual use but hypothetically commits us to murder, here and now. And since, evidently, no major recourse to violence could henceforth be effective without nuclear weapons, it follows that violence, at any rate on a world-war scale, is now morally ruled out.

We have emphasized that our case does not rest on any sort of general objection to the employment of force by states. We deny the pacifist position, and maintain that states have the right, and the duty, to protect their communities against unjust attack, so long as they do so by means that themselves accord with justice. In the past, wars—even the most terrible wars—could be fought honorably and even nobly, although time and again they in fact degenerated into murderous license. It is only with the most recent technological advances that major war—and hence the threat of such a war—has become inherently atrocious.

That this is what has now happened seems so primitively evident that there may well seem to be something a little grotesque about an elaborate inquiry such as this, to establish that it has indeed happened. But the facts themselves are grotesque; above all, the fact that this unparalleled moral landslide seems to have taken place with so little apparent response. Unconditional pacifists continue, of course, to denounce the evils of war—and non-pacifists (with the usual professions of respect) continue to discount them. Politicians are content to rely on pre-nuclear modes of appeal, the press is content to echo the politicians, Christian opinion is divided and ineffec-

tive. No wonder, perhaps, that for instance in Britain, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has itself so often relied on appeals to expediency. Apart from its traditional-pacifist wing, its exponents—whether theoretical thinkers like Lord Russell, strategists like Sir Stephen King-Hall, journalists like Philip Toynbee, or intellectuals of the "New Left"—all have sought to challenge the generals and politicians on their own ground, and to carry the public with them in terms of strategic and political considerations. In this process, the *moral* novelty of the situation is too easily taken for granted—or at any rate, there seems to be the assumption that morality is not enough, that the morally right course must be shown to coincide (very fortunately) with a balance of foreseeable advantages—or morality is in fact altogether discounted, the better to establish the "realism" of this sort of thinking.

It is easy to see why objectors to nuclear armaments should place so much stress on the expedience of their submissions. We have already (in chapter 1) touched on arguments of this kind and certainly do not wish to belittle the importance of this line of thought. Only by pressing these questions to the limit can we responsibly confront our situation. The danger is that, in our anxiety to achieve a maximum persuasiveness (towards ourselves as well as towards others) we might be led to push this kind of thinking far beyond its appropriate boundaries.

Unfortunately, this is just what has tended to happen in discussions of nuclear policy. The more stubbornly the advocates of established policies have insisted on our strategic and political dependence on "the deterrent," the more uncompromisingly have their opponents proclaimed its complete strategic and political uselessness. Where the one side can see no security or hope but in our

nuclear strength—if only as a counter in disarmament negotiations—the other denounces the possession of nuclear weapons as in fact the greatest of our perils—in Britain's case, uselessly attracting a preventive strike in case of war. In the one view, a world enslaved and corrupted by communism is the primary fear; in the other, a world either annihilated, or reduced to chaos and savagery. No wonder if, on each side, the temptation to ignore, or undervalue the other's emphasis has too often prevailed; in the face of *these* alternatives, our habitual calculations break down before the facts.

The trouble is that, again and again, we all the same insist on returning to these calculations. And if no balance of decisive advantages exists, we find it necessary to invent one. On both sides there seems to be the assumption that, whilst wickedness may be wickedness, this of course is not sufficient to disturb anything or anyone in the actual world. And so both continue to accumulate proofs (and there are disturbingly powerful proofs on both sides) that the other course is impossible; that, whatever the risks of the policy advocated, the opposite risks are worse.

Thus, whilst unilateral disarmers tend to denounce established policies as "madness," apologists for these policies respond by diagnosing unilateralism as a failure of nerve as well as brains: a reference to "practical politics" will then introduce some well-matured sentences on the need for "calm and careful judgment," on "security" and "the balance of power," on the pursuit of "peace through strength," on "diplomatic skill" and "patient negotiation," on "necessary guarantees and safeguards," on "adequate *quid pro quo's*." Some of these phrases, however threadbare, point to something that must still be taken seriously, but it is hardly surprising if many of those preoccupied with the nature of

the "strength" that has now entered the world should feel them to be unspeakably irrelevant to present facts. They do not, even in the most rudimentary way, appear to reflect the condition of which Professor P. M. S. Blackett has said that some five or ten hydrogen bombs would suffice to knock Britain out of a war, "however well prepared with passive and civil defense organization, and however high the morale,"¹ or concerning which General Gavin, as Chief of the United States Army Research and Development, testified to a Senate Committee, as early as 1956, that an "assault in force" against Russia was estimated to "run on the order of several hundred million deaths; that would be either way, depending upon which way the wind blew. If the wind blew to the southeast, they would be mostly in the U.S.S.R., although they would extend into the Japanese, and perhaps into the Philippine area. If the wind blew the other way, they would extend well back into Western Europe."² Meanwhile, an authoritative American study has estimated that an attack directed against the people of the U.S.A., totalling 2,000 megatons, would—through fall-out alone—kill 55 per cent of the population; 5,000 megatons would kill 80 per cent; and 20,000 megatons perhaps 100 per cent. (If the attack were directed only at military bases, 50,000 megatons would also destroy the entire population.)³

¹ "Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations," quoted by Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, p. 170.

² P. Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, p. 172.

³ "The Distribution and Effects of Fall-out in Large Nuclear Weapons Campaigns," by Everett and Pugh, of the Institute for Defense Analysis in Washington, *Journal of Operations Research*, 1959, Vol. 7. Quoted by M. C. Berenbaum, *New Statesmen*, 3 September 1960. Dr. Berenbaum points out that the present American stockpile is estimated as equivalent to 28,000 megatons, the Russian stockpile being probably nearly of the same order.

It is easy to see how those who have urgently faced the meaning of nuclear war might be led to a simple inversion of orthodox attitudes—and tactics of persuasion. The menace is so overwhelming and their opponents seem so unmoved, that it is hard to be serious about opposite risks and to recognize the relevance of other claims. Thus, at the 1960 Labor Party Conference, Mr. Michael Foot re-emphasized the "enormous risk" attaching to Britain's N.A.T.O. bases, Mr. Cousins deplored the cost of "a useless defense," and Mr. Mikardo denied nuclear weapons any deterrent value at all—they only ensured that Britain would "act as a lightning conductor or decoy duck to draw enemy fire on our heads and divert it from New York and Chicago."⁴

But whatever force there may be in such objections to the "deterrent" (neatly crystallized in the Vicky cartoon where a John Bull/Minister of Defense, faced by a Bear, resolutely points a gun at his own head: "One step, and I shoot") they are one-sided and overstated: no amount of juggling with the paradox of reciprocal suicide can conjure away the "balance of terror" itself. This "balance" may, from time to time, undergo relative shifts, and it cannot indefinitely guarantee peace. Nevertheless, it continues to be a present—as it is already a historical—determinant in our situation, and neither Britain's direct contribution nor those of nations serving only as bases for American weapons are negligible in this context. It simply is not the case that the gun is pointing solely at ourselves—and what serves very well for a cartoon will not do as a serious judgment of our condition.

Any undervaluing—within its limits—of "the deterrent" is all the more objectionable if there is also insufficient alive-

⁴ *The Labor Party Conference 1960, The Guardian Report.*

ness to the risks of a possible communist domination. There are some who would not be disturbed by such an outcome: they are entitled to their beliefs, but those who disagree with them have cause to treat their concern for Western disarmament with some reserve. There are others who consider military aggression unlikely; but they really should remember Hungary and Tibet; and ought to bear in mind that there are other means besides overt warfare in which military power can be employed—from the Czech *coup d'état* under Stalin to Mr. Khrushchev's fierce menaces in times of crisis. And there are some who simply affirm the sufficiency of conventional weapons: it is time they came to grips with *Defence in the Nuclear Age*. It may be necessary to dispense with our "deterrent." But we should not demand its sacrifice on false pretences.

Clearly it is as hard for unilateralists to accept the full burden of their position as it is for others to accept as *now real* the real possibility of nuclear war. Even Stephen King-Hall and Bertrand Russell have to some extent played down their burdens. Thus Commander King-Hall—who was one of the first to recognize the implications of nuclear weapons, and whose voice remains one of the most trustworthy in these discussions—has stripped off many illusions this side of "the thought-barrier in defence thinking." He was quick to expose the absurdities of "nuclear defence," to draw attention to the limitations of "nuclear deterrence"—and above all, to accept the logic of "escalation": since physical violence, in any major conflict, is now ultimately subject to the violence of nuclear weapons, the rejection of nuclear weapons must, in reason, involve the rejection of all other physical means of defence in such a conflict. Only a strategy of non-violence remains open on these assumptions; and Sir Stephen's *Defence*

in the *Nuclear Age* proceeds to outline one. At this point, however, a questionable optimism takes charge of his case.

This was brought out very sharply when, soon after the publication of his book, its findings were challenged by Professor David Mitrany, in an impressive letter to *The Guardian*. I should like to cite from this letter at some length:

Non-resistance [i.e., Sir Stephen's "non-violent resistance"] demands a very high degree of self-restraint and self-sacrifice, of which in any country only very few are likely to prove capable. With others it may be weakness or fear, or the sheer human need to keep oneself and one's family alive. But apart from that there have always been large numbers who, whether sincere sympathizers or merely callous opportunists, are likely to split the outlook of the resisting group.

In the case of a communist occupier the numbers willing to collaborate are likely to be much larger than in the case of the Nazis. And that is really the main aspect that Sir Stephen overlooks. Having set out to destroy a purely military point of view, he in fact looks at the problem likewise only from a military standpoint. But an occupation by the Russians would not be an ordinary military occupation; it would be a *revolutionary* occupation, with an ideological purpose and drive behind it. Apart from attracting very probably, therefore, the sympathy of many groups, it is also likely, as in civil wars, to be much more ruthless in its ways and ends. The Geneva Conventions have never played any part in civil wars. An attack or an occupation which is spurred by some fanatical ideal (whether of racial, or class, or religious "salvation") looks upon any resistance as a vicious reaction and treats it accordingly as something not to be merely defeated but uprooted. The consequence of this is that "democratic" non-resistance for the purpose of saving the democratic way of life is, sadly, a vain hope. . . .

Obviously, when Sir Stephen con-

templates the fine moral results that might come from non-resistance, even at the cost of some material discomfort or suffering, he thinks in terms of the way in which the Americans and ourselves would treat a non-resisting group. . . . He might have learnt something from what is happening in Algeria; and he certainly should have learnt something from the way the Soviet Communists, who are after all the chief factor concerned in this issue, have dealt with resisting, or indeed with merely suspected, groups in the countries they have occupied.

It might be easy for some of us to sacrifice ourselves; it would not be human to stand by and look on while one's family was starved or mutilated; and no political leader could call upon a whole people to accept such political immolation.

The conclusion is that non-resistance may save our skin, or some of it, but will not save our way of life—which is what Sir Stephen thinks of achieving. And in the meantime the emotional confusion fed by such appeals will deflect our minds and efforts from the only possible way to peace, by positive international action.⁵

Those whose most fundamental commitments are religious would need to complete Professor Mitrany's account by reference to the immensely efficient persecutions of the Church in China, Hungary and other satellite countries—not only the physical and psychological sufferings of its members, but the schismatic infiltrations, the unscrupulous propaganda, the insistent, insidious pressure towards apostasy, and the conditioning of youth with all the resources of official education. It is neither meanness nor fanaticism that leads one to kick against such a prospect. "Anything rather than this!"

And yet—anything? Even an H-bomb war? As Bertrand Russell has said, there may be some question whether half the population of the world would survive,

or a quarter, or none. What is certain is that, at best, such a world "would consist of destitute populations, maddened by hunger, debilitated by disease, deprived of the support of modern industry and means of transport, incapable of supporting educational institutions, and rapidly sinking to the level of ignorant savages."⁶ Leaving aside the tremendous question of genetic effects, really: *anything?* Neither free government nor the spiritual life is likely to flourish in such a world.

Yet again, if we should reel back towards unconditional disarmament, may we not be preparing the way for an equally incalculable outcome? Lord Russell underestimates both the immediate threat of communism and its more long-term dangers. "There have been bad governments and bad systems in the past. Genghis Khan, for example, was quite as bad as fanatical anti-communists believe Stalin to have been. But his tyranny did not last forever, and if his enemies had had the power to extinguish human life rather than submit to his brutalities, nobody in the present day would regret their not having exercised this power."⁷ But Genghis Khan had no Communist Party behind him, no Leninism, no modern thought-control techniques, no guns or aeroplanes—and, for that matter, no H-bombs. Is it, then, "unhistorical" (as Lord Russell suggests) to have misgivings even about the more distant future? Or is it not rather unhistorical to argue from analogy where all analogy has so plainly broken down (just as unhistorical as those who claim to be guided by historical experience in clinging to the H-bomb)? We simply cannot say what would happen. And though—when all has been said—Lord Russell and those who think along these lines have good

⁵ *The Guardian*, 21 March 1958.

⁶ *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, p. 42.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

grounds to persist even so in describing a communist domination as the "lesser evil," is language not cracking under the strain? Such a "lesser evil" might be more than we could bear.

And there is one further, crucial consideration: it is *risks* rather than outcomes that have to be weighed. A "worse risk" may be a risk of a worse thing or a more probable risk of a less bad thing. Those who defend the policy of "deterrence" freely admit that if the great war we fear breaks out, then the policy has failed and all is lost: they are just betting that our governments can edge along the tight-rope. They agree that what lies below is an abyss of destruction, but they think that we may not fall into it, whereas if the West gives up its present policy the "lesser evil" would become a certainty: to abandon the deterrent is thus felt to be the *graver risk*. Of course, in another sense the "graver risk" remains simply identical with the *greater evil*, but how are these two types of "gravity" to be related? What objective criteria could be appealed to, to arbitrate between them? Even if one is satisfied that, in the extremity of our dilemma, we can meaningfully go on speaking of a "greater" and a "lesser" evil at all, what, finally, is to decide the issue between such a "greater evil" and such a "graver risk"?

It is significant that, in his reply to Professor Mitrany, Sir Stephen King-Hall could only reply: (i) that, if his plan were adopted, a military occupation by the Soviet Union would be a "most improbable" tactic, (ii) "an *ad hoc* movement struggling to life after a military defeat is something qualitatively different" from what he is proposing, (iii) that "Professor Mitrany and all those who had seized on this one aspect of my defense plan seem to have no understanding of the monstrous dangers and deficiencies of our present arrange-

ments. The first two of these points are, at best, speculative. It is the third that really tells. But only by balancing Professor Mitrany's emphasis—just as Professor Mitrany only succeeds in balancing Sir Stephen's.

Sir Stephen's reply concludes:

Having dismissed my comprehensive plan by dealing with one aspect of it, Professor Mitrany gives us his formula for peace in the three words: *positive international action*. What does this cliché add up to in March 1958? I call for *positive national action*.

And here indeed, is the rub. As time goes on, things look now more, now less promising for "positive international action"; but real international control can now only mean *world-government*. (Nothing short of this could enforce an agreement in future crises; nothing short of such powers of enforcement can provide the security Professor Mitrany is in search of.) If, however, we were even beginning to be ready for world-government, we should not so urgently need it. The need is immense; the obstacles firmly anchored in this need. It is one of the ironies of our present condition that the story of the earthquake pills on sale at the time of the Lisbon earthquake (for "what else would you suggest"?)—is now as applicable to the toughest diplomatic "realists" as to the "Utopians" against whom it used to be told. With ideologies desperately confronting each other, bombs and missiles springing up right and left all over the globe, and a long queue of applicants for admission into The Club, what would you suggest in place of positive international action?

The fact is, neither international action, nor the strategic *status quo*, nor unilateral disarmament can produce a condition of pre-nuclear comfort. None of these can dissolve the fact of the East-West struggle for existence. And no adding up of relative advantages can appear entirely convincing, or even en-

tirely sane, so long as the other side of the balance-sheet is kept in view.

Our civilization is in many ways built upon the power to calculate. This power is, of course, splendid, it is one of the things in virtue of which we are human. But our humanity also places limits on calculation. These limits can easily be missed, and perhaps for too long now we have tended to miss them. Now there is fire on the horizon, like writing on a wall.

Absolute and Relative

THERE IS NO necessary gap between morality and prudence. Indeed, the majority of moral principles are simply codifications of prudence. The object is well-being, the individual's or the community's general interest. Sometimes there may be some tension between individual and communal—or between various communities'—general interest. It is then that we tend most readily to feel "under obligation": "conscience" now takes charge of our problem, and arbitrates amidst the conflicting claims. Usually, however, it still arbitrates in terms of prudential considerations. I must not only love my neighbor as myself, but must try to know what it is that love would prudently do in this or that situation. I must try to discover the nature of his real needs (that is, the deficiencies in his well-being) and so the appropriate means towards his completion. It would not only be unwise, it would also be immoral if a doctor took unnecessary risks with a habit-forming drug. Similarly, it would not be inexpedient but *wrong* if a government failed to afford the greatest possible protection to its subjects, or if a general lost more lives than he must.

Common sense—and even most moralists—would probably more or less agree up to this point. But disagreements are certain to multiply as soon as it is

claimed that there may, at times, be a clash between morality and empirical interest—and, in this sense, a clash between morality and prudence. The classical instance is that of the man confronted by X, angrily brandishing a gun, and asking whether Y is in the next room. Should the man tell a lie to save Y's life? Could it actually be *wrong*, here, to take the obvious precaution? One might say that all the most important ethical disputes, from Machiavelli and Hobbes, or Bentham and Kant, to Sartre and contemporary English moralists like R. M. Hare and P. H. Nowell-Smith, are implicit in these questions.

If this text-book problem should seem somewhat unreal (though one can easily envisage actual situations of this kind), one might refer to a long series of similar problems at the heart of recent ferments in our way of life. Does marriage continue to bind, even though this should involve a maximum of unhappiness all round? Is pre-marital intercourse not justified by releasing adolescent tensions and insuring more mature selection in marriage? Can the use of contraceptives be immoral, if it assists both the fulfillment of nuptial love and the family's well-being as a whole? Indeed, can it be other than *obligatory* in a world already heavily over-populated and continuing to increase at tremendous rates just where it is already most overcrowded? Or again: may abortion be justified in certain circumstances, especially if this alone offers hope of saving the mother's life? May euthanasia, in some circumstances, not be a duty? Must a state observe moral rules, even though it may thus injure its citizens? Must it *always*, for instance, observe treaty commitments, even though in some particular case doing so appears to threaten the peace? May it, in extreme need, have recourse to torture, as a means of securing vital information? Or

inflict collective punishments, where individual rebels have eluded its search? The questions could be indefinitely prolonged, though these are some of the most important. In confronting them, people will tend to fall into two clearly defined groups, all along the line, though with some of the examples they might wish, for various reasons, to cross over to the other side:

The problem behind all these problems is whether morality and prudence (in the sense in which I have used the term) must necessarily coincide. It is just because, in such cases, there are at least *prima facie* reasons for thinking that prudential humaneness may be in tension with general moral principles that our ebbing traditions have left a litter of clashing relativities behind them. On the one hand, there are the continued appeals to moral absolutes; on the other hand, a wide variety of approaches rejecting the unconditional authority of such norms. In the one case, as we have seen, the principle of double effect, bounding the areas of human responsibility, serves as the guardian of unconditional obligations; in the other, conceptions of responsibility so unlimited that everything we do or—however remotely—*permit* is conceived as equally “our doing”: so that nothing, in the end, seems determinately ours at all—and “necessary evils” begin to proliferate all over the field of moral conduct.

Some objections to this concept of “necessary evils” have already been urged, in chapter I. And most of this book has been devoted to an analysis of one absolutely intolerable course of action that we have collectively set out on—precisely as a “necessary evil.” From one point of view, the debate of the last few years on nuclear policy is simply a continuation of the long debate, at every level of our civilization, between absolute and relative moralities—or (to put

it another way) between prudence circumscribed and prudence absolute. What distinguishes the present debate from anything that has preceded it is the fact that unrestricted prudence can no longer find its way about, even on its own terms. It is as if Kafka’s parable had been given an ultimate finality:

“Alas,” said the mouse, “the world is growing smaller every day. At the beginning, it was so big that I was afraid, I kept running and running, and I was glad when at last I saw walls far away to the right and left, but those long walls narrowed so quickly that I am in the last chamber already, and here in the corner stands the trap that I must run into.” “You only need to change your direction,” said the cat, and ate it up.

Was it wholly sane after all to imagine that prudence—whether social or private—can settle every problem? As when statesmen and journalists and respected academics urbanely dismiss moral absolutes from this debate? Or when such a passionate objector to nuclear weapons as Mr. Philip Toynbee confessed in *The Fearful Choice* that he “would go on choosing lesser evils right up to the end”⁸—so that if it could be shown “that unless one tortured” (and killed) “a million children ten million would certainly be tortured” (and killed) he would think it “right” to torture the million?⁹

On this plane, it is Mr. Kingsley Amis—who not only accepts the sovereignty of “lesser evils” but has recorded a prudent dislike of “an irrational capacity to become inflamed by interests and causes that are not of one’s own, that are outside oneself”¹⁰—who accordingly has the last word:

⁸ *The Fearful Choice: A Debate on Nuclear policy*, edited by Philip Toynbee, p. 103.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

¹⁰ *Socialism and the Intellectuals* (Fabian Society), p. 6.

I feel I would sooner be occupied by the Russians than atomized. But if that occupation meant being shot, or seeing my family die of starvation instead of radiation, I begin to feel a little less certain about that preference. But until I can be shown that the chance of a savage Russian occupation of the kind I have described is significantly less than the chance of being atomized, I'm prepared to see us going on as we are, horrible as that is. The risks of unilateral disarmament frighten me to roughly the same degree (it's impossible to be precise) as those of continuing inside the American bloc.¹¹

Here at last—if prudence is all—*The Fearful Choice* is confronted without evasions of any kind. Mr. Amis successfully sheds all interests and causes that are not one's own, that are outside oneself—and denies himself all illusory comforts. No wonder he is paralyzed.

Paralysis, in these circumstances, is a wholly appropriate state. It alone fully registers that openness to the facts that each prudent disputant is so anxious to claim as his own. And, facing the facts, it may find a way through. "Where does one go from a world of insanity? Somewhere on the other side of despair."

For the determined insobriety of these discussions may be traced back to the assumption that men can calculate the future to a far greater extent than they can. It is a fact absolutely essential to the working of both prudence and morality that "no man knows what another day will bring"; this fact is grossly underestimated by both sides of our dispute. George Kennan has said that he knows of no difficulties that we are in now that cannot be related to the policy of "unconditional surrender" in the last war. At the time, objections to that policy were purely "moral." But morality would have been long-term prudence. Short-term "prudence" that conflicts with morality is likely to be the most

imprudent thing in the world. People are blinded to this by having too much confidence that they can calculate the future. In this confidence, they talk in madder and madder styles. In fact, the policy of keeping nuclear weapons is a mixture of short-term "prudence" and dark passions.

Arthur Koestler once dramatized how prudence (or "expediency") is related to morals in the modern world. Reminding us how expediency has tended to get increasingly out of hand, till we are threatened with "a kind of radioactive decay of all values," he proceeds to describe "the express train of mankind's progress."

On this train expediency is the engine, morality the brake. The action of the two is always antagonistic. We cannot make an abstract decision in favor of one or the other. But we can make a temporary adjustment according to the train's progress. Two hundred years ago, during the train's laborious ascent from the stagnant marshes of feudal France towards the era of the Rights of Man, the decision would have been in favor of the engine and against the brake. Since about the second half of the nineteenth century our ethical brakes have been more and more neglected until the totalitarian dynamism made the engine run amok. We must apply the brake or we shall crash.¹²

One may have reservations about this image (expediency and morality are by no means "always antagonistic") but its very crudities are symptoms of the condition it describes. For it is precisely because Koestler has so urgently lived through tensions of this kind that his emerging absolutism is so impressive. His essay concludes:

I am not so sure whether what the philosophers call ethical absolutes exist, but I am sure that we have to

¹² "What the Modern World Is Doing to the Soul of Man," in *The Challenge of Our Time* (Percival Marshall, 1948), p. 19.

¹¹ *The Fearful Choice*, p. 52.

act as if they existed. Ethics must be freed from its utilitarian chain; words and deeds must again be judged by their own merits and not as mere makeshifts to serve distant and nebulous aims. These worm-eaten ladders lead to no paradise.

The debate on nuclear weapons we have reviewed does not concern itself with paradise, its aims are confined to the most modest requirements for decent survival, yet these basic human aims have come to appear as elusive and retreating as the objects of the most rampant Utopianism. For our train is now careering into wild and unknown landscapes, with its engine completely out of control. Perhaps we shall yet apply the brakes, to be jerked out of our calculated insanities.

The Gates of Hell

THE IMMEDIATE demand upon us is quite simple and final: *Thou shalt not murder*. But, whether we are Christians or unbelievers, this demand, here and now, seems a very hard saying indeed. Even if we are impelled to comply unconditionally with it, we continually relapse into trying to make conditions. It could hardly be otherwise. Its present implications are so total that only a correspondingly total readjustment could match it.

On the practical plane, it just is not enough to say: very well, let us try to insure that nobody will ever have occasion—or the opportunity—to use nuclear weapons, let us move towards international control. By all means let us try: nothing less will in fact do than a radically new international order—a unified world authority. But how can we hope to create such an order—how is this most intimate, authoritative unity to emerge out of mutual anathema and terror?

We cannot begin to imagine it. Two things are, however, certain. That it is not enough to say, let us try: in this

matter, we must succeed; and that success will be more a matter of *willing* the means, than of merely discovering what these means ought to be. I have argued that to will the means to peace in our situation is to be ready to bear very grave risks indeed (though we cannot, anyway, avoid very grave risks of one kind or another). In effect, we should have to be prepared for unilateral risk-taking (or the equivalent of unilateral risk-taking—whatever the diplomatic formalities) and so ultimately for non-violent resistance.

For not only is a hardboiled, genuinely *secure* disarmament agreement so remote in terms of facts as to be hardly more than a block to fresher thinking; once we have recognized that nuclear war is not merely a catastrophic menace, but a *wickedness*,

That tears shall drown the wind

—we shall no longer want to await such a sound bargain before we abjure it.

Even if we should want to (in tribute, perhaps, to our unflappable practical sense), we shall have to recognize that, morally, we are involved in wickedness as soon as, and so long as, we are, in the last resort, committed to sanction such deeds—and that support for “the deterrent” commits one in this way.

We have striven, in this book, to defend these propositions with as much rigor as we could achieve. We have tried to preserve an appropriate detachment where this seemed to be called for, and to confess our passionate involvement where we felt we ought to confess it.

In the end, it is not, however, by arguments or counter-arguments that this question will be decided—not, of course, because it has nothing to do with reason, but because reason cannot but be radically tempted to have nothing to do with it. With so much, so desperately, at stake, and not merely a “thought-barrier” to be broken through, but bar-

riers of the spirit even more challenging, what meaning can we give to "the other side of despair"?

For the writers of this book, the answer is, of course, a religious one. For Our Lord charges us: "Woe to the world because of scandals. For it must needs be that scandals come: but nevertheless woe to the man by whom the scandal cometh. And if thy hand or foot scandalize thee, cut it off and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to go into life maimed or lame, than having two hands or two feet, to be cast into everlasting fire." But it is this same Lord of whom we say: "I know that my Redeemer liveth." Much is asked, but: "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, do I give unto you. Let not your heart be troubled, nor let it be afraid." Our cares are great and grave, but they are circumscribed. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." We cannot but say "yes" to unconditional demands. Even our care for the Church herself is ultimately set a term to: it would not *be* the Church but for the promise accompanying its mission: "and behold I am with you always, even to the consummation of the world."

Where these things are believed, there should be no panic—and no perplexity. As regards the immediate decisions to be taken, the paralyzing calculus of lesser evils is displaced by a simple, challenging absolute. (This is not, of course, the end of decisions to be taken but the beginning—a precondition to any realistic response to what confronts us.) As regards the outcome of it all:

Teach us to care and not to care
Teach us to sit still.

We only know with certainty that no other response will do, and that the Gates of Hell will not prevail.

Can one, today, retain any sort of rational hope outside this Ark? Lord

Russell, in his *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, hopes "that some gleam of sanity may yet shine in the minds of statesmen. But the spread of power without wisdom is utterly terrifying, and I cannot much blame those whom it reduces to despair."¹³ There is a note in this book whose latent reverberations could be far more profound than any of his actual proposals. He considers the possibility that, soon, we shall for instance have the means to control climates and geography in such ways as to be able to flood, or starve out, an enemy. Whilst such measures, he says, are not yet within reach, there are others which "have lately entered the domain of feasible lunacy." Satellites should soon be able to "rain death upon enemy regions, while suspending this useful activity during their passage over friendly territory." And then there is the business of space travel. This might seem a feat of disinterested scientific adventure. "But I am afraid that it is from baser motives that governments are willing to spend the enormous sums involved in making space travel possible."

General Putt, in evidence before the House Committee on Armed Services, explained that the United States Air Force aims at establishing a missile base on the moon to the earth without an enormous expenditure of energy, since the moon has no atmosphere and little gravity. He declared that the moon "might provide a retaliation base of considerable advantage over earth-bound nations." He pointed out that an attack upon the moon by the U.S.S.R. would have to be launched a day or two before an attack upon the terrestrial United States if the United States was to be unable to retaliate from the moon. Such a preliminary attack upon the moon, he considered, would warn Americans of their danger. If, on the other hand, the Russians did not demolish the United States from lunar

¹³ P. 20.

installations, it would be possible, from these installations, to destroy Russia although the terrestrial United States had been obliterated.

When, Lord Russell, continues, it was pointed out that, in that case, Russia must be expected to pursue a similar course "the moral which he drew was that the United States must also occupy Mars and Venus which, apparently, he considers to be beyond the reach of the Soviets." Lord Russell concludes:

In reading of the plans of militarists, I try very hard to divest myself for the time being of the emotions of horror and disgust. But when I read of plans to defile the heavens by the petty squabbles of the animated lumps that disgrace a certain planet, I cannot but feel that the men who make these plans are guilty of a kind of impiety. It is easy to imagine a Congressional election, or a Soviet party dispute, turning on the question of whether Americans on the moon have exterminated the Russians there or vice versa. Such plans degrade the heavenly bodies and the majestic course of nature to the petty nature of furious men quarreling over trifles.¹⁴

"Trifles" or not, this surely is the only authentic human response to what we are being involved in; and does not a whole modern tradition reach out towards new awarenesses in this great skeptic's protest?—a cry as far removed from *The Conquest of Happiness* as Albany's avowal:

If that the heavens do not their visible spirits
Send quickly down to tame these vile offenses,
It will come,
Humanity must perforce prey on itself,
Like monsters of the deep

—is from Mephistopheles' reassurances to Faustus:

Why Faustus,
Thinkest thou heaven is such a glorious thing?
I tell thee, 'tis not half so fair as thou,
Or any man that breathes on earth.

Could it be that these grotesque "impieties" against man and nature might be re-awakening to a sense of that inviolable—but violated—*ought*, whose very absoluteness could point to (and indeed could help to make present) "somewhere on the other side of despair"?

It would ill become those of us who are Christians to pursue these possibilities further, in theoretical terms. There is much to be done to assist the process just hinted at. But only through what we ourselves *do*: not by arguing, but by bearing witness.

We are in any case forced to bear witness, here: first, simply to our humanity and obligations as men. There is no escape from this challenge. One rejects, or one accepts. One protests, or one condones.

Exactly the same holds on the other two levels at which our witness is required. Only, there is even more at stake. As individual Christians, what we thus do, or fail to do, cannot but be also an affirmation or denial of Our Lord. And by our individual behavior (no man can say this without awe) others will be helped or hindered in their own moral and spiritual endeavors. They will tend to judge the nature, the fruits and the reality of our Faith by our faith.

In the end, however, our individual Christian witness is essentially a part of the collective witness of the Church. (I speak, of course, as a Roman Catholic.) Whatever we do, or fail to do, is part of the Church's being. Pope, bishops, priests and laymen, *together* are the Church—through whom Christ is mediated to the world. Christ is present within the Church, especially within the Sacraments, irrespective of what any of us

¹⁴ *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, pp. 19-20.

may do. But what we do and what we are cannot but make the Church's presence harder or easier to *see*. At all times, therefore, we are bearing witness—well or not so well, helping or hindering the manifestation of Christ-within-the-Church.

Today, the world's uniquely urgent problems of war and peace call upon the Church's witness with corresponding urgency. The Church, in its very nature, has a special mission for peace: because, as a human society it commands vast loyalties through out the world, and because it is divine, headed by Christ himself. Its tradition on questions of war and peace reaches back to the Gospels themselves and only requires application to new circumstances and problems.

In principle, there is no reason why individual Catholics should not arrive at these applications for themselves (as we have sought to do in this book); indeed, they have a duty to do so, so far as they are able. Unfortunately, as experience has shown, there is in fact nearly as much confusion among the faithful, in this field, as there is outside the Church. This is perhaps understandable, in view of the immensely radical character of these problems and the enormous risks and sacrifices that are in question. Some of these confusions have been touched on at various points of this book.

But not even the long series of Papal and episcopal statements that have been traced in the previous chapter have sufficed to reduce the confusions to order. Many of these statements are extraordinarily impressive—and one might perhaps have expected that such formulations as Pope Pius XII's to the World Medical Association, of September 1954, and the French Hierarchy's statement of 1950, would be hard to reconcile with subsequent apologies—or silences—on nuclear weapons. But no adequate Catholic witness has emerged.

Perhaps only the most solemn, authoritative pronouncement will suffice to bring this about. And whilst individual members of the Church may, and should, bear witness individually and in groups, may we not hope and pray for such a pronouncement?

As we have seen, whatever defects there may be in merely prudential arguments for unilateral disarmament—even on this plane alone, the policy of "deterrence" can be proved absurd. Sometimes the exponents of this line of thought have allowed themselves to overplay their hand, as for instance, when they claim that the deterrent cannot even (within limits) be said to *deter*. More often, and more seriously, they have underestimated the alternative dangers that obsess apologists for nuclear weapons. And they rarely appreciate, with sufficient urgency, the sense in which unilateral disarmament can be held to involve the "graver"—because *more probable*—risk, even if nuclear war is agreed to be the "worse"—because even *more terrible*—risk if it should ever actually come to such a war. Nevertheless, their case is unanswerable in so far as it sets out to show: (i) that nuclear "deterrence" is *at best* a highly imperfect instrument of protection; (ii) that no military means at all can win for us the underlying "battle for minds"; (iii) that the implications of nuclear war are such that it could not, sanely, be chosen even in preference to the most appalling alternative; (iv) and that the uneasy "balance of terror" between such opponents can hardly fail to explode, sooner or later, into total nuclear war—even if neither side deliberately "chooses" to trigger it off.

This case suffices to prove the absurdity of "nuclear deterrence." Prudence itself cannot tolerate a posture so inadequate even in purely military terms, so impotent on the ideological plane, and so recklessly intemperate in its accepted

risks. Prudence itself once and for all disowns the sanity of such a "defense." And yet—as we also saw—the predicament is so extraordinary that there remains this counter-claim on behalf of present policies: that unilateral disarmament also is absurd. If it is reckless to accept the risks of a nuclear war, it is reckless to place the whole world at the mercy of communism. (i) Nuclear deterrence may not give us full security, but it does give protection within limits, and it is all the protection we have; (ii) only by employing it can we hope to gain time, to win the "battle for minds"; (iii) even if a communist triumph were agreed to be the "lesser evil," as compared with a nuclear war, it is nevertheless so appalling as to render its deliberate acceptance absurd; (iv) and, whilst the prevailing "balance of terror" might, with luck and good management, be prolonged without an explosion, unilateral disarmament could hardly fail to result in a communist domination.

Each case establishes the absurdity of the other; so that neither can establish the expediency of its own. Where everything is reduced to absurdity, some absurdities may be more absurd than others, but degrees of absurdity can hardly form a basis for rational choice. The two sets of arguments do not exactly cancel out, but the main effect of confronting them with each other is to paralyze their respective force. Once this nightmarish stalemate of inexpedencies is faced, expediency may be ready to abandon its sovereign pretensions, and—acknowledging its natural human limits—return to its own subordination to moral law.

But is it not merely that absolute morality thus lays claim to the renewed allegiance of those who had long supposed it dead? Its immediate challenge is such that only faith—absolute, beyond all human calculations, a faith that can

move fear—can summon the resources to meet its demands. By its unconditional preclusion of total war—and, equally, the hypothetical readiness to engage in such a war—morality transcends the apparent stalemate of "necessary evils" and redeems the alternative course from absurdity. But it is *only* in the light of faith that this alternative can itself give ground for rational hope.

At bottom, therefore, the challenge transcends not only prudence, but morality as well: to Christians it is a challenge to their faith; to unbelievers, to their unbelief. For, just as this radical, total challenge pushes Morals Without Religion (a perfectly legitimate commitment within its limits) to a point where it must either delude itself, or despair, or itself be totally transcended by faith, so faith is compelled to take stock of its own reality, asking itself whether it dares pronounce the promise that the Gates of Hell shall not prevail, while preparing to massacre the innocent in defense of the things of God. It is just because this converging double challenge, to Christians and non-Christians alike, is so ultimate and inescapable that it contains within its desperate appeal the hope of things that could, literally, be wonderful.

Unconditional disarmament would only be the first step. Measures like those outlined by Sir Stephen King-Hall would acquire an essential added dimension by a revival of Western religious energies. So would adequate aid to the hungry countries of the world. Without this religious dimension, non-violent resistance seems doomed. But the more the Church stands to lose, humanly speaking, by committing herself, and her mission, to these dangers, the more clearly her existence will be seen as a divine fact. The future may then safely be left to God. Pharaoh's armies may be close upon us and the sea extend before our feet, but we know that our Redeemer liveth.

THE NEW NEGRO IN THE SOUTH

STEPHEN J. WRIGHT

THE SOUTH is changing with such rapidity that it is scarcely an exaggeration to refer to what is happening as a revolution—a revolution with many interrelated causes and effects. This section of our nation is becoming rapidly industrialized, rapidly unionized, and rapidly urbanized. These significant changes are having a profound effect upon its politics, its economy, and its racial problems. Cold statistics, however accurate, cannot begin to tell the whole story. Of the changes now in process, the most dramatic are those involving the racial situation—changes which are also destined to have far-reaching effects upon both the economy and the politics of the region. The changes in the racial situation are being attributed, in some quarters, to what is referred to as the “New Negro” in the South.

I shall attempt to present the background from which this “New Negro” emerged, to define and describe him, to suggest some of the principal factors which gave rise to his birth, and to predict something of the impact he will have upon the future development of the region and of the nation.

The “Old” South

ONE cannot understand the New Negro in the South without understanding something of the South itself. “The South,” as used hereafter, refers to the eleven states of the old Confederacy:

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Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas. These are the states in which the great majority of Negroes have lived¹ and which most effectively and systematically enacted their prejudices and their ideas concerning the inferiority of the Negro into law. These are likewise the states which have buttressed their laws with customs which frequently go beyond the law.² The combined effect of these laws and customs resulted in a tight, caste-like system of segregation and discrimination which abridged or denied the Negro's right to vote; guaranteed him inferior schools; denied him equal protection under the laws; deprived him of equal employment opportunities; excluded him from public eating places, hotels, places of amusement, and most hospitals; and segregated him on trains, buses, and street cars. On the other hand, the system did not exclude him from paying taxes or from defending his country in time of war.³

For the Negro, it was a system from which there was no escape. Color was the insurmountable wall. Many of the most successful politicians of the region built and sustained their careers on their solemn and vehement promises to maintain the system at *all costs*. The system became a cornerstone of the “southern

¹ Approximately 9,600,000, or 52 per cent of the Negroes in the United States live in these states. In 1950, 60 per cent; in 1930, 71 per cent.

² Border states such as Maryland, West Virginia, and Missouri have had a less comprehensive system of segregation and discrimination and one not as rigidly enforced.

³ The term “system” as used refers to the total complex of laws, customs, and methods of enforcement of segregation and discrimination in the South.

way of life." The white children were taught its articles of faith and the bitterest reprisals were reserved for those—white or Negro—who sought to change it, or who violated any of its important laws or customs. This, of course, explains why the lynching of Negroes went unpunished; why Negroes who committed crimes against white persons received excessive punishment; why congressmen who failed to sign the "Southern Manifesto" placed their political careers in jeopardy; why the white parents who attempted to send their children to desegregated schools in New Orleans were driven out of the city; and why a bus bearing "Freedom Riders" could be burned in Alabama without police interference.

Such a system could be maintained only by force, or by the constant threat of force, and with the consent and support of the great majority of the white people of the region. Until very recent years, and mainly since 1954, even the organized Church gave the system its silent support.

The legal victories in such areas as voting, education, and transportation, and the desegregation of the lunch counters, which have followed in the wake of the student demonstrations, have weakened the system, but its essential philosophy and much of its framework have remained unchanged.

It should be pointed out, however, that there have been, through the years, islands where the system was less rigidly enforced, as well as a few courageous southern whites who have spoken out against aspects of the system, and, in rare instances, against the total system. The number of such persons is very gradually increasing.

The "Old Negro" in the South

ONE cannot understand the New Negro in the South without under-

standing the Old Negro of the South, for the New Negro did not spring into existence suddenly; nor did he spring into existence as a totally "New" Negro.

While the Negro in the South has always wanted for himself and his children the same freedom and opportunity which other Americans enjoy, he has not always sought to achieve this by direct, organized pressure. In fact, he has not always been in a position to employ such means, although abortive insurrections for freedom, led by such men as Mark Vesey and Nat Turner, occurred even during the period of slavery.

There were three principal reasons why the Old Negro in the South could not employ organized pressure to secure his rights and privileges as a citizen:

1. He was, in the main, a tenant farmer, an unskilled laborer, a domestic servant—incredibly poor and very largely uneducated.

2. He had nothing approaching responsible police protection. In fact, almost any white person who chose to without penalty, self-deputized officers do so (and many did) could become, to see that he stayed in "his place." As Cash has pointed out, the southern Negro became almost open game when the courts were returned to Southern hands following the Reconstruction:

In many districts, particularly in by a white man ceased, in practice, the deep South, the killing of a Negro even to call for legal inquiry. But wherever and whenever the forms were observed, the coroner or the jury was all but sure to call it "self-defense," or "justifiable homicide" and to free the slayer with celerity. And if any black was fantastic enough to run to the court house for redress for a beating or any other wrong, he stood a good chance (provided he was heard at all) not only of seeing his assailant go scot-free, but of finding the onus somehow shifted to himself, or of finding himself in the dock on some other count, and of ending by

going to a chain gang at the mercies of persons hand-picked for their skill in adjusting his sense of reality.⁴

3. He had few leaders who commanded his or anyone else's respect. From about 1896, when he made his famous Atlanta Exposition Speech, until his death in 1915, Booker T. Washington was, without doubt, the single most powerful Negro leader the South had known. During the period when the southern Negro was being systematically disenfranchised, Washington advocated, with almost irresistible eloquence, that the Negro devote his efforts and his energies to educating and improving himself, and urged him to trust the southern white man to grant him his civil rights when he deserved them. "The great thing," counselled Washington, "is to conduct ourselves so as to become worthy of the privileges of an American citizen, and these privileges will come." Many Negroes came to believe Washington's teachings.

Thus, deprived of the vote, largely uneducated, having very few militant and informed leaders (W. E. B. Du Bois was one of the conspicuous exceptions), and denied equal protection under the law, the Negro in the South, in the main, developed survival accommodations and participated in what Doyle has called the "etiquette of race relations in the South"—i.e., a code of behavior consistent with the caste-like restrictions which the customs and laws of the region imposed upon him.⁵ He tended to put his faith in good race relations, which meant not disturbing the status quo to the point of reprisals, and such gains as he achieved were made by saying what the white southerner wanted to hear and by frequently acting the role the white southerner wanted to see. In

so doing, the Old Negro of the South helped to perpetuate the stereotype or image in which the white South wanted to believe and which it needed in order to justify the laws and customs which constituted its system of segregation and discrimination.

This, then, is the Negro the white South "understands." The fact is, that he no longer exists. In reality, he never existed.

Both the "etiquette" and the strategies employed by the southern Negro changed as the "logistics" of the situation changed. Following World War I, the Negro newspapers, as organs of protest, gained stature; the *Crisis*, the organ of the NAACP under the dynamic editorship of DuBois, stepped up its crusade against lynchings; the NAACP, as an organization, became strong enough to begin what was to become a systematic and highly successful attack on both the legal foundations of the southern system and the more flagrant reprisals used against Negroes to sustain the system; the separate but "equal" educational system improved; the decay of southern tenancy progressed more rapidly than was evident to anyone except the scholars; thousands of Negroes migrated to the North; Booker T. Washington's counsel was being repudiated by the new leaders; the economic position of the Negro improved slowly but surely; a young lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, forced the University of Maryland, in 1935, to admit a Negro, Donald Murray, to its law school; the principle of equal salaries for Negro teachers was established by the federal courts; the Supreme Court ruled that the state of Missouri had only the alternative of admitting Lloyd Gaines, a Negro, to its law school at the University of Missouri, or of providing an equal one for him within the state; and "graduate" schools for Negroes in the state-supported col-

⁴ W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South*.

⁵ See: Betram W. Doyle, *The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South*.

leges in the South mushroomed following the Gaines decision. The development of these "graduate" schools was designed to prevent Negroes from applying for admission to the white schools of the South.

World War II came, with its unprecedented demand for manpower, and before peace was declared, Negroes had been admitted to all branches of the armed services, and Executive Order 8802, laying the basis for FEPC legislation, had been signed.

The foregoing developments had been made possible largely by Negro protests, and by their legal and political action. In the process, the Negro had gained new friends and new allies. He had also learned, in the process, that almost no one could help him if he did not press for his own cause, but that many could and would help him fight for his rights as a citizen.

By the end of World War II, the southern Negro was not a "New Negro," but he was significantly different from the Negro who was disenfranchised following the Reconstruction; he was different from the Negro who began, following World War I, to learn that the world had not been "made safe for democracy"; he was also different from the Negro who put his faith in good race relations in the belief that, as he became a competent citizen, the rights and privileges of citizenship would be conferred upon him. Also by the end of World War II, more than a million tenant farmers, with their dependence upon white landlords, left the farm.

The Birth of the New Negro

CONTRARY to popular opinion, the New Negro in the South was not born with the student demonstrations in 1960. If an actual date could be set, the evidence would tend to place it

about 1945, and certainly between 1945 and 1950.

One of the things which gave rise to the New Negro in the South was the slowness and resistance with which the southern white responded to the Negro's representations for first-class citizenship. This slowness and resistance made the Negro impatient. For example, it took four years and a great deal of money to have the Supreme Court declare illegal the white primary which excluded Negroes from voting. It took three more years to have the same court strike down the cynical device adopted by Texas and seven other states to confer upon the Executive Committee of the Democratic Committees in the South what amounted to the right to exclude Negroes from voting. Moreover, it took approximately four years from the time that the first desegregation case was filed in Clarendon County, South Carolina, to secure a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1954 which outlawed segregation in the public schools. Finally, the slowness of the "all deliberate speed" with which the decision was carried out merely added to the Negro's impatience.

During the war, the nation had experienced a revival of idealism, a new concern for the extension of the great blessings and promises of democracy to all. A war fought to preserve the Four Freedoms, could not, in fairness, exclude Negroes. It was a climate of opinion in which Negro protests could be heard. In the North, some conspicuous gains in employment and housing had been made. Discrimination in most hotels and many places of amusement was disappearing. The southern Negro was aware of these gains.

The South, on the other hand, sought with its usual resourcefulness to maintain its "way of life." The educational system for Negroes continued to be unequal; voting rights in the deep South

continued to be abridged or denied; exclusion from the overwhelming majority of the white-collar jobs continued as a studied policy, the major exception being teaching in Negro schools; and segregation in transportation was substantially unchanged. In other words, the system was substantially what it was in 1930, or even earlier. In some states like Mississippi and Alabama, it was substantially what it was in 1900! But the Negro of the South was different. By this time, he had learned three bitter lessons:

1. That the white South would never voluntarily dismantle the Jim Crow system. On the contrary, it would at all costs, through legislation, legal conventions, and reprisals, where necessary, seek to preserve it.

2. That no substantial changes in his status and relationships would ever result from good race relations as they were conceived in the South, and that the time would never come when he would, in the mind of the white South, be "ready" to have the rights and privileges of full citizenship conferred upon him.

3. That the only effective way to change his status was to employ with vigor and imagination the instruments of pressure: the courts, the vote, his economic power, and protests of a variety of types and, further, that any leader who counselled otherwise had outlived his usefulness.

In other words, the system of Jim Crow had come to be understood for what it was, and with that knowledge it was realized that new and more effective means were now needed to achieve the long-denied, cherished ends of full citizenship. When these lessons were learned, the "New Negro" of the South was born.

The new approaches, the new means to old ends were heard from platforms all over the South from a wide variety

of leaders, and they were read in Negro newspapers, in books and in articles written by Negroes. The disparities which existed between the Negro's situation and the opportunities to which he, in a democracy, was entitled, were set forth with irrefutable accuracy.⁶ Even the ends were more clearly stated. Dr. Harry V. Richardson, the president of Gammon Theological Seminary, speaking before a Negro organization in Atlanta, stated them as clearly as any one:

He [the Negro] wants every Southern child to be able to live and grow and learn in the South, without having the stigma of inferiority stamped on his skin or burned into his soul.

He wants the right to secure any kind of work of which he is capable, without being denied because of his skin.

He wants access to every public privilege, or service to which as a citizen he is entitled, without having to crawl in through the back doors or behind screens like an outcast or a dog.

He wants an American's participation in the processes of his government, receiving all rights and bearing all responsibilities.

This is what he wants, this is all he wants and he believes under God this is fair.

Not only does the New Negro want these things. He wants them now!

As the New Negro began to apply his new means, the effects began to be felt. In the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, voting registration increased from 595,000 in 1947 to more than 1,238,000 in 1956. By 1960, they had increased another 28,000.⁷ In brief, the number of registrants more than doubled. More

⁶ See such works as: J. Saunders Redding, *On Being Negro*; Carl Rowan, *South of Freedom and Go South to Sorrow*; Walter White, *How Far the Promised Land?*; Richard Wright, *Listen White Man, Race and Color*, and the Year Book issues of the *Journal of Negro Education*.

⁷ Margaret Price. *The Negro Voter in the South*. Atlanta: The Southern Regional Council.

significant than the increase, in a sense, was the fact that the increase was achieved over intimidations which included violence, threats, and economic reprisals, as well as involved discriminatory tactics. The effect of the increase in voting could be seen in the election of Negroes to city councils in places like Richmond, Greensboro, and Nashville, and in the election of Dr. Rufus E. Clement, president of Atlanta University, to the Atlanta Board of Education, although in the latter case, votes other than those of Negroes played a significant role. The increased use of the ballot has had two discernible effects:

1. In states where the largest numbers of Negroes vote, the arch segregationist candidates for public office are having a difficult time winning elections, and this is encouraging the more moderate politicians to speak out with more courage with respect to Negro rights. The recent federal elections in Tennessee are cases in point.

2. The success with the ballot is doubtless encouraging even more Negroes to vote.

But it has been in the struggle for equal educational opportunity that the application of new means and new methods has been most spectacular. The new means began with a rash of cases filed in federal district courts for equal facilities. The NAACP received more requests for legal assistance than it could provide. Furthermore, each city, each county or district was a separate case. Unfortunately, the cases were being handled within the framework of the separate but equal doctrine. In 1950, however, the NAACP wisely decided to deal with the fundamental issue: the legality of segregation in the public school, the real cause of the inequality. Clarendon County in South Carolina in 1951 became the first such case to be filed. The system was under attack and reprisals

began almost immediately. Bank mortgages on the homes and farms of the participants were called; shotguns were fired into Negro homes; Negro homes were set afire in the dead of night. But not a single Negro parent withdrew his child from the list of plaintiffs. This is an example of the New Negro which can be multiplied many times in a number of different situations where the instruments of pressure—the vote, the courts, the boycott, the protest—are being used, in the face of reprisals, to attack the system.

What is the New Negro like? Is he only the educated Negro? How does he differ from the Negro prior to 1945? A few examples will help to provide answers to these questions. Many white southerners pretend to believe that the new militancy of Negroes is caused by northern or outside agitators. This is nonsense. The incident involving Spottswood W. Robinson, III, now Dean of the Law School at Howard University and a member of the Civil Rights Commission, but at that time (1951) an NAACP lawyer practicing in Richmond, Virginia, suggests the truth:

Robinson went with some trepidation to a meeting of Prince Edward County Negro parents to tell them, as he put it, that the NAACP had decided to "hit segregation head on and no longer fool around with the separate-but-equal business. . . . I took great pains, and I will readily confess that perhaps I belabored the question in pointing out why we felt this was necessary. I told them that if they were not ready to make the decision immediately, they could go home and think it over and then come to another meeting to decide."

A father in the rear of the church rose to ask, "I have one question. As I understand the position of the NAACP, it is impossible for our children to get equality so long as we have segregation. Is that correct?"

"Yes, sir," answered Robinson.

The parent looked quietly at Rob-

inson and told him, "Well, we have known that in this county for a long time, and we have been simply waiting for you and the NAACP to find out the same thing."⁸

The Montgomery bus boycott grew out of an incident involving the refusal of Mrs. Rose Parks, a seamstress, to relinquish her bus seat to a white passenger. Her action was not suggested by any "outsider" or northern "agitator."

This boycott illustrates several characteristics of the New Negro. For more than a year, the old and the young, the educated and the uneducated, boycotted the buses. When other transportation was not available, they walked. The boycott could not have been successful without discipline, cooperation, and sacrifice on the part of many. One of the most poignant and illustrative stories to come out of the Montgomery bus boycott involved an elderly Negro woman trudging along with obvious difficulty. One of the pool drivers stopped beside her and said, "Jump in, grandmother. You don't need to walk." She waved him on. "I'm not walking for myself," she explained. "I'm walking for my children and my grandchildren."⁹

The Montgomery bus boycott was an attack upon the southern system and in conformity with the pattern, it drew reprisals, including the bombing of the home of Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the movement. Again, the reprisals were met with fortitude and courage by leaders and followers alike.

Few instances of courage and poise exceed that exhibited by the Negro children who attended the Central High School in Little Rock in the face of daily heckling and threatened mob violence which finally required the use of army troops.

⁸As quoted in Walter White, *How Far the Promised Land?*, p. 47.

⁹Martin Luther King, Jr., *Stride Toward Freedom*, p. 61.

The Tuskegee boycott grew out of the effort of the state of Alabama to gerrymander Negroes out of the town of Tuskegee, fearing their potential voting strength. Many of the Negroes involved were the educated members of the staff of Tuskegee and the nearby veteran's hospital. In addition to boycotting the Tuskegee merchants, they fought the state of Alabama through to the Supreme Court of the United States and won a clear-cut victory. The case illustrates the disciplined and skillful use of two instruments of pressure—the economic and the legal.¹⁰

The enormous increase in NAACP membership in the South is another example of aroused concern.

The foregoing example illustrates the character of the New Negro of the South:

1. He represents no particular class;
2. He is confident that he can, by the use of the instruments of pressure, improve his status;
3. He is willing to make serious sacrifices in order to do so;
4. He is, for the most part, led by intelligent and courageous individuals, vastly different from the "Uncle Toms" of former years, prominent among them being the educated young minister and especially the lawyer.¹¹

The Student Demonstrations

IN THE late winter of 1960, the "sit-in" demonstrations exploded in a climate of opinion which was ripe and which almost guaranteed their success from the

¹⁰For an interesting account of the setting of the Tuskegee boycott and the legal aspects of the gerrymander case, see the articles entitled: "Gomillion versus Lightfoot," in the June 10 and 17, 1961, issues of *The New Yorker*.

¹¹Thurgood Marshall is so popular among Negroes that Arna Bontemps has labeled him a "folk-hero." See Arna Bontemps, *100 Years of Negro Freedom*.

outset. Since those demonstrations have perhaps been the best reported effort in the Negro's long struggle for equality, I shall not attempt to review in any detail what has happened, but rather to analyze what has happened.

Whether the demonstration is a lunch counter "sit-in," a theatre line "stand-in," a pool "wade-in," or a "Freedom Ride," the activity involves essentially one or more students exercising some right or privilege which he, in the South, is denied either by law or custom solely because of his race. This means that the demonstration is a direct attack on the southern Jim Crow system, and since it is, the student is exposed immediately to the standard southern method of dealing with such violators—the reprisal. The fact that the violator is a neat, courteous, non-violent college student makes little difference to those who are responsible for law and order.¹²

Shortly after the demonstrations began, those responsible for law and order made three serious mistakes:

1. They arrested the students, in mass, under a variety of charges: loitering, trespassing, disturbing the peace, conspiracy to obstruct trade and commerce, etc. (Most of these charges would not stand up in a fair court of record.¹³)
2. They allowed the white hoodlums to beat up or otherwise molest the demonstrators without, in most cases, even the penalty of arrest.
3. The governors, or in some instances, state boards of education, expelled or threatened to expel participating stu-

dents who were enrolled in state colleges.¹⁴

The immediate effect of these actions was that of cementing the Negro adult community in support of the students—adults from all classes. In Nashville, for example, the cementing of the adult community was expressed in a number of ways:

1. The ten Negro lawyers in the city contributed their services in defending the students;
2. In one afternoon, bond in the amount of \$40,000 was posted;
3. A boycott of downtown stores was conducted, lasting for more than a month and almost 100 per cent effective.

This latter activity, as in the majority of instances, was decisive in the opening of the lunch counters.

Conducting the demonstrations with a courageous, non-violent approach, usually with a willingness to serve jail sentences, the students have not only frustrated those responsible for "law and order," but they have, in my judgment, achieved the following results:

1. Advertised to the nation and indeed to the world the ridiculousness of the southern Jim Crow system and have helped to create a climate and a sentiment essential to the solution of this deep-seated problem.
2. Provided the nation and especially the South with a much more accurate image of the southern Negro, and particularly the young southern Negro.
3. Provided themselves with leadership training of value—immeasurable training which no institution could provide.
4. Demonstrated that direct pressure can be a powerful factor in accelerating changes in the racial situation in the South.

¹²It should be understood that the New Negro of the South also includes small groups who would achieve their ends by more drastic techniques. Examples would include the Black Muslims. (See Eric Lincoln's *Black Muslims* and Julian Mayfield's "Challenge to Negro Leadership," *Commentary*, April, 1961.)

¹³These cases have, in the main, been handled in police courts.

¹⁴To date some forty Negro students have been expelled from state-supported institutions for Negroes for participation in student demonstrations.

5. Opened, with the help of the Negro adult community and liberal whites, lunch counters in some twenty-eight southern cities and counties.

6. Aroused the southern conscience on racial issues especially where the organized Church is concerned.

7. Inspired many of their tired and disillusioned elders to rededicate themselves to the cause with new vigor.

It should be made clear, however, that student demonstrations cannot be a panacea for the racial ills of the South. They can never be an adequate substitute for responsible adult civic participation and action: intelligent voting, the use of the courts, the intelligent use of economic power, and the giving of effect to the new gains. It should also be pointed out that as impressive as the student demonstrators' achievements are, the power structure of the South is still very much intact and, until it is changed or its attitudes radically modified, the major problems of voting, equal employment opportunity, equal access to housing, the schools, hospitals, and hotels will remain in the realm of unsolved problems.

Nothing that I have said, however, alters the fact that the student demonstrators are a significant and dynamic part of the New Negro in the South. They are near the voting age and are destined to become a part of a great reservoir of intelligent and courageous leadership, sensitive and dedicated to problems confronting Negroes in the South. In the long run, this latter point may become even more important than their achievements to date.

The Negro student demonstrations also focused attention on the Negro college student generally, and on the role that education is playing in developing the New Negro in the South. Negro institutions of higher learning in the region enroll more than seventy thousand

students, and their education includes an understanding of America "as a civilization" and a way of life as well as their duties and responsibilities as citizens. When twenty-seven students of Fisk University were arrested in February of 1960 for engaging in sit-in demonstrations, as president of the University, I issued the following statement to the press which reflects something of the spirit of the Negro college of the South, especially the *private* college:

As president of the University, I approve the ends our students are seeking by these demonstrations. From all I have been able to learn, they have broken no law by the means they have employed thus far, and they have not only conducted themselves peaceably, but with poise and dignity. As long as this is true, I have no present intention of instructing them to discontinue their efforts. The point at issue, it seems to me, is not how to stop their efforts but rather to find better alternative ways to end segregation in the public eating places of the city. . . .

I would hope sincerely that the constructive citizens of our community would seek ways by which this can be accomplished. After all, these are fine young citizens who, in their post-college years, will make significant contributions to the nation. Moreover, they have been exposed, all their lives, to the teachings of the great American scriptures of democracy, freedom and equality, and no literate person should be surprised that they reflect these teachings in their conduct. In the meantime, it is my hope that they will receive the sympathetic understanding of our community and the responsible protection of the police.

In other words, the education Negroes have received is doing for the Negro what education of the right type has always done for people, i.e., it has given them a sense and an appreciation of freedom.

Effect of the New Negro on the South and the Nation

THE New Negro in the South, with his new instruments of pressure, his increasing self-confidence, and a new leadership which is *earning* the right to lead, will inevitably make significant changes in his status, despite the stiffening resistance of the white South. In assuming his new posture, he has placed himself in a position to be helped a great deal more by both the "moderate" and the liberal white southerner, as well as by many others who understand the national and international significance of the stakes involved in the struggle.

In addition to the official white South which enforces the laws and customs of the region, there are many concerned white southerners who labor against heavy odds to hasten the day when equality of opportunity will be accorded all citizens of the region. Many of these individuals are members and supporters of the Southern Regional Council and its state and local affiliates. The Council, which is thoroughly interracial, is one of the most constructive and effective organizations working in the field of race relations. Its monthly periodical, *New South*, together with its special studies and releases constitute what is, in my opinion, the most accurate and extensive current information on racial problems in the South. Examples of its studies include *The Negro Voter in the South*, one of the best sources of information on the subject, and their excellent and widely quoted report prepared for President Kennedy entitled *The Federal Executive and Civil Rights*. The report states (and documents) that the President holds power under the Constitution and existing statutes which, if used, "could carry the country far toward good race relations." The influence of the Council and its affiliates is enormous.

The majority of the white Churches in the South have now, through their denominational organizations, condemned segregation and discrimination. A number of city ministerial associations have done likewise. Unfortunately, however, examples of positive action by local churches are very difficult to find.

In addition to the leavening that will come from within the South, the fact that the peoples of the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and South America are gaining their freedom and self-respect has already begun to have its reverberations in the South.

The Communists' exploitation of the American racial paradox will also have its effect. The federal government's new emphasis on civil rights, with the new laws of 1957 and 1960, will undoubtedly increase the New Negro's use of the ballot. Likewise, the federal government's interest in seeing that the Negro has a fair chance to secure equal employment opportunities where government contracts are involved will improve his economic status.

The education of the Negro in the South will improve beyond any question, and no one can predict the magnitude of the long-run effect of this education.

If the foregoing factors and forces run their expected courses, we can, I think predict the following with reasonable certainty:

1. That with the coming of the unlimited right to vote, the New Negro in the South will help to retire from public service the racial demagogues who build their political careers on the exploitation of the racial situation and who, in the process, sow seeds of hate which may some day reap a bitter harvest.
2. That with better economic and educational opportunities, the New Negro in the South will do much to help raise the economic level of the South. The system has forced large numbers of Ne-

groes to be a part of the problem of poverty in the South, rather than a part of the answer to its eradication. The long relief rolls and much of the petty crime which characterize the Negro ghettos are direct products of the system.

3. That the nation will be the beneficiary of the talents and genius of many thousands of young Negroes who, under the system, either fail to be developed or atrophy. This is a luxury which this nation in these demanding times cannot afford.

The speed with which these predictions will occur will depend upon a number of factors which no one can accurately assess, the principal ones being:

1. *The role the federal government will play.* The government has, in the cases of Little Rock and Montgomery, interfered with the South's use of the violent reprisal. If it continues to do so, the New Negro will be able to continue to exercise the processes of democracy to improve his status.

2. *The attitude of northern businesses operating in the South.* Southern business is almost inextricably interwoven with Northern business. In 1957, for example, *The Nation* pointed out that National Cash Register had 150 sales and service outlets in the South with some 2,300 salesmen; that the Prudential Life Insurance Company had 245 southern sales offices with approximately 5,000 employees.¹⁵ In addition, chain stores like Woolworth, Sears Roebuck, and many others have branches or outlets in the region. *The New Republic* calls attention to the situation in Birmingham:

More than any other city in the South, Birmingham is dominated by Northern capital. It is not a Southern city at all in terms of control or culture. It is the city of U. S. Steel, of

those who play the game Steel's way, and good race relations have never been an apparent concern to Steel. Backing from Steel and the financial powers of Birmingham for (Bull) Conner, for the brilliant racist and former governor, Frank M. Dixon, and for former Congressman Laurie Battle (who played on prejudice with evangelical fervor in his 1959 effort against Senator John Sparkman) has kept race a throbbing issue. . . .

What about the Birmingham Press? The morning *Post-Herald* has long been a member of the Scripps-Howard chain, based in the North, and the afternoon *News* was sold by local owners not long ago to Newhouse, another Yankee chain publisher. What is the stand of these Northern-owned newspapers on segregation? It could not be more faithful to Southern segregationist tradition.

Who's to blame for the shame of Birmingham? The people who live there, and the elected officials, local and state, who wink, and the law, of course. *But behind them run lines of economic and political power straight into New York, Washington and other cities.* [Emphasis supplied.] The belief is inescapable that if the men at the other ends of these lines were to act with courage and in terms of the highest moral and national interest, they could improve things in Birmingham.¹⁶

The problem extends far beyond Birmingham. The reported discrimination against Negroes in the Lockheed plant at Marietta, Georgia, with a large one million dollar government contract, is but another example.

3. *National public opinion.* There are those who hold, and many are in the North, that the Negro should not push the issue, that he faces the danger of alienating his "friends" or potential "friends." The Negro and those who understand the issues at stake must inform the larger public that if the issue

¹⁵ *The Nation*, October 12, 1957, p. 234.

¹⁶ Quoted in *New South*, July-August, 1960, p. 8.

is not pushed, nothing happens except a continuation of the system; that unless the "time" for which the white southerners plead so eloquently is actually used by them to make constructive changes, it has no healing virtue. As Gordon W. Allport points out: "The world is too small, too crowded, too perilous, and too rapidly changing to permit further temporizing with bigotry and discrimination!"¹⁷

4. *The emergence of a new southern leadership.* There are leaders in the South who recognize the incalculable damage the system does to whites and Negroes alike, as well as to the nation in the eyes of the rest of the world. They recognize also the ultimate futility of the effort to defend it and the hypocrisy which its defense involves. The question is, when will a new crop of political

and business leaders begin to make these facts their platform?

Take any group of human beings and provide them with inferior education; deny them the right to vote; deny them equal job opportunities; force them to live in ghettos; and exclude them from hotels, public eating places, and even hospitals; and, developed under such conditions, they will scarcely be able to compete as first-class citizens, unless they are supermen.

The Negro of the South has lived under these conditions for nearly one hundred years and he is seeking, in constructive ways, to change them. One cannot be exposed to the great American dream and not seek to become a part of that dream. In seeking to become a part of that dream, the Negro of the South helps to make that dream come true, not only for himself, but for the South and for the nation, and he deserves the help of both.

¹⁷ Quoted in *The Christian Century*, May 24, 1961.

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THE MESSIAH OF ISRAEL

ANDRÉ CHOURAQUI

MASHIAH: the Lord's Anointed, the princely carrier of grace and of power, the one by whom the boundary line between the uncreated eternal and his creation is abolished, who restores the glory of the real order of the world. Israel's oldest tradition puts the Messiah at the source and at the terminus of the creative act. "And the spirit of the Lord glided over the face of the waters. What is the spirit of the Lord?—The Messiah King is the spirit of the Lord who glided over the face of the waters on the first day of creation." This text of Bereshith Rabbah reveals the knowledge which the rabbis had of the Son of Man, of the one in whom the psalmist recognized the *Bechor*, the first-born son.

He is prior to the act of creation, but He is also the end of creation. The angels, we know, were opposed to the creation of man. Why would the All-Powerful compromise the peace of the kingdom by this glaring error, whose sin was to disrupt the harmony of the structure? The All-Knowing could say nothing in reply to the angelic hosts. But he took advantage of a moment of inattention on their part, on the eve of the Sabbath, to mold Adam and Eve from a clod of earth. "Why have you acted so?" "For the love of the Messiah,

for whom I have created the world." In this way the Creator accepts worlds of suffering for the love and triumph of the Son of Man.

The Messiah is present at the heart of the life and thought of men. From its first verses, the Bible reveals to us the world's structures: the creative act snatches non-being from its eternities and inserts multiplicity there. The first day—the single day, says the Bible—enjoins the confrontation of the heavens and of the earth, of the darkness on the mouth of the abyss, and of the spirit of God on the face of the water. The free act of God, in his word from eternity, opens the drama by letting light flash in the bosom of darkness. *Yehi Or*, let there be light. The first day is announced like the succession of dusk and of dawn, of night and of light: a unique day, *Yom Ehad*, the day of unity, one could equally well translate it.

From that time on a covenant is inscribed in the nature of things. The commentators of the ancient Text used to point out that the word covenant, *Berith*, had the same etymology as the verb to create, *Bara*. Grammarians today have other explanations. But it remains no less true that there is a singular bond between the Creator and the Creature and that in this bond lies the foundation of every union. By setting the liturgy of creation in motion, the Creator had a share in the "work of his hands"; by placing the creation at the head of its chapters the Bible is already the book of the Covenant.

The rabbis analyze the hierarchies of the covenant identically with those of the days of creation, namely by placing them in pyramidal order.

André Chouraqui, president of the *Union pour la culture hébraïque*, published this article in a special issue on *Judaism of LUMIÈRE ET VIE* (2, place Gailleton, Lyon, France, bi-monthly, \$5), No. 47 (1958). He is the author of *L'ÉTAT D'ISRAËL, HISTOIRE DU JUDAÏSME, LE CANTIQUE DES CANTIQUES*, and translator of the 11th century work of Behai ben Joseph ibn Bakodi, *INTRODUCTION AUX DEVOIRS DES CŒURS*.

The largest base, creation as a whole, has as one of its partners the Lord who permits it to work; it is the academic covenant, concerning which *Genesis* is quiet, but which springs forth from the text with relentless power, as the later commentators do not fail to point out. The law of this covenant is the law of life: *Peru u'rbu*, increase and multiply. All of reality is here a sign of this Covenant and of this law, prior to death and at the source of being and of life.

The second stage of the Covenant is clearly the Covenant with Noah. The fall of Adam and his expulsion from Eden consummates the work of death. After the deluge it is fitting to repurchase what remains and to quicken it by integrating it in the harmony of a Covenant which reunites it to the Living. Humanity as a whole is implicated in this; each man participates in the sacrifice offered by Noah and can see in the rainbow the sign of his redemption in the supernatural order of unity and of love. The law with which this Covenant is provided, which the rabbis will articulate in seven principles of natural law, already prefigures a more decisive restoration of the original harmonies.

The Third stage: Abraham. Love acts as if it wished rather jealously to triumph over rebel man and imposes the fullness of her passion on her only elect. The Covenant here is the locus of the encounter and the Beloved's possessive hold of the Lover. This is a marriage, as the later prophets and the chant of the *Canticle of Canticles* would appropriately call it. Abraham commits all his lineage in his sacrifice: Israel, Ismael and Edom, the Jews, the Moslems, the Christians, all those who call to witness this Most-High God, whom he is the first to announce and to serve. The Covenant of Abraham is endowed with a sign, the circumcision, and with a more explicit and more restraining law: the

Kingdom of God moves forward in history to the day when, forsaking his idols, Abraham sets out towards the Holy Land.

The Fourth Stage: God acquires a people the day when Moses on Mount Sinai concludes the Covenant which makes Israel the theophoric people. The Covenant is no longer with creation as a whole or with humanity or with all the inheritors of the ethical monotheism of Abraham, but with a people established in a religious order and consecrated to the promotion of the Kingdom of God in human history. The sign of the covenant (and this is always brought to a conclusion in a sacrifice) is here the Sabbath, the symbol of rest at day's end. Its law is the Torah.

The Fifth Stage: the base of the Covenant is still too large. A particular election will choose within the bosom of Israel one tribe, the Levites, whose whole existence will be exclusively consecrated to the service of the Lord. God alone is the concern of these priests. They break all earthly attachments and have no share in the temporal heritage of their people. They are the mediators between the uncreated eternal and creation; by offering sacrifice, they allow the articulation and functioning of the Covenant. The grace (*Hessed*) of the Lord passes through them as through a canal to irrigate the body of the people consecrated to God and in this way to ensure the joining of all of creation to the Will which manifests it. The priestly Covenant is the supernatural Covenant par excellence: a Covenant of salt (*Berith melihah*).

The sixth level of the pyramid of the Covenant concerns only one family and one man, the royal family and its head, the King of Israel, of which David was to incarnate the most perfect figure.

At each step, the Covenant is secured by a law; but to the extent that one

risks in the hierarchies the law becomes more strict and more restraining: The law of sanctity has as its end the separation of man from the natural order so that he might come to life again in the light of God's order—the *Mitzvah*—and that by it he might manifest pure perfection in the heart of the world whose salvation he must assume.

The structures of the Covenant thus defined assure to biblical revelation an autonomy and an originality absolute with respect to the non-Biblical traditions and philosophies. Here the message is inseparable from the man and from the people; the divine word has the vocation of reconquering the entire world so as to redeem it. In fact the Covenant, in reconciling some men to the Lord's Will, snatches the earth from its original confusion and shatters the barrier of darkness to give sense and direction to human history. The pyramid of the Covenant is crowned by an arrow which points to the messianic ends of creation.

IN ISRAEL, the Messiah is thus the immediate datum of consciousness. Maimonides, summing up the whole doctrine, could assert that not to believe in the Messiah as a *person* and not to aspire towards his coming and his *personal* triumph, would, for a Jew, be equivalent to apostasy. In fact, the Jew who stopped believing in the Messiah had *already* denied his spiritual heritage and had separated himself from the people whose complete hope awaits the appearance and triumph of the Son of Man.

The Son of Man. Here the Christian would be vexed not to find in Israel a messianology comparable to the Christology which defines all that a Christian should know about his God. But the fact is that in the ocean of Hebrew literature, there is not a single theological

treatise consecrated to the Messiah.¹ To analyze the reason for this fact would be to trace the whole internal and external history of Judaism. But let us at least give a few indications which will help us put the question in focus. Theology has never succeeded in becoming established as an autonomous science in Israel. It is necessary to wait for the encounter of Biblico-Talmudic thought with Islam and Christianity, on the one hand, and with Platonism and Aristotelianism, on the other hand, in order for there to arise, at the beginning of the 19th century, the first attempts to elaborate a dogmatic theology of Judaism (Isaac Israeli, Saadia ben Joseph of Fayyum).

Whatever brilliance the elaborations of the most famous theologians of the Synagogue, Solomon ibn Gabirol, Bahya ibn Pakuda, Judah Halevy or Moses Maimonides, could have had, it can be said that their works are never at the vital center of the religious problem of Israel. For the Jews the stream of life continues to flow in the Holy Scriptures, in the Torah, the Prophets and the Hagiographa, in which they had recognized the revelation of the eternal Word and which, illuminated by the oral teaching deposited in the Talmud, they continually take as the first if not the only source of all human knowledge. Written revelation, supported by oral tradition, possesses for the semitic spirit a profound cohesion, an internal unity, whose harmonies continuously illuminate and enrapture anyone who knows how to uncover them. One must pass by the narrow gate of holy knowledge and must humbly pay the price which results in the call to participate at the

¹ Some modern essays consecrated by Jews to the Messiah of Israel have an historical and non-theological point of view. The preoccupation there is to know what has been said or thought about the Messiah, and not, as in the old tradition of Israel, *who* the Messiah is.

banquet of Angels. It is better to turn away and shake the dust from one's feet in front of the barbarians who, for want of knowledge and of preparation, ransack the garden, where it would have been better for them never to enter. For knowledge here goes beyond what concepts and words could express for anyone who had not crossed the threshold where the heart's eye can finally be opened and become sated with its vision.

And so instead of finding a beautiful construction of dogmatic theology, someone anxious to arrive at the knowledge which the rabbis had of the Messiah of Israel will have first to label an enormous mass of scattered and sometimes contradictory traditions. This is the lot of the searcher desirous of penetrating a religion which, perhaps more than any other, can be known only from within. But an additional difficulty arises here. For it is true both that the Messiah is the culmination of Israel's whole tradition and that Christianity is built on this tradition which it claims to accept in its entirety in proclaiming the divinity of Jesus Christ. The conflict between the victorious Church and the Synagogue, which was obliged to fall back on itself in order to survive at all, forced the doctors of Israel to remain conservative in their thought and close to the traditionally allowed positions on the problems of common interest. The common frontier thus forced the weaker to the greater prudence.

The rabbis understood this so well that they emptied their teachings of everything on which victorious Christianity could stumble (in any sense whatsoever). A veil must be lifted to find once more the living tradition of Israel concerning the person of the Messiah. In modern times another difficulty must also be overcome: western Judaism, frankly emancipated and more than ever susceptible to the influences of its

surroundings, hardened itself and has the tendency to define itself not on its own foundation but by opposition to the doctrines of rival churches. Thus emancipated Judaism had the tendency to make of Israel's Messianism a mixture of humanitarian tendencies in which belief in progress took the place of faith in the Son of Man. It was no longer a question, in certain rabbinic sermons, of the person of the Messiah (since the Christians spoke too much of this person) but of the messianic era of peace and of social justice. If the messianic era is not to be repudiated, nevertheless it is no less true that to renounce the person of the Messiah and his triumph is in fact an apostasy from Judaism. It is fitting here to recall the decisive and very clear pronouncement of that eagle of the Synagogue, Moses Maimonides.

OBJECTIVITY demands that one search in the tradition of Israel only for the markers of a possible messianology, as if the doctors had wished to make the Messiah present in the life of each Jew, while reserving it for him to reveal himself personally, in his time, to each of them. These markers already existed in the Bible, and the doctors exhausted—still more than did the Christian theologians, either Catholic or Protestant—the possibilities of messianic exegesis of the Holy Scriptures. There is not one verse of the Torah, of the Prophets or of the Hagiographas which was not interpreted in its full messianic sense. This is inevitable in a tradition which firmly reserves the fullness of its revelation until the hour of the meeting of the end of time, for the triumph of light over darkness and of the Son of Man over the fallen angel.

The promises made to the heirs of David are received personally by each child of Israel, as the pledge of the triumph of God's Word over the forces of

the night, the lighthouse beyond the darkness which proves the tangible reality of the salvation of all. The post-Biblical literature also swells with many developments on the messianic, historical or transcendent eschatology. The pharisaic tradition gives the most complete summation, in Judaism, of the fragmentary traditions which can be used to restore the countenance of the Messiah of Israel.

His name, *Mashiah*, already points to the particular anointing which effects in him the perfect condition for a singular Covenant with the Master of Life. This anointing makes him the king and the priest, the one who holds the keys of the temporal and supernatural salvation of Israel and of the world. The rabbis also continually speak of *Malakh Mashiah*, of the Messiah King, to designate the preeminence of *Bechor*, the first-born son, the "Messiah of justification" or "of our justification." The rabbis take up again the terminology of *Isaiah* and the *Psalms* to announce the reign of the Master of peace, the wonderful one, the advisor, the hero, the redeemer. . . .

The most profound intuition of Israel's tradition is without doubt this: the Messiah exists before his historic manifestation. We have already cited the text of Bereshith Rabbah who identifies the Messiah with the Spirit of God who glides on the surface of the water at the very dawn of creation. This Beraitha is also often cited: "Seven things were created before the creation of the world: the Torah, Repentance, Paradise, Hell, the Throne of Glory, the Temple and the Name of Messiah."² This pre-existence of the Messiah, con-

stant in the Hebraic tradition, shall be viewed here with the heart's eye, rather than within the conceptual framework with which greco-latin thought has endowed Christianity. This is to say that a doctor of the Synagogue in affirming that the Messiah is identical with the spirit of God and prior to the creation never as much as raised the problem of the double nature of the Messiah. The text clarifies the heart of things without as much as allowing the polemic on what, in the last analysis, belongs to the Mystery of the Lord. What was more important was the historic mission of the Son of Man who would receive his ordination from the hands of the most indomitable among the children of Israel, the prophet Elias.

THE examination of the text also disarms the most inveterate presumptions. We know the constant theme of Christian apologetics: the Jews refuse the crucified Jesus as the Messiah of Israel because they were waiting for a triumphant Messiah who would come to bring them victory and not abjection. Our Lenten preachers would no doubt be both surprised and delighted to learn that there is in the synagogal literature a whole line of thought which admits the existence of a suffering Messiah and of a redeemer who by his sufferings rightly replaces the sacrifices of the Temple of Jerusalem.

The theme of redemptive suffering (*Issurin shel Ahava*, the proofs of love) enriches the oldest tradition of Israel with one of its most brilliant intuitions. The idea of the saving sufferings of a Messiah sacrificed for the salvation of the world was drawn by the Christian theologians from Biblical sources, the meditation of which was to give birth in Israel to a current of ideas which were related, although formulated in other perspectives. In these latter the

² *Pessakhim*, 54a. One must have a poor idea of the expression of semitic thought to wonder (cf. Lagrange, *Le messianisme chez les juifs*, Paris, 1909, p. 218) if it is a question of real or ideal pre-existence. Here the name of the Messiah is identical with his being.

people were often identified with the suffering Servant.

A late (it is true) but nevertheless significant text will prove how far the most orthodox literature can go in this line of thought:

In Paradise there is a Palace called the Palace of Woes. The Messiah goes into the Palace and calls all the ills, all the sorrows, all the sufferings and all the punishments and invites them to swoop down upon him. If he did not take it upon himself to suffer the punishment merited by Israel, no man could have withstood the punishment incurred by the sins committed; and this is why Scripture adds: "He took our sorrows upon himself" (Isaiah 53, 4). Rabbi Eleazar acted so during his earthly life (Baba Metzia, 85, a).

*As long as Israel occupied the Holy Land and offered sacrifices there, it was preserved from all evils and all punishment by the merit of the sacrifices offered. Now it is the Messiah who carries the sorrows and punishment of the whole world; and this will be the case until man leaves the world, at the moment when he receives his chastisement.*³

This remarkable text admits a celestial Messiah voluntarily suffering to expiate the sins of Israel and of the world, and his sufferings of love have the suppliant virtue of the sacrifices previously offered at the Temple of Jerusalem. Should we see here an influence of Christian dogma on Jewish theology, or the inevitable result in cabalistic literature of a deepening of the known texts of *Isaiah*, of the *Psalms* or of *Daniel*? The fact is that some old texts of the Talmuds of Babylon and of Jeru-

salem take into account the proofs of a mysterious Messiah son of Joseph, suffering and dying (*Sukkah*, 51b). The fate of this Messiah son of Joseph was to be killed, while the son of David was to come and snatch Israel from its exile and to triumph over death.⁴

The theme of the suffering Messiah and of the killed Messiah is side by side in the rabbinical literature with that of the hidden and destitute Messiah who awaits amid the poor those who claim to be on the lookout for his coming. We shall find this significant theme again at the end of our essay.

More numerous are the sources which speak of the Messiah, son of David, and announce his triumph and his reign. Messianism is implicit in each page of the Bible as soon as it is read in the traditional view which is that of Israel; it transforms itself into a mystic current starting with Daniel and takes on an extraordinary development in apocalyptic literature. The triumph of the Son of light against the forces of darkness is announced in the sermon of the rabbis, and their vehemence became more vigorous the more impossible seemed the abyss which separated current history from its eschatological fulfillment. The triumph of the Son of David is henceforth tied to the dénouement of a universal and cosmic drama. He must

⁴ Here also the theologians concerned with conceptual logic will be dumbfounded in the face of this apparent duality of two Messiahs at the heart of the most irreducible of monotheisms. Certainly, with one God, there can be only one Messiah. The most elementary meditation on the sources imposes this first conclusion. But then what is the meaning of a Double Messiah or a double coming of the same Messiah already present in his pre-existence? Our aim here is only to lead the reader to the point where he can make first-hand acquaintance with the problem and with the sources and to locate for himself the theological and historical debate which inevitably arises from the confrontation of the sources.

³ Zohar, vol. II, fo 2,116, on Ex. 23, 23; cf. Briere Narbonne, *Le Messie souffrant dans la littérature rabbinique*, Paris, 1940; and the admirable text of Pessikta Rabbaiti, (ed. Friedmann, p. 161a) on the suffering Messiah and the redeeming of the Jews by his sufferings. This theme is clearly tied to the constant developments on the redemptive value of Israel's suffering for the salvation of the world.

re-establish creation in the harmony of an order which prevailed prior to the fall of Adam. The descriptions of the messianic era identify terrestrial Jerusalem and celestial Jerusalem, since the Messiah is the restorer of real unity in the heart of earthly darkness. Master of peace, he seals for all time the grave of eternal turpitude, saves the just from the hands of reprobates and restores the victory of light over darkness, of justice over slavery, of peace over war, of love over hate. The Restorer of unity, the Messiah is also by the same act the introducer of the triumphs of the Kingdom of God.

He acts in the name of the Lord and by the power of His Word. His action is also conceived on the temporal plane as one of abolishing the resistance which matter opposed to spirit and of ensuring the victory of the Word in time.

One might say that there is a question here of a carnal certitude, of a promise which engulfs the very being of Israel and the entire redemption of creatures. Likewise the messianic hope of the Jews takes on an otherwise singular fullness *after* the destruction of the Temple, during the exile of the survivors of the war against Rome.

THE structures of Jewish history changed the very moment when the Roman legions, in September of the year 70, destroyed the sanctuary which ensured the spiritual unity of Israel. The Temple stood alone as the place of the meeting of God with Abraham and with his people. By sacrifice (and it was not possible to offer it except on the altar of Jerusalem), the Jews had access to the sacramental roads of penance, of forgiveness, of redemption, and of communion. Once the Temple was destroyed, Israel was engulfed in the darkness of exile. For not only was it to be uprooted and to lose its national independence

and the benefit of a common language, but more importantly the communion with the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob was to be forbidden to it because of the impossibility of continuing the sacramental fulfillment of the sacrificial rites. The Torah, which expressed for Israel the whole of the will of God, found itself cut off at one stroke from at least a third of its commandments and from the essentials in the order of rites and action.

Israel suddenly found itself again enclosed in an age of its history which reached, in its very principle, the most extreme limits of tragedy. It identified itself with the drama of Absence and Expectation. A Christian could easily understand the spiritual situation of Israel on the day following the destruction of the Temple by imagining the state of Christendom deprived of a Pope (Israel no longer had a temple or a high priest), deprived of cardinals (the Sanhedrin had only an embryonic and ephemeral existence after the destruction of the Temple), deprived of bishops (the *Semikah*, or ordination, no longer had the same meaning and no longer conferred the same powers) and deprived of priests. The sources of sacramental life ran dry in Israel; the Jews had to take up their abode in this abyss of their temporal and spiritual exile in the memory of suppressed glory and in the hope of their restoration. The glory of the history of the Jews, in their early age, consisted in choosing God and His Word and in accepting the testimony of the Prophets and identifying themselves with their message so strongly as to consistently protect it, preferring it if necessary to life itself. But this glory—if we may say so—is no less great for their having accepted without weakening the condition of exile and the paradox which it was to inscribe in human history.

The Messiah was awaited from that time forward with a more immediate fervor. His role, before the destruction of the Temple, was generally regarded as that of a hero who would carry to the ends of the earth the message of God, of which he was to ensure the triumph in all the nations of the world. Israel, driven away from its land, deprived of its Temple and of its sacramental life, subject among nations to such savage treatment as was from century to century to mark the Calvary of an empty-handed people, the only people, without doubt, who for two thousand years marched on this land without arms in their hands and who, unarmed, were to survive all the schemes aimed against them from the time of Constantine to the reign of Adolph Hitler. Israel, in the shadow and the retirement of the ghettos, was to hope from its Messiah for works at once both more divine and more human.

The Messiah would be above all the one who would put an end to the exile of Israel: not only to its temporal exile in which masses covered with blood wandered between hostile borders, but still more its spiritual exile. It was necessary to snatch the Jews from this Egypt which was harder than that of the Pharaoh, where they wandered, deprived of help and of the very sweetness of their sacrifice, since Titus had pillaged the altar of the Temple, the sole place of the meeting of the uncreated Eternal and the creature. This waiting had nothing in it of sentimental reverie. A transhistoric and supernatural intervention had given to Israel the Revelation, the Covenants, the Priesthood, the Sacrifices. Since Moses and Aaron, from man to man, from generation to generation, there was transmitted, as a thread of gold, not only the knowledge, but also the inherited powers of Sinai. The destruction of the

Temple rent the traditional continuity with one blow. Though the knowledge of Sinai (henceforth deprived of its highest possibilities of fulfillment) was to continue to be passed on in the night of exile to preserve there the memory of the ancient glories and the hope of their restoration, the powers of Sinai were henceforth abolished. The Synagogue was surely what the liturgical poems called *the widow, the beauty who no longer had eyes*.

YES, Israel could well say: "Look and see if there is any sorrow like mine." At the frontiers of exile there was only one way to survive in the shadow of the ghettos: by the surrender of oneself to the will of the Lord, by purification, by submission to the *Mitzvah* and by constant prayers for the arrival of salvation and the rising up of the liberator. The latter, the "Messiah of our justification," was awaited, and is still awaited in Jewish circles which have not lost faith, with what might be called carnal impatience, daily renewed. A dozen times each day the Jew, in his liturgical prayers, asks the Lord to "render close the Messiah," to "restore in Jerusalem the throne of David, the servant of the Lord," to "make flourish again the posterity of David, the servant of the Lord, and to bring forth his horn of salvation," to "give us the privileges of the days of the Messiah and of the life of the future world." These prayers, repeated from moment to moment, during centuries and millenia, wherever some Jew found himself by fate, molded the spirit of a people and wove in the web of history the certitude and the conditions of its preservation and of its resurrection. The life of Israel in exile was completely oriented towards the coming of the Messiah and was carried along by the certitude of its victory.⁵

⁵ From this arose the many ventures of false messiahs. One of the first, on the day following

The Messiah was to be the bearer of the keys which would open the gates of exile. He would gather together the exiles; he would bring back the Judges and the Judgment to Israel; he would pass sentence against the reprobates and would give justice to the Just; he would bring back the real presence (the *Shekinah*) of the Lord to Jerusalem, his rebuilt City where he would make flourish anew the horn of salvation; he would bring back the adoration and fires of Israel to the heart of the rebuilt sanctuary, to the glorious return of the mercifulness of the Lord and of the restoration of his Presence in Sion for the victory of complete peace.⁶

Was the intervention of the Messiah to be absolutely transhistoric and were the Jews all to wait for orders from heaven? This is the traditional attitude of the doctors and of the faithful. Everything was to be suffered in the all-powerful passivity of prayer until the Lord deigned to awaken His mercy. In the strictly spiritual order, nevertheless, at least an attempt was made to hasten the birth of the days of the Messiah. On the day after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492), the victims of this monstrous measure went in great numbers to take up their abode in the Holy Land. Their souls, burning with mystic fervor after the test, awaited the judgment of God. The mystics of Safed, the doctors of Cabala, by their preaching supported the living hope of the end of time. Since the gathering of the

the destruction of the Temple, was that of Bar Kokheeba, sponsored by one of the greatest doctors of the Synagogue, Rabbi Akiba. The longest lasting, in the 18th century, was that of Sabbatai Zevi; cf. A. Chouraqui, *Histoire du Judaïsme*, Paris, 1957, p. 90.

⁶ These attributes of the Messiah are collected in the master liturgical work of Israel, the Eighteen Benedictions (*Shemonek 'Esreh*), which the Jews repeat three times a day and which sums up the universal procession from Abraham up to the triumph of the days of the Messiah.

exiles in Zion seemed to be accomplished, would it not be possible to take a step further and to restore ordination (*Semikah*) which would bestow upon its recipients the fullness of jurisdictional powers, of which the transmission, as we have seen, had been abolished since the destruction of the Temple? Joseph Berab (†1541), native rabbi of Spain, from Tlemcen and since 1534 a refugee at Safed, where his learning and his holiness had given him great authority over his colleagues, referring to a thesis of Maimonides, held that the unanimity of the doctors of the Holy Land, united in council, could restore ordination by the imposition of hands (*Semikah*). Berab thought that in this way the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin should precede and prepare for the coming of the Messiah. Unrelenting, and faithful to the deepest meaning of the text, Levi ibn Habib, Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, supported by Moses of Castro, rose up against this extraordinary reform, recalling that only the Messiah, priest and king, could give back the powers, inherited from Sinai, which ordination had the object of retransmitting. The coming of the Messiah had to precede the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin and the reconstruction of the Temple. The desperate undertaking of Berab did not outlive its author, but the problem which he raised and meant to solve contains one of the keys to Israel's exile.

SHOULD it be necessary to retrace the plan of the messianic incarnation through the history of Israel, one would have only to follow the unfolding of this history and the *mystery* (the word is St. Paul's) which it inscribes in human history.

The genesis of Israel is that of a people who gather at the call of their prophets to receive the message of the Living God, to take on its burden and

to promote its order. Israel is incomparably a *theophoric* people during the first part of its history, which lies between Abraham and the destruction of the Temple in the year 70; Israel is the *Carrier of God*, and seeing in him the only Master worthy of being served, they are a people henceforth guardian of and responsible for the promotion of his reign. Sinner, surely: who is there who is not? But who else has given birth and hearing to the line of prophets who define forever the law of all humanity in this crossroads of countries and of traditions which is the Holy Land? Israel is indeed the Carrier of God until the final hours of its existence as a living people, since the Nations saw arise from its bosom a crucified one whom the Christians continue to adore as God.

They are a singular people. The second act of the mystery of Israel is no less significant in comparison with the messianic fulfillment (with the incarnation, if you wish) in human history. The people of the Bible remain faithful to their profound vocation by not fleeing from their complete dereliction in the test and the night of their exile. The doctors of the Synagogue, faithful to the prophetic teachings, see the reason for the defeat of the Jewish nation not in the superiority of the Roman arms, but in the infidelity of Israel to its vocation as a *theophoric* people. The Jews were uprooted from their land, deprived of their Temple, removed from their pre-eminence and driven out among the nations of the world, disfigured, debased, unrecognizable, not only to expiate for their sins but also by their suffering to solicit and to await their repurchase, the final Easter of all creation, the true and holy passage from *Golah* (exile) to *Ge'ullah* (redemption).

Let their adversaries resign themselves to the fact that Israel, in the poverty of its time of exile and in its

very rejection, embodies perhaps more greatness, surely more true power than in its Biblical ages. Power? Surely Israel shows an overabundance of power in its fidelity to its essential affirmative choice of the primacy of the spirit, and in its determination to hold fast to this choice, at whatever cost—until the end of time if need be—in order that it might still be present at the hour of the Return, of which no Jew, even in the darkest hours, ought ever doubt. This wager of all powerful resignation and of hopeless expectation (have you thought about those processions of Jews going to their death at the doors of their brother Germans?), this heroism unconscious of its true greatness (one had only to say yes to the church, or in the territory of Islam one had only to pronounce the *Shahada*, and he and his descendants would completely escape the Jew badge, the ghetto, the state of a humiliated man, the poverty of exile and the dangers of which our generation could know one of the illustrations by witnessing the massacre in the concentration camps and crematories of six million persons said to be of the Jewish race, of whom 1,800,000 were children under 14 years of age)—this wager Israel held in such inhuman circumstances that her survival seems once again to push back the limits of the impossible. For two thousand years a whole people turned back on themselves have lived a hidden, reclused, underground life; for two thousand years the mortal remains of exiles have been ready to face everything with empty hands, and have undoubtedly been the only ones to engage in the combats of history without arms so as to betray neither the mercy of the Lord nor His promises, and so that the hour of His final redemption might come.

Judah Halevy, a 12th century theologian of the historic destiny of Israel, forcefully asserted that the Jews (con-

cerning whom he did not fear to hold that they were "a people without head and without heart like the dried bones of the vision of Ezekiel") in their exile, embodied the presence of the suffering Servant of Isaiah's vision "in an intermediary state between free choice and compulsion." Here Judaism appeared less as a religion than as the particular embodiment of revelation taken upon themselves by a people who manifested its presence in the continuity of collective experience historically lived.

Two thousand years to receive the Message. Two thousand years to carry its weight in exile and the night of mankind. And now? Now here we are on the threshold of the third age of a history the true problems and exact dimensions of which the world would do well to notice, since its future embraces equally, in a certain sense, those of the peoples of the world—Christians or Moslems—who have inherited the spiritual patrimony and the Biblical sources of Israel.

This third age is that of the Return of Israel. The Jews, threatened with total extermination by Hitler, bled white in concentration camps and crematories, on the day following the most difficult test of their history, had exactly the opposite reaction than one would have expected from a normal people. Scarcely a few short years after the fires of the crematories had been extinguished, they again defied the impossible and in spite of all opposition dashed off to reconquer the Holy Land which became again the Land of Israel. The Jews proved to the surprised world not only that they are a people of soldiers but that they could achieve surprising victories over an enemy ten times more numerous; that they are not only an agricultural people, but that they could fertilize the desert itself and forest rocky hills barren for ten thousand years; that

they are not only detached from money but that they could prove it by tying up all their materials and all their capital in the apparently most quixotic undertaking of the century and by clarifying in their *kibboutzim* a style of life in which a man can at last be freed from the servitude of Mammon. And further still these people, whose culture was heteroclite, restored the language and culture of the Bible. Israel in May 1958 celebrated its tenth anniversary; but it is already possible to foresee, in this land of the Bible, the fulfillment of a destiny not unworthy of the four thousand years of history of which the Jews are the heirs.

It is worth noting that on the day following the creation of the State of Israel, the gathering of the exiles was again to bring about the need for the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin. The question was officially asked by the Minister of Religious Affairs of the first government of Israel. This effort failed to develop for less noble reasons than those which inspired the Chief Rabbi Levi ibn Habib. But the problem thus posed at least shows the consciousness which the Jews have of the necessity of recapturing spiritual unity. For if the creation of the State of Israel puts an end to the earthly wandering and temporal exile of the Jews, it makes the profound spiritual exile appear more clearly. The masters of Jewish spirituality underline the fact that this exile, more unbearable because it goes on near the walls of Jerusalem, cannot end without the supernatural and transhistoric intervention of the Messiah. The project defined by the ancient prayer of the Eighteen Benedictions would then take on the fullness of its meaning: the gathering together of the exiles, the messianic intervention, the restoration of the Sanhedrin, the return of the Presence (*Shekinah*) in Zion, the fulfillment of the messianic promises

and of the final vocation of Jerusalem, the first and last crossroads of the uncreated eternal and of creation. Thus in fact the coming of the Messiah is traditionally linked with the last ends of humanity and with its fulfillment in the last judgment and the resurrection of the dead.

THE Christian reader of these pages might be astounded that one can speak of the Messiah of Israel without once mentioning the name of Jesus of Nazareth. In fact, it would be possible to treat of Jewish messianism without saying a word about Christianity although the reverse would not be true. But to avoid the meeting of the Church and of the Synagogue with respect to Him who should abolish their conflicts and allow their reunion would be to lack objectivity. For, Master of Unity, the Messiah has no other route for His mission than to make Unity reign on earth as in heaven.

The paradox is great, we are agreed, of the divorce from the Synagogue of the one of its sons whom entire peoples hail not only as a priest, a prophet, a king, but as God, and who is the head of the universal and apostolic Church. Nonetheless one is playing with illusions in trying to locate the reason for the divorce of the Church and of the Synagogue on the level of dogma and of doctrine. Let us say that the clergymen and the rabbis keep their war alive with arguments equally drawn from dogma; to promote its order. Israel is incomparable; the conflict has more profound and valid reasons.

With the destruction of the Temple the Jews had to choose either to disappear, crushed by Rome, or to refuse their defeat and to attempt with all their energy to hold out so that they might survive in order to come to life again. To hold out for them meant that even prior to saving their bodies they

were to preserve from shipwreck their Holy Scriptures, which they alone in the world could read in their authentic texts, and to keep intact the spiritual tradition which, since Sinai, had made them the theophoric people. To survive without land, without a State, without arms, by the force of the spirit alone, at the price of all deprecations and all mutilations of the body—such was to be the wager, in the certitude of the triumph of the promise made to their fathers; for though Israel could fail, God could not lie. It is the certitude of the vision of the Return which allowed the miracle of the survival of Israel during the two thousand years of her exile.

Survival was gained by a voluntary mutilation of soul and body. As to the soul, Israel, in order to maintain its personality in the conflict of centuries, had no other choice than to refuse confrontation with religions and philosophies foreign to its singular destiny. This refusal did not pass without a weakening and impoverishment of its being; but this aspect of the poverty of exile did not cut into the life of the spirit, riveted to the contemplation and to the will of the Lord eternally present in its Torah.

So far as the body is concerned, Israel, driven from her land, was to assume among nations by her fidelity to her God the office of a Pariah—the man without arms—in Europe as in the Orient, and to accept with its bare hands combat against the powers bent on destroying it. A people of conscientious objectors? More than that it is a people condemned by their singular condition to testify, among nations, to the eternity and the primacy of the spirit. Testimony straightforward and without glitter, theirs is a testimony signed in blood. For the ghettos were certainly established centers of the highest and most undisguised prayer. As long as adversity arose, the orders were to accept death with open arms, the prayer of praise on

their lips. Such was the meaning and the value of election in the abjection of the blood-stained exiles.

One of the most authoritative theologians of the Synagogue, Judah Halevy, whom we have already cited, defined well the exact preeminence of the people of the exile in his universal embodiment of the figure of the suffering Servant. A whole people, the very ones from which Jesus came, voluntarily placed themselves in the position of climbing a Calvary which was to measure the time of nations and of their awakening to the supplications of the Word. The Christian, who believes that there is some sweetness in knowing and loving Christ, will recognize the price of a sacrifice which deliberately renounces its own happiness. The Jews had to live life in a spirit so ascetic that it separated them from the world, from men and from God himself, by virtue of a supernatural hope which moved them towards the absolute of the meeting with the absent Prince, in the certitude of His apparition. Is there a clearer or purer lesson of foregone heroism?

The first and last, Alpha and Omega: he whom the Christians preach, the Jews hope for; he of whom the Jews await the coming, the Christians await the return. Ambiguity of words, hypocrisy of

positions, the Jews were in fact crucified on this Cross of which they denied the virtue and most often by those very ones who claimed to be the adorers of a crucified Messiah.

Is not the actual position of man with respect to the Messiah rather that which a rabbinic apologue describes: we all claim that we await the Messiah (His coming, His return, what does it matter?) the better to excuse ourselves from making the effort which would surely lead us to Him? We assert we are waiting for Him while in reality He dies from waiting for us in each poor person, in each man who suffers injustice or hatred. Whether you are Jew or Christian, note this well.

But, in bare truth, love is already acting to reunite the children of light beyond the boundaries which stain spirit and matter with blood. God as creator is necessarily beyond the boundaries which limit the creature; He is at the heart of the Jerusalem of the real world. In this center the Messiah stands guard and lives in the expectation of men who would know how to understand and fulfill His message of peace, of unity, and of love. The expectation of the Messiah? To live up to it, one need only be faithful to the light, to life.

Translated by RICHARD T. DE GEORGE

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REFORM AND INFALLIBILITY

GEORGE LINDBECK

A Protestant view of the place of unalterable dogma in contemporary Catholic theology

IN COMPARISON to most post-Tridentine theology, contemporary Roman Catholic thought displays an astonishing flexibility. Roger Aubert,¹ in what is perhaps the best example to provide an over-all survey of the current scene, describes it as having two main features, both of which involve a stress on change. The first is a movement of *resourcement*, "back-to-the-sources," which manifests itself in the biblical, liturgical and

¹ *Le théologie catholique au milieu du XXe siècle*, Paris: Casterman, 1954.

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Dr. Lindbeck's article was originally given this past August as a talk at the annual Week of Work of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education held at Drew University, Madison, N. J. It should be read in conjunction with Fr. Fransen's essay, which follows it, and in itself is a provocative example of informed and irenic understanding of Catholic positions by an American Protestant scholar.

patristic revivals. There is a real and widespread passion to bring the church's life and theology into harmony with early Christianity. Even the motto *ecclesia semper reformanda*, with its peculiarly Protestant ring, has been proposed as a battle-cry by some responsible and respected Roman Catholic theologians.² The second feature is equally unexpected. Aubert speaks of an "openness to the modern world" which expresses itself in a widespread willingness to experiment extensively in adapting Catholic forms, practices and actions to contemporary needs. There is a seeking for new and more intelligible ways of proclaiming the Christian message to the man of the present day, and this sometimes leads to genuinely radical innovations. Formerly, it has been said, the effort was always to discover the error in opposing positions, in order more effectively to refute them, while now—perhaps especially in France—one systematically tries to find the element of truth which they contain in order both to enrich the life of the Church and to persuade the non-Catholic that the values which he holds precious are not denied, but fulfilled and completed within the *complexio oppositorum* which is Roman Catholicism.

All this may well puzzle the outside observer. He is likely either to dismiss the new movements as transitory, or, if he is to acknowledge their strength, to suspect that they are a grave danger to the stability of the church and likely at any moment to be condemned. He finds it difficult to imagine the possibility of really profound reformation or adaptation within the Roman Church.

² E.g., *Küng, Konzil und Wiedervereinigung*, Freiburg: Herder, 1960, p. 22 ff.

Surely, he argues, changes as revolutionary as some current ones appear to be are incompatible with the necessarily conservative character of an authoritarian society whose dogmas are supposed to be unalterable and whose highest teaching office claims infallibility. In this context radical reformation or adaptation must either be subversive or only apparent.

These impressions are likely to be strengthened when the observer first begins reading the books of the Catholic reformers or listens to them talk. They seem to adopt tactics which evacuate infallibility of all real meaning. They insist that dogmas are inadequate, sometimes egregiously inadequate, statements of revealed truths; they then go on to add, as Karl Rahner does,³ that it is often exceedingly difficult if not impossible to distinguish an inadequate statement from a false one. What then is the point of asserting that they are errorless?

Let us first illustrate the problem by concrete examples. Any dogma can in principle be complemented—some would prefer to say replaced—by more adequate, though insufficient, statements of the original truth; in addition, every age must rethink and sometimes reinterpret the doctrines of the past in order to preserve them from misunderstanding. It will be observed that the practical meaning of this seems much the same as that of the common Protestant contention that the creeds need to be revised. When the Protestant says this, he is usually not expressing disagree-

ment with Nicea or Chalcedon, but is simply suggesting that the ancient words are now misleading, and that we have learned better ways of stating the truths which they were intended to defend. These are precisely the theses which Karl Rahner advances when he argues that a monophysite misunderstanding of Chalcedon has long pervaded not only the piety but the theology of the church, and that the reason for this neglect of the full humanity of Christ lies at least in part in the inability of substantialist categories to express the full historicity of human existence.⁴

It would be easy to multiply indefinitely radical reinterpretations of both ancient and recent dogmas which attempt to make their religious significance more clearly biblical as well as more intelligible to the modern mind. We shall cite only one of these, Hans Küng's⁵ already famous effort to show that the Tridentine decrees on justification are fully compatible with Karl Barth's version of the Reformation doctrine. More precisely, Küng's argument was that the Catholic view of justifying grace as internally transforming can be reconciled with the Reformers' insistence that this grace is first of all the *favor dei* expressed in God's objective declaration of righteousness in Christ, and that this saving righteousness is appropriated by faith alone. In effect, Küng's position amounts to saying that Trent was dreadfully one-sided, in some respects even more one-sided than the Reformers. It did not actually exclude the important Biblical elements in the Reformation doctrine and it is therefore possible to say that it was inerrant, but it ignores these elements in such a way as to create the impression that they are

³ "Just because the propositions of faith are true, an infinite qualitative difference separates them, in spite of their finitude, from false propositions, however hard it may (even often) be in individual cases accurately to determine in the concrete where the boundary lies between an inadequate and a false statement." Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, trans. C. Ernst, Baltimore: Helicon, 1961, p. 44.

⁴ Op cit., "Current Problems in Christology," pp. 149-200.

⁵ *Rechtfertigung: Die Lehre Karl Barths und eine katholische Besinnung*, Einsiedeln, Johannes Verlag, 1957.

rejected. Only now is it becoming possible to develop a more adequately balanced doctrine of justification which includes both the Catholic and the Protestant emphases; interestingly enough, K  ng implicitly acknowledges that it is a Protestant, Karl Barth, who is leading the way. Reactions to this thesis are also deserving of comment. Barth says that K  ng's views on justification are in agreement with his own, but raises the question of whether they are truly Catholic, while most of K  ng's fellow Catholic reviewers return the compliment by recognizing that this position is orthodox enough but doubting that it is really Barthian.⁶

We have perhaps said enough to illustrate the radical character of the theological revisions which are now being proposed, but before we go on to our main question of whether such innovations are not fundamentally subversive, we must say a few words about the techniques which enable their authors to reconcile them with traditional Catholic positions. In the first place, modern historiography has immensely increased the freedom of movement within the dogmatic framework. The point is most obvious to those familiar with contemporary scriptural studies, and most of us are aware that the Catholic exegete is sometimes just as uninhibited in his biblical criticism as is his Protestant colleague. However, we perhaps do not always remember that it is persistently maintained that the literal sense of the Bible, just like that of dogma, is inerrant and therefore infallible and unalterable. The problem is to determine exactly what is the literal sense (i.e., what the author primarily intended to say), and this requires the most refined

historical investigations. The historical, intellectual and cultural context must be precisely determined. When this is done, it becomes apparent, e.g., that the authors of the first chapters of Genesis fundamentally intended to assert that the one God, not a group of Gods, created heaven and earth, and He did so by His word rather than by some sort of giving birth. In order to be intelligible to themselves and others, they necessarily used primitive myths, for it was these which provided the only available framework for talking about the origin of the world. But there is no evidence that they intended to assert the truth of the mythological details which they repeated. They might very well not even have understood the question if they had been asked whether they believed, or meant to assert, that creation took place in the precise way they describe. Their sole purpose in revising and retelling these stories was to assert that the world is a creation, not emanation, of the one God, and so this alone in their account is the literal sense, and this alone is infallible. Papal and conciliar pronouncements are treated in a parallel way. A familiar example is provided by the work of Father John Courtney Murray on the non-dogmatic yet authoritative condemnations of liberalism and democracy. When Pius IX promulgated the Syllabus of Errors, so the argument goes, he clearly had in mind the absolutistically secular and aggressively anti-religious European, and especially French, forms of liberalism and democracy. His condemnations cannot therefore be generalized to include the English and American movements, which go by the same names but differ in some very important respects. In short, the precision introduced by modern historical methods greatly narrows the literal and authoritative sense of magisterial documents.

Actually, however, infallible ecclesias-

⁶ See Barth's "Ein Brief an den Verfasser," *ibid.*, pp. 11-14. For a survey of Catholic reviews, see Juan Alfaro, "Justificaci  n Barthiana y Justificaci  n Cat  lica," *Gregorianum* XXXIX (1958) p. 757 ff.

tical statements have even less scope than do the biblical ones (even though this has not always been apparent in practice). Scripture is said to be positively revelatory, while the church's teaching is simply "preserved from error." From this it follows that the personal theological opinions of the Church authorities, and speculations regarding what they would have said in the light of a new situation, are not decisive, but in the case of biblical authors, are to be taken very seriously. For example, it may be that Pius IX would have condemned Anglo-Saxon forms of democracy and liberalism if he had known about them, or that the Fathers at Trent would have anathematized Küng if they had foreseen his irenic attitude towards Protestant heresies, but the Roman Catholic need not feel bound by such considerations. Magisterial pronouncements have an official, legal character, and consequently only what they actually unambiguously say, not the private opinions of their authors, is decisive. They must be read with exactly the legalistic precision which lawyers and the courts employ in dealing with law. Here is another technique, therefore, in addition to historical analysis, for narrowing the inerrant and irreformable point of dogmatic pronouncements. Unlike the refinements of modern historiography, it is a method which has long been employed by the theologians.

Now it is easy enough to understand that these techniques open up immense and unpredictable possibilities for change and innovation. In terms of what might be called the technical legal opportunities, it is conceivable that the Church might transform its interpretation of its unalterable dogmas in the next hundred years as much or more than the Supreme Court has transmuted the understanding of the unaltered aspects of the American Constitution in

the last hundred. Nevertheless, it would seem that any major effort to exploit these possibilities of change actually, even if not theoretically, turns the claim to unalterability and infallibility into a pretense and a fraud.

In actual practice, some responsible Catholic theologians seem increasingly to treat the doctrinal decisions with even more freedom than do many Protestants. Indeed, to make a specific comparison, even moderately liberal Lutherans are likely to treat their own professedly reformable Confessions as in fact more definitive than Rahner or Küng consider Chalcedon or Trent. Is it really candid and honest, then, to go on maintaining that Popes and Councils proclaim infallible and unalterable dogmas? And does not such freedom undermine the basic affirmation of the Roman Church that its faith is, and always has been, identical with that of the apostles?

So much, then, for the question. It is, I hope, posed sharply enough, and yet not too sharply. In trying to answer it, we shall have to deal briefly with a number of crucial problems, each of which has generated whole libraries. Dogmatic fixity has lost its traditional role as the chief expression of the invariability of the faith, but the claim to invariability has not been abandoned. Instead, the theological understanding of faith has been revolutionized in such a way that its self-identity through change can be plausibly maintained in the face of the modern emphasis on historical relativity. At the same time, the infallibility of dogma, despite the loss of its previous function, has not declined in importance. It is perhaps more important than ever, but in a new way and with a new meaning. A captious observer might say that we have here a prime example of a theological game of musical chairs in which everything seems to change even while actually re-

maining the same, but this would be decidedly unfair, for what we have rather is a theological attempt to provide a rational justification for greater openness to the world and for the thesis that the church has unfailingly maintained the "faith once and for all delivered unto the saints" despite alterations in form and distortions in understanding.

A non-Catholic might be inclined to say that the new understanding of faith and of its invariability through history is quite simply Protestant. The object of faith, that is to say, revelation, is more and more often said to be primarily reality, event, God's mighty acts in history, rather than truths which can be adequately expressed in propositional terms. Congruently with this, the faith which accepts revelation is described as the total personal response of the whole man, a new mode of existence, a new type of being or, to use more customary Catholic terms, an incarnational reality, a participation by the whole of the self in the new humanity which is Christ. Because faith involves the whole human being it necessarily does include an element of intellectual assent to propositionally stated truths, but, in contrast to much of the theological tradition, this aspect of intellectual belief is no longer made the central defining characteristic.

It is evident that this new view of the nature of faith and revelation makes it much easier to affirm that it remains one and the same through history, despite changing theological formulations and the addition of new dogmas. This fact is presumably the reason such views gain acceptance wherever the modern historical consciousness has penetrated into the Catholic church. Of course, there are bastions of resistance, theologians who still try to explain the development of doctrine as a process of logical deductions from premises explicitly and con-

sciously believed by the apostles. But I think it is fair to say that under the sheer pressure of historical evidence such positions are gradually disappearing.

However, it is sometimes objected that the newer views involve a kind of historical fideism, that they purchase immunity from historical criticism at too high a cost, viz., that they make faith into so deep and inward a thing that the historian or biblical scholar can no longer say anything about whether it remains faithful to the original revelation. This accusation has been leveled against Newman, I think unfairly; but it does hold against a group of theologians who present what R. Draguet calls a theological solution of the problem.⁷ They hold, in effect, that the only relevant evidence as to whether a given development is implicitly contained or is in harmony with the original deposit is the decision of the magisterium. My impression is that, oddly enough, this opinion is favored by a good many of the scholars who insist most on a radical freedom in their biblical criticism. They are men of what might be called a philological bent who believe that the historian can speak only of the surface meanings of a text. They can say nothing about the inner character of biblical faith, and about the conformity of the church to that faith. On these points, only what the Pope says counts. And because of this very reason, because of the theological triviality of their often highly competent work, they feel at liberty to reach extreme conclusions on such questions as those of authorship or of the presence of legendary and mythical materials in the Bible.

But my own opinion is that the biblically oriented Catholic theologian is right when he holds that this kind of

⁷ J. H. Walgrave, *Newman the Theologian*, trans. A. V. Littledale, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960, p. 302.

theological positivism, of total reliance on the magisterium, is historically untenable. The philological approach, the surface reading of historical documents, represents a 19th century methodology which is now in the process of being definitely surpassed. Historiography has progressed since Newman's or Harnack's day, especially through the use of analytic techniques borrowed from the existential phenomenology, as well as from our keener appreciation of the sociological, economic and depth-psychological dimensions of human existence. In short, the modern historian is increasingly able to say, on what *he* at least considers objective grounds, something about whether a given change, or a given development, is in fact in conformity with the faith of the early church.

Stated in this abstract way, this advance in historical methodology sounds much more difficult and forbidding than it actually is. In fact, all that is happening is that modern historians, like contemporary educated men in general, are learning to think in a different way which, from the common sense point of view, is just as easy and just as natural as the old way, even though it takes thousands of books and many decades for the new approach to spread and develop. Oversimplifying, we might say that western intellectual reflective thought, especially since the middle ages, has been dominantly analytic and atomistic. Only in the last hundred and fifty years or so have methods begun developing for thinking with reasonable rigor, that is to say in a reflective scholarly way, what, for lack of a better term, might be called organic structures and processes. On the level of pre-reflective common sense, these aspects of reality are just as intelligible as are the atomistically analyzable ones. Once we become familiar with the new technique, we see that the aspects of reality with which

they deal are just as obvious to pre-reflective common sense, and probably even more important, than the atomistically analyzable components of reality on which scholarly attention has heretofore been focused.

In order to see the application of all this to the nature of faith, let us use an organic analogy. Faith viewed as a total response does have an organic structure. This is obvious, for it is, after all, the structure of existence of human beings who are organisms, though of a unique sort. As in all organismic situations, this basic pattern or structure can retain its self-identity even though the explicit analytically identifiable components (such as doctrinal formulations, and modes of worship and practice) change and grow enormously. At the same time, certain types of variations, certain types of additions, are incompatible with the basic pattern. In addition to what might be called the clearly healthy and the clearly unhealthy developments, there are always changes (and these may be the most important) which it is impossible to evaluate on purely objective grounds. Here, the Catholic would say, there is nothing to do except rely on the teaching authority of the church, but this does not exclude the fact that extensive objective testing of the possible biblical validity or invalidity of a given development can and must be done.

A further implication of the organic character of faith is that both openness to the world and return to the sources are constantly necessary. Whatever has an organic character ceaselessly adjusts and re-adjusts itself to its changing environment precisely in order to maintain the stability of its basic structure. Therefore, faith must be expressed differently in a new situation in order to remain the same. This means, on the one hand, that it assimilates whatever is beneficial

to it in its surroundings, for otherwise it would cease to grow, wither and die. It must welcome whatever is true and good, even when this is first discovered by its enemies. Everything genuinely valuable in human existence comes from God and will be united with Christ when he becomes all in all, as St. Paul puts it; in fact it is the Christian's duty, as medieval writers liked to phrase it, to despoil the Egyptians. On the other hand, every organism develops new defenses against new threats; it must eliminate foreign and injurious bodies, infections and cancerous growths (i.e., originally good parts of its own substance which lose their organic interconnection with the rest of the body and run wild). For this reason, reform is everlastingly necessary. Corruptions and extraneous growths must constantly be removed in order to preserve the original structure of the faith, although this must be done cautiously in order to avoid damaging the healthy while removing the diseased, as Jesus himself suggests when he talks about allowing the wheat and the tares to grow together until the final judgment.

Like all analogies, this one requires qualifications. I shall mention only one. In the case of a physical organism, one can identify with objective certainty when the basic structure is operating properly and when it is so corrupted that it loses its essential character, that is, becomes incapable of supporting physical life. Such precision is impossible in the case of spiritual organic structures, and so arguments on objective grounds as to whether any given deviations from the original pattern of the faith destroy its essence, or which of two deviations is the more damaging, must always be inconclusive. For instance, the Reformers, even though this is not true of many of their successors, recognized that the visible unity of the

church is part of the normative pattern of the existence of a Christian community, but they believed that it was less damaging to abandon this than to compromise with the works' righteousness and other corruptions of late medieval Catholicism. A Catholic of K  ng's persuasion will agree that both were damaging, but will hold that it was better to compromise with the corruptions than to fall into a schism which (he would then add) rapidly became a heresy. I can imagine, therefore, that it is theoretically possible that a vigorous Catholic and a vigorous Protestant might agree completely in their theological premises except for a slight difference in their estimates of the relative significance of two factors, both of which are considered important for the integrity of the faith. Of course, from this initially slight divergence, increasingly important differences would follow, but they would still be closer together in their systematic starting point than either of them would be to many of their Catholic and Protestant colleagues. Indeed, I suspect that this is precisely the relationship of men like K  ng and Barth. As a systematic theologian, K  ng is probably much closer to Barth than he is to even such men as Father Weigel, while Barth, whom some consider Calvin *redivivus*, is definitely closer to K  ng, theologically speaking, than he is to Bultmann or even Tillich.

It is, I think, desirable to make another concrete application of the organic analogy, this time to the thorny problem of Mariology. Biblically oriented Roman Catholic theologians sometimes express cautious disapproval—far too cautious, a Protestant will be inclined to think—of certain types of Marian theology and piety. These, they say, distort the original and normative pattern of Christian faith. This faith is theocentric through and through, christocentric, and—they add with increasing frequency

—eschatological. To exalt Mary independently of Christ, in such a way as to distract attention from the sole sufficiency of Christ's redemptive work, is therefore wrong. The Virgin is properly understood only when her whole being points men away from herself towards Christ. In my opinion a theologian such as Karl Rahner has given a theological interpretation of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption which assigns to these a religious meaning which is basically in harmony with biblical faith.⁸ This does not mean that he advances any reasons which are to me in the least persuasive for accepting these doctrines. He simply makes them unobjectionable. If given the meaning he proposes, Protestants would have no reason at all for protesting, so long as they were considered as private opinion, rather than official dogma. This is widely recognized, perhaps especially in Lutheran circles, where it is chiefly the dogmatism of the Assumption which called forth protests.

There is only one trouble with Rahner's reinterpretation of the Marian dogmas and even this is not really an objection. By his own admission, what he considers the true theological and religious significance of the dogma of the Assumption had never been thought of before he proposed it. Marian piety and theology has been a largely independent and sometimes dangerous growth which badly needs to be reintegrated into the Christological and theocentric unity of a properly structured Christian faith. Nevertheless, I suppose that a Protestant has to admit that there is nothing unreasonable in this suggestion that something good and true (*viz.*, the dogma of the Assumption) could come out of an unbalanced and distorted Marian piety. Many contemporary Protestants seem to look at something like the social gospel

movement in the same way. It represented, in their opinion, a dangerously one-sided form of the Christian faith which nevertheless taught us the fundamental importance of social concern. Actually, this is only an application of a wider principle which we have already touched upon. Many truths which the church needs to assimilate arise first in the context of dangerous errors. It is no doubt terribly upsetting that God should take this roundabout way of instructing his church, but in view of the fact that not only the church but also the world belongs to God, we can scarcely accuse Him of being unreasonable.

Perhaps we have said enough to make meaningful a summary statement regarding the nature of dogmas. In practice they appear to be relatively empty shells which can be filled with any one of a number of concrete religious meanings; they can be given an indefinitely large variety of theological interpretations. Actually, therefore, to say that a dogma is infallible, inerrant and irreformable is to assert that it is capable of being given an interpretation which is without error, that is, in full harmony with the truth. It is conceivable that some dogmas have never as yet been given such an interpretation, that even their original formulators understood them in a way which is in some respects erroneous, but in the providence of God, the authors of such a dogma have been preserved from interjecting their false opinions into the dogmatic statement in such fashion that it is irreformably erroneous. It may sound like paradoxical sensationalism, but I quite seriously think that to say dogma is irreformable is logically equivalent in the practice of many contemporary Catholic theologians—even if not in their theory—to saying that its interpretation is reformable. In other words, to assert that a proposition is irreformably true is logically equivalent

⁸ *Op cit.*, pp. 201-227.

ent to asserting that it is not irreformably false.

This may appear to make claims of infallibility, unalterability and all the rest sound like what polemical critics would call jesuitical casuistry. However, with the logic-chopping habitual to those who have at some time taught logic, I would maintain rather ardently that it is nothing of the sort, but is simply a matter of technically precise thought. Given the revised understanding of faith and revelation which we have sketched, a dogmatic pronouncement, just because it is a necessarily brief and abstract statement about immensely rich concrete realities, inevitably has very little content of its own. The content, so to speak, must be imported from outside. This does not in the least imply that a dogma is religiously unimportant, or that it is meaningless or that it is impossibly ambiguous. It simply says that its function is a formal one. To use a metaphor, what a dogma does is to draw a line across an indefinitely wide expanse of possible affirmations. On the one side are the affirmations which it excludes, which, if it is well-formulated, it clearly and unambiguously says are false. On the other side, is an indefinitely large number of mutually incompatible religious meanings and theological interpretations which it admits as possibly true, but only one of which is actually true. It would be nonsense to demand of a dogma that it designate which one of its possible interpretations is the true one. It is no more possible to do this than to square a circle, for this would be equivalent to formulating a proposition about non-physical realities which is logically incapable of being interpreted incorrectly. Nor is it possible to limit the possible number of interpretations *a priori*, for there are as many logically consistent interpretations as their

interpretative frameworks, and there are as many possible interpretative frameworks as there are human minds.

In conclusion, then, on the basis not only of our investigation of Catholic theological practice, but also for logical and philosophical reasons, the positive theological meaning and concrete religious significance of a dogmatic formulation must be viewed as coming from outside, from the Bible, the worship and life of the Christian community, and the general cultural and intellectual context. The primary function of a dogma must therefore be to exclude error; its role, not only as a matter of historical fact but in the very nature of the case, must be primarily negative and defensive.

Now from the Protestant point of view this is exceedingly important, for while it is quite capable of supporting an argument for the juridically or canonically binding character of dogma, it does not really justify infallibility or unalterability even in the precise and limited sense which I have described. This interpretation of dogma as fundamentally defensive and negative supplies the rationale for the Lutheran (and Orthodox) position that while ecclesiastically binding doctrines are necessary for the health of the church, they are not to be considered irreformable or infallible in the strict sense. On this view it is not necessary anxiously to seek for an acceptable interpretation of every word, of every clause, of doctrinal definitions, as presumably the Roman Catholic must do. All that is affirmed—and this, to be sure, is a great deal—is that when the faith is vitally threatened, as by Arian heresy or late medieval corruptions, God does not permit His church to be overcome by fundamental error, and so the main import of its doctrinal decisions on such occasions must be considered permanently valid. This

is a necessary consequence of the defensive view, according to which dogma is an exceptional, not normal, protection of the health of the church, of its faithfulness to its origins. The normal sources of that health are the Bible and, inseparable from this, a sacramental and at the same time kerygmatic liturgy which presents in new and vital form the fundamental pattern (Christocentric, eucharistic and eschatological) of the worship of the early church. But these all-important channels of the faith, once and for all delivered to the saints, are equally available, the Protestant would argue, outside the Roman Church. It is because these are so overwhelmingly decisive that he sees no need for dogmatic infallibility.

Why, then, does the Roman Catholic, of the type we are describing, disagree? Like the Protestant, he holds that the Bible and the liturgy are fundamental. He admits that where these are being properly used, as in the first centuries, there is really no need for officially proclaimed infallible dogmas. He admits that these primary preservers of the true faith can be frightfully perverted, with catastrophic consequences for the life of grace, even within a formally correct dogmatic framework. He further admits that it is by such things as the biblical and liturgical renewals—which, if anything, seem to be more hindered than helped by the ordinary view of doctrinal irreformability—that the life of the church is reformed into conformity with Christ Himself. Why, then, does he think it essential to have infallible, unalterable and irreformable dogmas?

There is no mystery in the answer to this. It is simply that the Roman Catholic reformer is convinced that the maintenance of the visible unity of the church is of essential importance because Christ came to bring unity, to reconcile all men to God and to each other, and that for human beings, dependent on

the visible as they are, visible unity is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for this work of reconciliation. If anything is evident from the lessons of history, a large and diverse human society, even when it is divinely established, cannot maintain its unity over long periods of time without becoming more and more organized and institutionalized. Furthermore, it cannot adjust itself effectively to changing circumstances unless there is present within it what political scientists call a sovereign authority and what theologians call an infallible one. Infallibility, therefore, is of vital importance in order to maintain the unity of the church. It is therefore also, of course, of great indirect importance for maintaining the vitality and the continuity of the faith. For one thing, belief in the importance of visible unity is an important element in the faith. To deny it is in effect to undervalue the universal reconciling function of the work of Christ, or else to fall into the blatant individualistic spiritualism of supposing that mankind can be united by the bonds of an invisible love which is neither dependent on nor expressed in visible institutional forms. It is also argued that it is through the maintenance of visible unity that the heritage of the early church is best preserved, often no doubt in the form of empty husks and misshapen shells, but nevertheless in such a way that the heritage is there to be revived and refilled with its vital content, rather than dispersed, scattered, and largely lost, as in schismatic and heretical bodies.

There is nothing novel in this argument for infallibility. The only point in this investigation which was unexpected, at least for me, was the discovery that the practical meaning of infallibility has radically shifted for those theologians who are sensitive to the results of historical studies and are involved in the biblical, liturgical and patristic re-

vivals. Magisterial pronouncements, including infallible ones, are relatively unimportant for them in the central theological task of struggling for a fuller and more faithful apprehension of the saving truth that is in Jesus Christ. But even if it may have lost the function of directly guaranteeing that the church still believes as the apostles did, these theologians give infallibility another role, another meaning, more juridical and less doctrinal. Infallibility is fundamentally sovereignty. This is the power to settle issues which need to be decided, to reject errors which need to be rejected in a final authoritative and unappealable way. The need for such an authority is the same as the need for a final court of appeal in a civil society. Without it, fragmentation and civil war will develop. Because of his conviction of the importance of the rule of law and order, of unity, the Roman Catholic, like the good citizen of any society, will insist on respect and obedience to this final court of appeal. He will not always agree with the wisdom of its decisions, he might not even agree with what he supposes was the intention of their authors, but out of concern for the welfare of the society he will insist on obedience unless he is ordered to act (or, in the case of the church, believe) something which is flatly contradictory to his conscience—that is to say, he will obey as long as he can give the supreme law of the society an acceptable interpretation. The fact that most people, including perhaps the Supreme Court, interpret a given decision unacceptably makes no fundamental difference. He will argue for his own interpretation, he will try to get it adopted, as long as it is not clearly forbidden. All the while he will hope (and, in the case of the church, believe) that the present erroneous interpretation and evil conse-

quences of a given decision will eventually be removed.⁹

To be sure, there are great differences in the attitude of the Roman Catholic to the Pope and to the Supreme Court. He believes that the church is guided and protected from fundamental error by the Holy Spirit. Consequently he holds, in reference to decisions which might seem to him especially inadequate or misleading—e.g., the Tridentine decrees on justification—that the situation made it in effect impossible to decide otherwise; that a different action would have had worse effects, that the church chose the lesser of the evils with which it was confronted, and that it will always be possible in reference to both past and future decisions to find a good and acceptable way of obeying them.

I hope it is clear from this description why there is nothing fundamentally subversive, from the internal Catholic point of view, about the newer progressive, or even revolutionary, forces within Roman Catholicism. Just as an American citizen can be an outright radical, and yet, because of respect for the Constitution, be thoroughly loyal under a disturbingly reactionary administration, so also we can understand the loyalty of many Roman Catholics to their church. Similarly, just as the greatest contributions to the health of our society are often made by men who are deeply committed to reform, and yet cherish the ideals of the founding fathers and the values of law and order, a similar process can well take place within the context of the

⁹ Although not generally expressed as starkly as I have done, this attitude and line of argument become quite explicit in some theologians, such as Otto Karrer and Johannes Hessen. Their autobiographical sketches make this particularly clear. J. Hessen, *Geistige Kämpfe Zeit im Spiegel eines Lebens*, Nürnberg, Glock u. Lutz, 1959; O. Karrer, "Autobiographisches," *Begegnung der Christen* (ed. M. Roesele & O. Cullmann) Stuttgart, 1960, pp. 12-24.

Roman Church. The reforming movements now in progress within Catholicism have this balance, this "safeness." They are, perhaps, the first movements of this sort since the Counter-Reformation. This present ferment differs fundamentally from the Jansenist or modernist explosions, and evidence accumulates that the ecclesiastical authorities are coming more and more to recognize this fact, although there are doubtless a great many of "the old guard" who are deeply disturbed. Reactionary voices seem unlikely to dominate the coming Council, and we may therefore expect that it will not hinder—and will thereby tacitly approve—both the return to the

sources and the attitude of greater openness to the modern world.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the significance of these developments for the non-Catholic. I have simply tried to understand and explain how loyal Catholics can be deeply engaged in what, even in Protestant terms, must be called the Christian reformation of the church. Some will rejoice that this is so and be challenged to a new sense of openness to and responsibility for their Catholic brethren. Others, including some who call themselves Christian, will regret it. But no man and no group will be able to avoid responding in one way or the other to this new situation.

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THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCILS

PIET FRANSEN

THE COUNCILS have always met to deal with questions of faith, questions of Church discipline and practical problems affecting a local Church or the Church as a whole. Thus in the middle ages, problems of international Christian policy were often considered, such as peace between Christian princes, the "Truce of God," war against heretics such as the Albigensians or against the infidels who were in possession of the Holy Places.¹

To raise the problem of the authority of the Councils is equivalent to raising the problem of the Church in regard to the matters we have just enumerated. In other words, the authority of the Councils is only one particular application of the general authority of the Church in matters of faith and morals and in those that concern the Christian

life. And this particular case is at the same time a *special case*, since the work of the Councils shows in a more obvious manner certain aspects of the Church's constitution which in the ordinary course of life are in danger of being thrust into the background of our thoughts as believers. In fact, a Council is the *Church in act* at a given place in the world and at a given moment in history.

This danger is a real one in our Western Church, excessively centralized as it is, and still too closely modelled on the European if not the Mediterranean attitude of mind. We are only too well aware of the fact. Our lay people during these last few centuries of the Counter-Reformation and of struggles against rationalism have forgotten that they too have a genuine responsibility in the life of the Church. We are less aware that during this same period too many bishops have failed to recognize the true meaning of their episcopal vocation and have tended to consider themselves as mere mouthpieces of the Roman authority, which apparently was sufficient of itself to guide and govern the Church. Before the accession of John XXIII, there was a fairly widespread view that Councils were no longer necessary. The Roman congregations were adequate for all purposes. But Providence has decided otherwise, and we should thank God for this, for already the Church is unconsciously benefiting in large measure from the fact. Although the number of bishops who have the right to vote has made the organization of this great Christian assembly more difficult, modern means of communication make it possible for all to share in the work of the Council more intensively than was

The accompanying article was one of the papers given at an Anglo-French symposium held at the Abbey of Notre Dame du Bec in April 1961. The proceedings were a continuation of the annual Downside conferences, which have already produced such volumes as THE SPRINGS OF MORALITY (Macmillan), THE ARTS, ARTISTS AND THINKERS (Macmillan), and WORK (Helicon). The record of this 1961 meeting will appear as PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITY, published jointly by Darton, Longman & Todd (London), Editions du Cerf (Paris), and Helicon Press (Baltimore).

Fr. Fransen lectures in theology at Louvain; his doctoral thesis at the Gregorian University was on marriage legislation at the Council of Trent. CROSS CURRENTS included his article, "Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace," in the Summer 1958 issue.

formerly the case. It is an undeniable fact that a new sense of the Church has come into being in the souls of the faithful and of the members of the Hierarchy. This was inevitable, for the Councils manifest in a living and concrete fashion the life of the Church which is in us by the operation of Christ and of his Spirit.

We propose to divide this lecture into two parts. In the first, we shall analyze the dogmatic and theological nature of the Church's authority in matters of faith and discipline, and this is the more important section. We shall then apply these principles to the Councils, bearing in mind above all the different character assumed by the latter in the course of history. Such differences, however, have never destroyed the fundamental unity in the structure of the Councils as a whole. We shall explain the principal rules for the interpretation of conciliar texts, and point out how indiscreet or fanatical forms of obedience are distortions that inevitably falsify the meaning of the Councils' witness and thus attack the work of the Holy Spirit.

The Dogmatic Foundation of Religious Authority in the Church.

General Principles

IF WE WANT to deepen our grasp of the divine mystery which operates through the authority of the Church, we must above all remind ourselves of certain truths, for they have a profoundly religious value and alone make genuine ecumenical work possible, since they deliver us once and for all from any clericalist pride or from our sectarian complacency.

In matters of faith, no man, not even the Pope or the bishops, *possesses* the truth. Faith is a divine truth. Christ himself, the Word of the Father and the only "way, truth and life," continu-

ally gives himself to his Church in the outpouring of his Spirit. This divine truth *possesses* us. And it possesses us in three ways. It commands our acceptance with the very authority of Christ and of God. It gives itself to us as lifegiving truth, and therefore not as abstract or speculative. And finally, it always remains itself, that is, a divine truth which of necessity transcends our powers of understanding and our capacity to express it in human language. All our human thoughts and formulae will always fall short of God's fullness. But since the truth possesses us in this way, we must go on to recognize at the level of our own action that any reflection on the data of faith—and such reflection occurs whenever a Council is held—involves an authority which is not ours, involves too the need for a living witness and a deep sense of humility and of our unworthiness. All reflection on the data of faith is in a word, a *diaconia*, a ministry—in the old sense of the word, a service—of the Word. To this point we shall shortly return.

Truth takes possession of us. But we must go a step further. It does not take possession of us individually, for this truth is *entrusted* first of all to the Church. Similarly, at the level of the Church as a whole, we cannot strictly say: "The Church is in possession of the truth, of the true faith." Yet the true faith is unfailingly entrusted to the Church, the Body of Christ and the Bride of the Lord. It is entrusted to her as a sacred heritage which never becomes her own property. In other words, the sum total of her teaching will never exhaust all its wealth. The Church, too, necessarily lives a life of *diaconia* and that is why she is called our Lord's Bride.

This religious view of the mystery of the Church alone makes it possible for us to understand the words of the Holy

Father, who has so frequently called on us to see the Council as an invitation to our separated brethren to join us in seeking the unity which Christ is preparing for us. If the Church were simply in possession of the truth in the over-simplified and commonly held sense, all she would have to do would be to wait benevolently for the heretics to return. But if this truth is entrusted to her as a sacred heritage, she too must ceaselessly purify herself in adoration and faith, and by a renewal of Christian life bear witness before the world to this truth which, although it gives her life, yet also transcends her. Only then will she be able to begin the oecumenical dialogue with that deep sense of humility and charity which alone make it possible.

The Word of the Father became incarnate in the Son, God's Word, and continues to become incarnate in the Church. "To become incarnate" means to adopt the human condition in all its fullness, and while doing so, to recreate it from within according to the rhythm of the Trinitarian life. Here lies the noblest of Christian paradoxes, the paradox of divine love. We must hold that in a certain sense Christ *made his own human nature divine in the very process of making it human*. In other words, only God could so completely regenerate humanity. This mystery of love was expressed in its absolute perfection in the union of the eternal Son with his own human nature. But through his Spirit the Father united the whole of humanity to Christ in the Church. In both cases, this mystery of grace does not destroy our human situation; it purifies it from sin and makes it new in Christ.

We have now to ask what this human condition is in relation to the preservation of truth. Every human truth is acquired, elaborated and developed with-

in a community. None of us can think without using a language, without using words. This is so true that the discovery of certain aspects of truth is sometimes impeded by the fact that some languages do not possess words or the grammatical constructions which are found in others. In order to think we need not only words that correspond to abstract concepts, but also—and this to a far greater extent—we need symbols. It is only too clear that this whole linguistic, symbolical, rational and poetical heritage is the particular possession of a given people, a given race, a given human community.

The most inspired thinker can only become a philosopher or a poet if his education in the family and at school has made it possible for him to share in this national heritage. But even then, no progress can be made by thought except through the dialogue between man and man, through that strange dance of question and answer that develops when complementary points of view are brought face to face. There is a dialogue between individual persons, between groups, between periods of time. We are all aware of the swing of the pendulum which takes the thought of a nation from one extreme to the other and so makes it possible to progress in the discovery of truth. The human race thinks somewhat in the same way as it walks. It is its state of unstable equilibrium which makes it able to move forward. Thought at rest is dead thought.

Sometimes we even have the impression that the human race has a kind of communitarian soul, for at certain moments in history, considerations that are strangely similar to one another arise unexpectedly in different areas of a given continent among persons who have never seen one another and never read one another's writings. The solitary thinker is an illusion. To think in soli-

tude is in fact to run the risk of old age because it is to shut oneself up alone with one's memories and so to lose the lifegiving contact with the community.

Application of These Principles to the Church.

When Christ entrusted his truth to his Church, he showed the respect of the Creator for his work, by respecting the communitarian fabric of our thought. His Word is to be preserved by the Christian community, by the "people of God." And the Christian community cannot preserve the Word by fixing it once and for all in static formulae, for this would involve the death of our faith. It must preserve it by living this truth in the Liturgy, in its public and private life, by defending it against heresies within and attacks from without, by preserving the Word "in its heart," as did the Blessed Virgin, and not merely in its head; and so it will discover throughout its long history new meanings, wider and more rewarding relations and horizons. This is the process known as the evolution of Christian dogma. The only difference between the Church's thought and that of any other people on earth lies in the fact that her thought is ever less isolated than secular thought. It is the thought of the Bride of Christ, who has granted her his Spirit, who remains with her until the end of time. This is why the Church cannot err, this is why she is infallible, for she meditates on the Word of her Bridegroom in this constantly renewed dialogue with his Spirit.

It is especially important, in connection with our subject, to note that this sacred deposit is entrusted primarily to the Church as a whole, to the "Catholica," as St. Augustine already called her. She alone is unable to err, for she alone is the Bride of Christ. This "Catholica" is the Church as the Body of the

Lord, as the people of God throughout time and space, according to the apt phrase of Vincent of Lerins: *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, what is believed everywhere, always and by all. Here again, we find that the laity have a vocation which cannot be taken from them, anointed as they are as living members of the Church by Baptism and Confirmation. And we should not forget that the Pope and the bishops before receiving their office, were (and *still remain*) members of the body of the faithful, baptized and confirmed believers.

But in *God's people*, as St. Paul says, "there are different kinds of service, though it is the same Lord we serve, and different manifestations of power, though it is the same God who manifests his power everywhere in all of us." (1 Cor. 12. 4-6.) In a word, there are various missions within the Church, but all are manifestations of the one power of the Trinity. We can never forget these two complementary aspects of the Church, this diversity of ministries in the unity of the Trinitarian grace. The diversity is therefore a real one, it is holy and so hierarchic, but it is also *organic* since it is constantly renewed by grace and so never loses its fundamental unity. St. Paul continues: "The revelation of the Spirit is imparted to each, to make the best advantage of it" for the common good which is the building up of the Church of Christ, a theme which runs right through the next chapter (1 Cor. 14. 3,4,5,17,26.)

There are different charisms and ministries. First of all there is the *Ordo Episcoporum*, the Order of Bishops, successor to the College of the Apostles. There is the *Presbyterion*, the priestly Order, destined to be auxiliary to the episcopate, and through its rite of Ordination sharing in several of the liturgical, pastoral and governing functions of the

episcopate. There is the people of God, which, under the guidance of its religious leaders, and one with them in faith, is to bear its witness as a body of believers before the world.

As we have already said, all are baptized and confirmed. Since this is so, all have received the strictly common vocation of witnesses to the truth and grace within them, and they are to bear this witness both within and outside of the Church. From this standpoint, the Pope, the bishops, priests and laity all have the same responsibilities. From this fundamental point of view there is a similarity between the Church and our democratic institutions. It is even true to say that this aspect of the Church gave rise to the democracies of today. True democracy is only possible in Christendom.

But the Church is not a democracy on the Western model. Nor is she an amorphous mass of believers sharing in the same religious enthusiasm (the sectarian idea) or observing the same code of moral and religious life (this is the rabbinical conception and is always latent among us Christians). The Church is a Hierarchy, which, according to the etymological sense of the Greek word, means a community governed by a sacred authority. She is also a people with a hierarchical organization, that is, a people in which each individual has received a place corresponding to his vocation.

Now that we have established this fundamental point of view, without which all that we are about to say would run the risk of complete distortion, we can now apply ourselves solely to the study of the nature and work of this charismatic authority which has been given by Christ to the Church.

And here we at once meet the other axiom to which we have already alluded. Since authority is divine, it is

never the private possession of any man. It is divine and was given by the Father to his Son, our Risen Lord, who is the one and only High Priest, just as he alone is our King. Every other exercise of authority becomes by the same token, and in a very real sense, *diaconia*, a ministry. "Minister" means "servant." We have already seen that we do not possess truth, it possesses us. So too, we do not possess authority, authority possesses us. I must apologize for insisting so much on this basic principle, but history shows that, unfortunately, few truths are so easily forgotten as this one. How many times did not our Lord have to return to it as he taught the Apostles! The neglect of it in practice leads to clericalism in all its forms and this is a great cause of scandal to our separated brethren. It is tragic even that it is this particular abuse of authority which so easily arises in fervent Christian communities. It is true to say that the respect shown by the faithful towards their pastors becomes a dangerous temptation for the latter to fail to recognize the profound religious and christocentric nature of every form of the exercise of authority in the Church.

If we insist on the aspect of service (*diaconia*) in the ministry of authority, it is not with the idea that we ought to diminish the majesty of this authority of the Church, as did the Reformation. On the contrary we are convinced that in reality the Church of Christ, which is the apostolic and Roman Church, speaks to us in the name of God. No authority in the world possesses any power like it. No secular power can bind men's consciences as she does. None of them can demand such sacrifices as she does. None of them deserves that devoted obedience which is characteristic of the Catholic attitude.

This hierarchical authority is in fact unique. It cannot be compared to any

authority known to us in the various societies of men. That is why it is difficult to exercise it with great purity of heart. It is unique from different points of view. No human authority demands such renunciation from the men who are invested with it.

It is never identified with a person, and this for three reasons. We have already mentioned two of them. God is the only source of this authority and that is why its ministry is a holy diaconia. In addition this authority cannot dispense with the light that emanates from the Body of Christ, the light she possesses in the witness of her faithful. For if the divine Spirit inspires the Hierarchy, it is the same Spirit who prays and bears witness in the life of the faithful. It is the same Spirit who guides the former in its mission of authority and inspires the latter in its mission of witness and obedience. It is therefore the same Spirit who maintains and gives life to this charismatic and "pneumatic" dialogue, who maintains the life of faith within the Church. Hence the authority of the Hierarchy is never purely identical with the person of the bishop or priest.

There is a third reason for this and it is more clearly evident when a Council is held. No bishop possesses personal infallibility, and even that of the Pope has to be properly understood. The Council of the Vatican did not condemn the need for a dialogue of faith between the Pope on the one hand and the bishops together with their faithful on the other. The Vatican definition was directed solely against the remains of Gallican and conciliar teaching which held that the authority of a pontifical definition depended on the subsequent approval of a Council or of the college of bishops.²

Hence in a Council it is the Episcopate in communion with the Pope

which pronounces on truths of faith or which decrees reforms. Episcopal infallibility is therefore a charism *possessed* by the episcopal Order in communion. At the same time it remains one *particular* aspect of the basic infallibility of the whole Church, of the "Catholica," an ultimate and particular specific characteristic determined by the authoritative function of the bishops in the body of the Church. It is, moreover, noteworthy that the Vatican Council decided to define the "personal infallibility" of the Pope by firmly linking it to the infallibility of the whole Church. We are continually meeting this communitarian view of the Church, and not the "atomistic" standpoint to which our rationalist individualism has accustomed us.

We have just used the word "communion." Communion is a concept which, unfortunately, has scarcely any further interest for us in the West. Yet it has remained quite universal and central in the East and is known as "koinonia" or in Russian as "sobornost." We must not forget that it is precisely this primal conviction, that the bishops cannot exercise their authority fully in the Church unless they remain in "communion" with their brethren in the Episcopate, which has given rise to the institution of Councils. Hence the "communion" between large or small local churches in the person of their bishop preceded the appearance of Councils and was one of the basic reasons for their inauguration.³

What, then, is meant by living in communion? Above all, it is communion in the same faith, that is, a constant care to compare the way faith is expressed in the Creeds and in Christian life with the "sensus fidei," the way the faith is understood, to judge by the expression given to it in the other churches. It is therefore a constant care not to lose

touch with the living witness of the "Catholica" or the "Oikoumene" as it was then called. This anxiety was composed of different elements; it was expressed above all in the awareness of the bishops as successors of the Apostles, that they possessed a certain jurisdiction over the Church as a whole. This aspect is still always in evidence whenever a Council is held, although it must be admitted that theology has hardly even begun to concern itself with it. This anxiety also revealed the bishops' sense of their responsibility in the Church. The forms in which they gave expression to their faith could not be a matter of indifference to the Church as a whole. If they condemned heretics, this was of great importance for the life of the Church beyond the limits of their own episcopal or patriarchal jurisdiction. In other words, they felt they were under an obligation to invite the other Churches to share in the witness of their own community. Thirdly, this anxiety arose from a need to bring their own particular ideas to the bar of the "Catholica." No bishop thought he could be the ultimate court of appeal in a matter of faith, or even in a matter of discipline which (like the date of Easter) concerned the whole Church.

This communion was brought about by frequent journeys, by exchanges of letters or delegations between one Church and another, and by communicating information as to disciplinary decrees, liturgical texts, definitions of faith and creeds used at baptism. Its highest expression was found in the common participation in "the sacraments of faith," and especially in the Holy Eucharist. In the ancient basilica, the bishop celebrated with his priests around him. When it became necessary in Rome to increase the number of churches and services, the officiating priests received from the Pope during

Mass the "fermentum," that is, a particle of the bread consecrated at the pontifical Mass. They thus showed that they were in communion with the pontifical Eucharist.

All this has ceased to be customary and has disappeared to a certain extent from our consciousness of the Church. We may even venture to say that our bishops are only very rarely interested in religious questions outside their own diocesan jurisdiction. This is a tragic fact in our times when unbelievers and pagans are anxious to unify the world by means of intensive international collaboration, while it is difficult to bring Catholics together on the international plane and to make them forget their barriers of race, language, nationality, and their religious ghetto. We are accustomed to leave this kind of work to the Roman Congregations and to the Pope; it is no longer considered a matter of life and death for each local Church.

We might add a fourth reason to prove that episcopal authority is not identified with the bishop as a person. It is dogmatic in character and will at the same time make it possible a little later to describe the nature of this hierarchical authority, which is *unique* because instituted by Christ and brought into the world by his Spirit.

When Protestants consider the infallibility which Catholics acknowledge in the Pope and in their bishops, they are prone to think of this charism as a particular revelation on God's part. God tells the bishops in a vision or in a dream, as he did with the ancient prophets, what he eventually wishes to reveal to the Roman Church.

This idea is obviously false. Revelation was closed after Christ's preaching on earth and the foundation of the apostolic Church by the Holy Spirit. In this respect there is an essential differ-

ence between the bishops and the Apostles. The latter were the founders of the Church because they were the privileged witnesses of Christ's Resurrection and the mouthpieces of the Holy Spirit, who was given to them so that Christ's work in them might be completed. The bishops are in no sense founders. The Church is "guardian and mistress of the Word" (Vat. Sess. IV, ch. 3): *they preserve the deposit of revelation*. Their infallibility, and hence also their authority, is limited to interpreting, in new ways adapted to the circumstances and needs of the time, the truths revealed to the apostolic Church by Christ and confirmed by his Spirit. And they must do this without falsifying them.

Thus the charism of the Episcopate does not rest on a particular revelation. When the Pope or the bishops speak or write to us, they are not inspired in the sense of the word as it is applied to the authors of Scripture. The Biblical writers possessed the charism of inspiration, that is, the efficacious assistance of the Holy Spirit which makes their writings at the same time the Word of God itself. God speaks to us in the Holy Scripture through the instrumentality of the sacred writers. God does not speak to us in the same way through the instrumentality of the Pope, the bishops or the Councils. It is therefore very important to note that there is an essential difference between a text in Holy Scripture and a conciliar text. It must be admitted that a spirituality of obedience, or a certain form of "popolatry" due to reactions following on the Vatican Council, have sometimes made us forget these important distinctions.

What then is the nature of this episcopal or conciliar authority? Theology has a precise term for it. It is neither revelation nor inspiration, it is the *assistance* of the Holy Spirit. This concept

of assistance has two aspects. Above all it implies the need for the study of the sources of our faith: Scripture and Tradition. The bishops must consult the Bible and the life of the Church. This study, which is, at the same time, a form of prayer, they themselves undertake or else entrust to their theologians, canonists or other specialists, laymen if necessary. As we have already seen, the witness of the Church as a whole is important. In this reflection on the data of revelation, the bishops are assisted by the Holy Spirit, that is, the *conclusions* they reach do not falsify the data of revelation. The "conclusions," be it noted, since the arguments used at a Council do not possess the same guarantees of infallibility as the conclusions. In fact only the conclusions involve the bishops' hierarchical authority and belong to their authoritative mission. As we shall see later, this statement imposes very clear rules for the interpretation of conciliar texts, as well as for the interpretation of every episcopal or pontifical declaration.

Nor is this assistance of the same character under all conditions; as we have seen, Councils define the faith, decree reforms or attempt to solve practical problems of Christian living that affect the Church as a whole.

Theologians speak of a *positive assistance*, whenever a Council defines a truth of faith or a central point of Christian morals. This positive assistance guarantees that conciliar definitions genuinely express a revealed truth in matters of faith or morals.

Since it is a question of *assistance* granted to human study, it is easy to understand that these conciliar formulae are not necessarily the best possible, the only possible, or the most complete. It is possible for the Church to fall short on all these points, because for instance, theology at any given time may be de-

fective, because the bishops allow themselves to be carried away by partisan considerations, etc. Yet the assistance we are speaking of is a *positive* one. This means that, in spite of human weaknesses at a given period or among a group of men, the Holy Spirit himself guarantees that *what is asserted is irrevocably true from God's point of view* because divine truth is eternal. Hence what a Council asserts really expresses the divine mystery although in a human and therefore always imperfect manner. This is why these definitions are called dogmas of faith; they bind our conscience and are binding on our faith.

The assistance of the Holy Spirit is of quite a different character when ecclesiastical reforms are in question. In this field our human situation prevents us from achieving permanent results, for the conditions of our life are in constant evolution. At a still deeper level, all concrete legislation, including that of the Church, inevitably involves advantages and serious disadvantages. The Church will often have to "choose the lesser of two evils." Hence in such case, we use only the term—*negative assistance*,—which means that conciliar or pontifical decrees cannot run counter to faith or offer any grave threat to any of the Church's constituent factors, for example, in matters concerning the sacraments. The guarantee is negative, for these practical problems do not belong directly to the domain of faith. In these cases, we are not speaking of dogmas of faith, but of conciliar decrees, canon law, ecclesiastical reform. It is no longer a matter of revealed truth, but of "ecclesiastical truth or certitude," that is, in fact, truth whose authenticity is guaranteed by the negative assistance of the Holy Spirit. This latter point is still a subject of theological controversy, and we are not attempting here to advance proofs to justify our point of view; we

confine ourselves to stating it. In our opinion, it is of great importance for the formation of a more adult religious consciousness in priests and people.

It could be objected that all these distinctions may well occupy the leisure hours of a theologian, but that they are of no interest at all for priests in their apostolic work or for laymen. We are convinced that the opposite is the case. At this present hour in the history of the Church, laymen can no longer do without an adult and instructed faith. If so many priests and laymen have found themselves upset, scandalized or anxious in the presence of the liturgical and canonical reforms of recent Popes, or the enormous work which is being done in theology and Biblical exegesis (and this work has its echoes in preaching and catechetical instruction), it is because they put everything to do with their religion on the same absolute and eternal level—the Trinity and the eucharistic fast, the nature of the Episcopate and the wearing of cassocks, the unity of the Church and the use of Latin, the creation and the origin of Eve in Adam's rib, original sin and the apple of paradise, etc., etc. There are in our faith certain realities or truths that are absolute and irrevocable and come to us from God; there are also theological explanations of these same realities or truths, whose content is divine but whose mode of presentation is human, and so therefore relative. There are the opinions of the schools and there is canon law, which repeats certain principles of natural law. There are laws directly promulgated by God, and also laws which, since they are promulgated by the Church are therefore reformable; finally, there are our Western and national customs and habits of thought, which are only the concrete form in which the white race or a given Western people lives its Catholic faith. All these reali-

ties and truths involve varying degrees of certitude, of sanctity and of religious value. They are often made obligatory for us by ecclesiastical authority, but this act of authority also implies different degrees of obligation. It is high time our people realized this.

We have up to this point been studying the nature of hierarchical authority, its limits and its greatness. Above all, we have emphasized its character as a "diaconia," a service done to God, Christ and his Spirit, a service done to men, to the Church. "The Son of Man did not come to have service done him; he came to serve others" (*Matt.* 20. 28). The Greek Matthew here uses the word "diakonein." It is this "ministry" which confers on ecclesiastical authority all its strength, majesty and sanctity. What interest has the opinion of Angelo Roncalli for me, even in religious matters? But as a Catholic, I revere in him the successor of Peter, the representative of Christ. I am not especially interested in the necessarily diverse opinions of all the unknown foreigners who will soon meet at Rome for the second oecumenical Council of the Vatican, but as a Catholic, I respect the teaching of this worldwide Episcopate, the successor of the Apostolic College, which will speak to me in the name of God. We now come, therefore, to the second part of our paper, in which we shall study the concrete exercise of this hierarchical authority in a Council.

The Authority of Councils.

AS WE SAID a moment ago, hierarchical authority is above all a *diaconia*. All the Councils have met in the name of the Holy Spirit. The first Council of Jerusalem in the year 48 already wrote in its apostolic letter to the Churches of Asia: "It is the Holy Spirit's pleasure and ours that no burden should be laid upon you beyond these . . . (*Acts* 15.

28). This is why conciliar decrees today still have the following solemn heading—I quote the Vatican formula—:

Thus therefore, while there sit and judge with us the bishops of the whole world, met at this Oecumenical Council in the Holy Spirit and by Our authority, taking Our stand upon the Word of God in Scripture and Tradition as we have received It preserved in the Catholic Church and expounded by Her according to the truth, We decree before all men from this Chair of Peter that this saving doctrine must be confessed and declared against the contrary errors which we prohibit and condemn by the authority which God has given to Us (*Denz.* 1781).

It would be difficult to find a better summary of all that we have said in the first part of this paper.

The conciliar ministry is a *diaconia* of the Holy Spirit and so also of divine truth. This truth possesses the Church but we do not possess it. From this profound sense of the transcendence of revealed truth there has arisen a whole conciliar tradition, a few examples of which we now propose to give.

The Councils, for instance, have always avoided the introduction of technical terms forming an essential element in a given, enclosed philosophical system, even when such a system is a Catholic one. Thus the Tridentine definition of "transubstantiation"—in any case, the word itself is not strictly speaking defined—disregards the Aristotelian and Thomist cosmology, as the formula in which the canon is couched makes abundantly clear (canon 2 of the thirteenth Session) as do also the Acts of the Council.⁴ At the Council of Nicaea, there was even a conflict of conscience in the case of several bishops when they found they were obliged by the very objections of Arius to look for terms which were not to be found in the Bible.

More recently it has been noted that,

for the most part, Councils refuse to explain a revealed truth but content themselves with condemning obvious errors arising from all quarters. It is as though they are defining *the limits within which the outlook of our faith remains orthodox*, by simply excluding views which have no future. This long conciliar tradition remains much more respectful of the divine mystery than those theologians who, during the Council or after it, have tried, in their efforts at interpretation, to find warrant for their own little personal systems. Thus the Council of Trent defined that the Mass is a sacrifice but did not attempt to explain this term, except in so far as it barred the garbled assertions of the Reformers. The first oecumenical Councils all returned by divers ways to the same truth, namely, that Christ is true God and true man, but we shall find nowhere any explanation of this mystery. The Church leaves this work to the theologians.

This attitude is of very great importance. It shows that the Fathers are acutely conscious of the profound inadequacy of language by comparison with the abundance of divine truth. If our priests in their catechetical instruction and their preaching, and our laymen in their thinking about religion, had a greater respect for the divine mystery, they would come nearer to sharing the theological understanding of their Fathers in the faith, the bishops assembled in Council. Every expression of divine truth whether in a dogma defined during an oecumenical Council, in Scripture, even in the sacred words of Christ, determines the correct *perspective*, the orthodox direction in which we are to attempt to contemplate the Truth which is God himself. No human word, however sacred, can be identified with the Word of God. Though it is true that Christ's human word is at the same time

the Word of the Son, it is equally true that this human word is included in our Saviour's state of "kenosis." Hence a defined dogma is always a *starting-point*, which makes it possible for our prayer, contemplation and theological reflection to set off on the right path and to move securely *in the direction* of the Truth whole and entire. These considerations are only one application of the principle we have previously stated—we are not in possession of the truth, not even in a Council. It is the Truth which possesses us in the Spirit and which leads our minds and hearts towards itself. The Councils have never forgotten this fundamental law of all religious thought within a religion which is fundamentally a *revealed* religion.

This is why the Councils—and here we find another fairly common tradition—avoid as far as possible the condemnation of opinions formerly defended by the Fathers of the Church, the great Catholic Doctors and the chief theological schools that have flourished in the Church. There is in this attitude not only a respect for the witness of the great saints in matters of faith, but also a refusal to enter into theological discussion within the area of Catholic dogma. As we have shown in our studies on the canons of the Council of Trent in regard to marriage, the work of the Fathers often consisted, especially during the Sessions devoted to the Sacraments, in a laborious effort to find a formula so carefully worded and delicately balanced that it avoided condemning a Catholic author and dealt only with Lutheran errors or heresies. Anxiety to achieve this has sometimes made the formulation of the canons extraordinarily complicated.

We have seen that the authority of the Church is never identified with the person of the bishop or the Pope, but

must normally be exercised in a living communion with the Body of the Church, with the "Oekumene." This aspect of ecclesiastical authority is also more obvious during the holding of a Council. It is from this same concept of the "Oekumene," that is, the whole world, the whole Church, that the technical term "Ecumenical Council" is derived. In this connection we find in our times a widespread error which confuses "Ecumenical Council" with the œcumenical movement. Whilst "Ecumenical" in the ancient and canonical sense of the word was essentially based on the unity of the whole Church lived out in a full communion of faith and sacrament, the modern meaning necessarily presupposes a state of division and indicates any movement or current of thought which seeks to restore unity. In drawing attention to this, we are laying our finger on the regrettable fact that we have lost the sense of the primordial value, in every manifestation of the life of the Church, of visible and spiritual unity and communion.

In any case a Council is one of the most solemn forms of communion in one and the same *faith* and in one and the same *charity*. The bishops of the whole world—who, moreover, bear the names of their episcopal sees, and hence of their dioceses, rather than their own as persons—gather round the same altar and the same Vicar of Christ.

Although Councils have always been meetings of bishops in the sense that final authority has always lain in their hands, history proves that priests and even laymen have not been absent from them. From the dogmatic standpoint, their presence gives rise to no difficulty. The only thing which can change, and has in fact done so, is the concrete manner in which their presence has been accepted. And this necessarily depends on the modes of thought and the way of

life at given moments in history, although it is fundamentally inspired by the essential structure of the Church given to her by Christ. The same is true of conciliar procedure. The first eight Councils under the Empire were largely indebted for their own procedure to that inherited from the procedure of the Roman Senate. The General Councils in the middle ages were so similar to those of Constance and Bâle and, from a procedural point of view, to the imperial and royal diets, that a distinction between them is all but impossible. Msgr. H. Jedin has shown that the influence of parliamentary methods is observable at the last Council of the Vatican.

Laymen have always been present at Councils, the one exception being the Council of the Vatican. They were formally represented at the earliest provincial councils. Under Byzantine rule they were represented by the Emperor who was considered by all to be the Patron of the Church, the "temporal bishop by divine right." He was either present in person, or represented by the Empress, by his ministers or his generals. During the middle ages, the Emperor of the West attended, as did also the other Christian princes or their ambassadors. Towards the end of the middle ages they were joined by representatives of the universities and of certain public bodies. Msgr. Jedin has rightly pointed out that, prior to our own period, the question of the responsibility of laymen in the Church arose in a very different manner from that in which it presents itself today. Our ancestors inherited the clan concept of society from the Germanic peoples, and quite naturally entrusted a part of their civil, political, and therefore also their religious responsibilities to the former chiefs of the clans, who were now their princes. The Church did the same by admitting to her Councils the natural represen-

tatives of the faithful, the princes, the kings and the Emperor. After the French Revolution and the disappearance of the Ancien Régime this social framework was irrevocably destroyed. Hence the last Council of the Vatican was unable to find an immediate solution suited to a new type of society. It found itself face to face with laymen deprived of their age-old corporate ties, face to face with an amorphous mass of individuals. A century later, as we approach the new Council of the Vatican, we have to admit that the solution has still not been found, although the problem presents itself much more clearly now than it did in 1870. We have elsewhere dealt with this important question in conciliar ecclesiology.⁵ It should be obvious that conciliar authority does not do away with the necessity of a dialogue between the Hierarchy and the laity.

The Interpretation of Conciliar Texts.

It now only remains for us to examine the rules for the interpretation of conciliar texts. Before all else, there is the question of method. Protestants and even sometimes a certain number of Catholics are scandalized when they observe the precise analyses to which the theologians subject the conciliar texts. It seems to them legalistic logic-chopping; can all this be in accordance with our Lord's will?

The answer is that it is, since he willed his own Incarnation and hence the expression of the divine message in human language. When we have any text before us, we must read it correctly. We must therefore apply the rules of literary criticism, especially when we are dealing with texts in foreign or ancient languages. The Bible is God's Word. If we are to hear and understand this Word, it is inevitable that specialists of every kind restore to the sacred text its original sense, which alone is in-

spired and alone brings God's Word to us. Nobody—and certainly not Protestants—doubts any longer that this exegetical principle must be used in the reading of Scripture. If the word "fleshly" in St. Paul's writings signifies "human," "sinful," it is absolutely ridiculous to continue to take it as meaning "impure." Unfortunately, even in theology, we are still far from applying the same principle to the exegesis of conciliar texts. If the bishops have often spent whole months choosing one single word or the correct formula for a conciliar canon, the least we can do, if we are to respect their work and therefore their authority, is to discover through patient historical research the precise reasons which led them to choose this word rather than any other. We have seen that the bishops are assisted in their conciliar work by the Holy Spirit. If the Holy Spirit's assistance has been operative in this very work of dogmatic formulation, our love and our loyalty to the Holy Spirit must help us to give all our attention to the result of this supernatural assistance, even if this is to involve hours of labor. This is why there are such men as theologians. But theologians have a right to ask that their deep sense of obedience, expressed in work that is often extremely arduous, should be treated with sincere respect. By reminding the reader of these elementary common-sense principles, we hope we have dealt in advance with the various objections, or rather with the hostility due to a naive and at rock bottom lazy sentimentality.

The first rule is that in dogmatic texts only the central assertion in a decree or a canon is defined. Similarly, in the case of reforming decrees, we are only bound by the act of will expressed in the law. All reasoning, all glosses or subsequent observations which are used in order to illustrate or to give motives

for this central assertion, do not have the same authority. We do not mean that these reasons and considerations have no value at all. They give expression to the pastoral witness of the bishops in matters of faith, and so belong to the acts of the ordinary magisterium, which, even in a Council, remains fallible. The absence of any guarantee of infallibility does not signify that this act of the ordinary magisterium has no authority but only that this act of authority is not final; it may be corrected and even, within certain limits, be called into question. No one then should be surprised that theologians, that is, specialists, discuss the biblical or dogmatic arguments put forward during a Council. We do not intend to insist on this point since it is admitted in principle by all Catholic theologians, even if it seems to be forgotten in the writing of manuals of theology or in certain controversies between theologians.

There is a second rule, which is important in the case of pontifical documents but is usually less useful in that of Councils. We have always to distinguish carefully between human declarations of faith addressed to the Universal Church and replies given to one bishop on behalf of one or several dioceses. This rule is still more important in regard to reforming decrees and ecclesiastical laws. Frequent confusion exists particularly on this latter point.

We now put forward a third rule which is a fundamental one. It is far from being universally and systematically applied in Catholic theology. The *Imitation of Christ* has a very appropriate formula for it: "Omnis scriptura debet legi eo spiritu quo scripta est," every text should be read in the spirit in which it was written. This is self-evident. Yet in the matter of conciliar texts, dogmatic, philosophical and psychological reasons have hitherto pre-

vented theologians from accepting this obvious truth. Many seem to experience an odd kind of anxiety when it comes to applying this rule to a conciliar decree. And the reason is very simple. We have just emerged from a very unfortunate period of rationalism. The discovery of the historical dimension proper to human activities gave rise at the beginning of the century to Modernism. There are still theologians, accustomed to a comfortable, clear theology, based on solid concepts, who detect the threat of modernism as soon as we dare to mention the historical dimension of our faith, of the Church and of theology. Many theologians, especially in countries where theology is much more a question of sentiment or of passions, do not yet possess a sufficiently developed historical sense, which is so necessary for the study of ancient texts. Since conciliar texts are written in a dead language, which they themselves continue to use in their teaching, they think they may draw the conclusion that they are capable of understanding these ancient documents with no serious historical training whatsoever. Once a Council has set its seal on a word or a formula as the irrevocable and infallible expression of a revealed truth, in other words, once a Council has defined a dogma of faith, they think they can suppose that this act on the part of the Church has, by the same token, removed these words or these formulae from the sphere of the psychological and historical laws which govern human language. This mistaken respect for the Church's word involves both a dogmatic and a philosophical error.

From the point of view of dogma, this error may be compared to Docetism which refused to take Christ's human nature seriously. Similarly, an effort is made to remove conciliar thought from the linguistic and theological context of

a given historical period. In reality, there is a failure to accept a genuine Incarnation of Christ in his Church—and the Church as separable from the historical process. This dogmatic attitude conceals a philosophical *a priori* which is equally harmful, namely a hidden rationalism, which supposes that Revelation was given to us solely in the concepts which Christ has bequeathed to us. In her Councils the Church then gives a definitive expression to the concepts which belong formally or virtually to this initial Revelation. The rationalistic character of this position, which is common in certain quarters, also supposes that our concepts and the words into which they are translated are pure intelligibles, independent of the historical evolution of language, and thus within the reach of any mind which has the light of faith. And so the conciliar texts which define a dogma of faith provide us with words solidly linked with corresponding concepts, like hard, clear crystals, emitting their own light and in no need of any historical commentary.

Thus they think—and here, finally, we come to the psychological reason—they can rescue Catholic dogma from the danger of lack of precision and of the movement of ideas into which it would apparently and inevitably be engulfed by historical evolution. Their rationalism is their only answer to modernism. Unfortunately the controversy between the two can lead nowhere, for both modernists and Catholic fundamentalists are prisoners of the same rationalist *a priori*. The only difference between them is that the former opt for a fundamental indeterminacy in religious thought, while the latter opt for a conceptual inflexibility. Since they are enclosed in a false *a priori*, their debate leads nowhere; one group merely denies what the other asserts. And what is far worse, they do not see that their rationalist *a*

priori exposes them to a danger similar to that of modernism. Since they accept as an eternal and unchangeable meaning a sense which is current for the time being in their own circle and their own period, they themselves become unconscious modernists.

This fundamentalist position in regard to conciliar texts is certainly erroneous. We have not time to offer a complete criticism of it here. One argument should be sufficient to deal with it. It is now definitely agreed in the Catholic Church that it is impossible to read any passage in Holy Scripture without taking into account literary forms and linguistics and stylistic peculiarities, in short without sound literary criticism. A century of study and controversy was needed before this point was reached. Recent pontifical declarations have put an end to these discussions.

What has been done for the study of Holy Scripture still remains to be done for the critical study of conciliar texts. This is an immense labor which is merely at the beginning. There is all the more reason for undertaking it in that conciliar texts are not inspired, and should therefore be studied in their historical sense, which alone carries the guarantee of infallibility through the assistance of the Holy Spirit.

A practical consequence at once emerges. The Church does not approve of the reading of an edition of the Bible which does not include a commentary or at least notes which make clear the original meaning as accepted by the Church. The publication and reading of conciliar texts that have not an accompanying appropriate historical commentary should likewise be discouraged. But so few theologians are engaged in this work that such an edition still remains beyond the bounds of possibility.

All that remains for us to do is to list the dangers that threaten our obedi-

ence in regard to the authority of Councils. It is the refusal to obey which, above all, characterizes heresy. There is no need to labor this point, and we think that it will be more useful to draw attention to the chief faults which may distort our obedience as faithful members of the Church.

In the first place there is a certain *flippancy* which considers the Church's official texts as an arsenal in which any text can be found once it seems to condemn one's adversary. The ecclesiastical texts are there solely "to show I am right." Nothing is more improper than this mutual bombardment with quotations from Popes and Councils, taken out of context without any serious study of their meaning and scope. Catholics divided by modern problems in social, political or religious matters are addicted to this practice. This very human attitude inevitably involves a fundamental lack of respect for the authority of the Church.

Our obedience is also threatened by a certain fanatical orthodoxy, an "integralism" which easily turns into the fundamentalism of which we have already spoken, as soon as official texts are involved. This fault is often found after a Council has come to an end, especially if the preparatory work for this Council gave rise to keen controversy. This was the case after the Council of Trent as well as after the Vatican Council. The texts which were drawn up so scrupulously by the Fathers, immediately became the property of the party which considered itself victorious. This is a very natural phenomenon and comes within the category of crowd psychology. Controversy has bred a keenly aggressive feeling. This aggressiveness gives rise in its turn to a terrifying simplification of thought due to the fact that the two extreme parties are constantly repelling one another's attacks and grow-

ing increasingly angry in the process. We have only to remember McCarthyism in America a few years ago. Any reference to social reform at once brought an accusation of communism. In the same way, it is possible to note after certain Councils an increasing rigidity in theological thought due to the fear of heresy and to the glorification of orthodoxy. This religious fanaticism tends to read into the conciliar texts a sense they never had in the mind of the Council. People want to be more orthodox than the Pope or the Council. In matters of faith this is a dangerous illusion. Revealed truth is a divine reality; it is a truth whose wealth of meaning constantly transcends us. Hence orthodoxy cannot be separated from a catholicity, that is from that religious respect for all the shades of meaning of a truth which will always be richer in meaning than any words of ours can express, even in a Council.

It is fashionable today to call the Council of Trent to account, to accuse it of a failure to understand the real difficulties of the Reformation. It is forgotten that this accusation is only valid for post-Tridentine theology and to the extent that this theology allowed itself to be carried away by the spirit of controversy. A serious study of the Acts of the Council of Trent proves that the Fathers were much more prudent than we dare to think today. Very fascinating studies could be made to show how, after the Council, to the degree that the historical meaning of its definitions was forgotten, theological thought underwent in many respects a narrowing process, against which we still have to defend ourselves four centuries later. The reason for this is that the state of division, and therefore of controversy, has continued to dominate our religious thought, as we have not succeeded in achieving reunion with the Protestants.

A similar phenomenon is observable after the Vatican Council. It was of a less serious character since the opposition of those who became "the Old Catholics" was less violent, of shorter duration and less widespread. Nevertheless, we are entitled to note that in various countries a certain exaggerated glorification of the Papal Primacy threatens to falsify both our devotion to the Holy See, and more important, the orthodoxy of our idea of the Church. A study of the acts of the Vatican Council provides clear proof that the Fathers certainly did not intend to produce some of the movements which followed the Council, i. e., certain developments in the theology of the Primacy, in curial centralization, and particularly in the practice of devotion to the Holy Father. It is easy to understand that on all sides it is hoped that the forthcoming Council, obviously without abolishing the definition, will nevertheless restore the balance in the Church. It is easy to find grounds for this development in the actual text of the definition of papal infallibility.

But as with every swing of the pendulum, it is important at this point in history that we should not go to the opposite extreme. What would be the use of more distinctions in the doctrine of the Episcopate, if in practice it meant replacing the extreme centralization of the Roman offices by local absolutism in diocesan administration? The latter form of clericalism is more dangerous than the former, which is held in check by the very extent and diversity of its responsibilities.

In our opinion, it is impossible to bring about a real revival of the authority of the bishops in their dioceses and in the Church as a whole, unless there is a profound renewal of the religious authority of the Episcopate and above all a genuine re-education in the use of

this authority. If our bishops, especially in their practice, continue to preserve the idea of authority they have inherited from the nineteenth century, then this revival of episcopal authority will lead to situations that are more difficult and more tragic than those resulting from excessive Curial centralization. While the bishops should be given the place that is really theirs in the Church, the possibility of appeal against abuses in their exercise of authority should be restored. Such forms of appeal are allowed for in Canon Law, but who would venture in our times to have recourse to them with the certainty of being heard? We refer in particular to people in the Church who find it difficult to undertake their own defence, nuns, enclosed and unenclosed, and laymen in certain countries. Those who know what goes on sometimes in certain episcopal curias, will understand what we mean. We think it can be said if, during the preparations for the Second Council of the Vatican, it is possible to observe a counter-current apparently opposed to the general tendency in favor of a revival of episcopal authority, the reasons behind this movement are not so much of dogmatic origin as based on a very real and direct experience of an "absolutist" mentality, which, as we have shown, is foreign to the spirit of the Gospel. The bishops will only recover their place in the Church to the extent that they renew the concept and practice of authority by returning to the sources: the Gospel, the tradition of the Fathers and the Saints. It is only in so far as they have faith in the Spirit at work in the faithful that they themselves will become "men of the Spirit," according to the ancient tradition of the Church. But this means that they must free themselves from the spirit of fear and suspicion which is one of the chief causes of their isolation and of the rigid,

testy way in which they exercise their authority.

If we have set so much store on this fundamental respect for the many and various aspects of divine reality as Christ has instituted it and entrusted it to the Church, it is not because we imagine it is always possible to avoid the exaggerations characteristic of our finite and sinful nature. Scripture says: "Heresies must need be." Divisions are inevitable. But while we are all preparing for the forthcoming Council, it is of major importance as we face the tragic problems of the hour, that we should prepare fervently and wisely for the important examination of conscience the Church is about to undertake. The Church is holy because she is the Bride of Christ and the Temple of the Holy Spirit. She is and remains, during that period of time which began at the Resurrection of Christ and will end with his glorious return as the world's King and Judge, the Church of sinful men. She must continually persevere in the practice of penance and self-reform. Christ himself reminds us of this as he speaks to us with the voice of the Holy Father. The Church must reform herself in her members, each according to his vocation and his charisms, some in their exercise of authority and others in their mission of witness, prayer and loving obedience.

NOTES

¹ There is an excellent introduction to the history of the Councils in Msgr. H. Jedin's *Kleine Konziliengeschichte*, Freiburg in Br., 1959.

² Dr. Dvornik, *The General Councils of the Church*. London, 1961. As an introduction to the historical and theological problems in connection with the Councils, we recommend Lorenz Jäger, *Das ökumenische Konzil, die Kirche und die Christenheit*, Paderborn, 1960, and especially, *Le Concile et les Conciles*, Paris, 1960. R. Aubert, Documents concernant le tiers parti au Concile du Vatican," in *Abhandlungen über Theologie und Kirche*, Festschrift für Karl Adam, Düsseldorf, 1952, pp. 241-59, and "L'ecclésiologie au Concile du Vatican," in *Le Concile et les Conciles*, op. cit., 245-84.

³ Dom. H. Marot, "Conciles antinicens et conciles oecuméniques," in *Le Concile et les Conciles*, op. cit., 19-43.

⁴ Denz., 884. See G. Ghysens, "Présence réelle et transsubstantiation" in *Irenikon*, 32, 1959, 420-35. The Council of Trent not only placed the term "transubstantiation" in a secondary position, namely, in a relative clause referring to the customary terminology of the Schools, but also preserved, in spite of the opposition of some of the Fathers, the ancient terminology which is less philosophical: "conversio totius substantiae . . . manentibus speciebus." The Council's commission refused to alter this term "species" in favor of that in common use at the time, "accidentia." See S. Merkle-T. Freudenberger, *Consilium Tridentinum, Acta et Diaria*, vol. 6, Freiburg in Br., 1960, 160-1.

⁵ See my article, "Le Concile et les laïcs," in *Choir*, Fribourg, Switzerland, November 1960. An English translation will appear in the *Eastern Churches Quarterly*.

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Notes and Reviews

BIBLICAL RESEARCH

1. Biblical Archaeology

The Biblical Archaeologist Reader. Edited by G. Ernest Wright and David Noel Freedman. Anchor paperback, 1961, xvi+342 pp. 16 pp. of plates. \$1.45.

The Bible and the Ancient Near East. Essays in Honor of William Foxwell Albright. Edited by Ernest Wright. Doubleday, 1961. 409 pp. \$7.50.

The paperback *Reader* is a collection of articles reprinted from the *BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGIST* over the years from 1938 to 1959 and it presents a wide variety of subjects. The most competent scholars in this country are represented and they have succeeded remarkably well in combining a popular style with sound scholarship. Such a combination is particularly welcome in a field where the temptation to journalistic sensationalism is always present, and where the specialized scholar does not always succeed in communicating to the unspecialized reader. Here the reader will find just what we learn from archaeology about the Flood, the location and destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the nature of the manna of Sinai, the new radiocarbon method of dating and many other subjects. A few maps would have helped the kind of reader for whom this very useful book is planned.

The Albright *Festschrift* will be of particular interest to the biblical orientalist. The purpose of the volume—a most fitting way to honor the distinguished scholar and gentleman to whom it is dedicated—is “to describe the course taken by scholarly research since World War I in the various areas of Near Eastern Study to the end that a perspective may be gained of the progress made and

of the problems demanding solution.”

(p. 6) Almost all of the fourteen contributions are by former students of Professor Albright. Because of the delays which a *Festschrift* almost inevitably suffers, the editor has sensibly decided to date each of the articles, an expedient which similar volumes might imitate. The 27-page bibliography of Professor Albright's writings from 1911 to 1958 (two columns to a page and in small print) gives some idea of the extent and variety of his contributions to the study of the Bible and the Near East. An author index and a subject index enhance the usefulness of this handsome volume.

2. Old Testament

Curt Kuhl, *The Old Testament, Its Origins and Composition.* John Knox Press, 1961. viii+354 pp. \$4.50.

Joseph Dheilly, *The Prophets.* Vol. 66 of *The Twentieth Century Catholic Encyclopedia of Catholicism.* Hawthorn Books, 1960. 158 pp. \$3.50.

Although a second revised edition of the late Professor Kuhl's *ENTSTEHUNG DES ALTEN TESTAMENTS* was published last year, it was not substantially different from the first. As a consequence, the reader of this translation of the first edition need not feel that he is missing anything significant. But he will find that the book is very concentrated, more suited for study than for mere reading. The author's chief interest, as the title would suggest, seems to be in *Redaktionsgeschichte*. In his three-page conclusion, which, incidentally, turns out to be the most lucid and readable part of the whole book, he tells us that he is concerned to show what was the religious purpose of the final redactor as he com-

bined the various sources into the Old Testament books as we now have them. Even those who feel that the author is overly timid about the part God played in the formation of these books will find much that is useful in this careful examination of their complex history.

Many a valiant soul who has determined to read through the whole of the Bible from beginning to end loses his courage and puts down the book when he comes to the prophets. Joseph Dheilly's book should fall into the hands of the discouraged Bible reader when he reaches that stage. It manages to convey a great deal of information without the impression of overloading the text. A short section on the nature of prophecy is followed by a somewhat longer one on the psychology of the prophetic calling. The third and largest section of the book moves chronologically through the prophets, beginning with the twelfth century and concluding with Daniel. Since the author is keenly aware of the importance of knowing the historical background in order to understand the prophets, frequent comparative chronological charts are provided to keep the reader from getting lost. An excellent short chapter on the prophetic message shows how the various mysterious strands of prophetic tradition are woven by Jesus into a new creative synthesis. This popularly written book concludes by reminding the reader of the prophetic mission every Christian has in our own day.

3. The Gospels

Lucien Cerfaux, *The Four Gospels. An Historical Introduction*. Newman Press, 1960. xvii-145 pp. \$3.00.

C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom*. Scribner, 1961. 176 pp., \$3.50.

This translation of Cerfaux's *La voix vivante de l'Évangile au début de l'Ég-*

lise, which was originally published in 1946, is welcome, though somewhat late. The chapter on the apocryphal gospel literature has been slightly enlarged to include some information about the findings of Egyptian papyri, but apart from that the book is the book of 1946 and represents an earlier stage of Catholic study of the Gospels. The frequency with which the name of Loisy occurs reflects a specific period in the history of Catholic exegesis in the French language. Probably a majority of Catholic New Testament scholars would now prefer a different answer to the Synoptic problem (some form of the Two-Source Theory), and most of them would probably not share Cerfaux's lack of sympathy for the liturgy as a *Sitz im Leben* of certain Gospel pericopes. Another echo of the more apologetic temper even of the mid-40's and even of a great scholar like Cerfaux is the rather improbable suggestion that the marked difference of the language of Jesus in John from his language in the Synoptics is adequately explained by the fact that Jesus was presenting different kinds of truths. These remarks should not give the impression that this book has nothing but historical interest. It is still an extremely valuable book and can be recommended to those looking for a short introduction in English to the formation of the Gospels.

Professor Dodd, the eminent British New Testament scholar who was chairman of the committee responsible for the translation of the *New English Bible New Testament*, has a gift for putting original and carefully thought-out ideas between the covers of delightfully thin volumes in deceptively simple and altogether engaging language. One of these books, dealing with the parable of the Kingdom, was originally published in 1935, and has probably been the most influential book on the subject since Jülicher's ground-breaking book of the

early part of the century. Joachim Jeremias, who can rightfully be considered the third in the line of succession from Jülicher through Dodd, considers that this book opened a new era in the study of the parables. What are its main lines? Following Jülicher, Dodd rejects the allegorical interpretation of the parables which sees meaning in each of their details and maintains that each of the parables, as Jesus spoke them, had a single point to make. He goes on to say that it is the Kingdom of God which the parables are talking about, either directly or indirectly. Their *Sitz im Leben* is the eschatological crisis which Jesus knows has been brought about by his presence and which is the central purpose of his mission. In order to lay bare in all its unadorned simplicity the central message Jesus intended to convey by the parables, Dodd distinguishes between the parables as Jesus spoke them and the additional elements which were added to the parables as they were preached by his followers, handed on in the community and finally recorded in our Gospels. All of this is carefully done and much can be learned from it, but it is not entirely above criticism at certain points. The reaction against exaggerated allegorization perhaps goes too far to the other extreme. Indeed, a certain degree of allegorization of some parables is such a natural thing that it would be rather surprising if Jesus avoided it as completely as Dodd suggests. Furthermore, despite the remarkable gift Dodd has for rendering everything he says plausible, some of the parables seem to "suffer violence" when they are made to speak exclusively for *realized* eschatology and are allowed to say nothing about the *future* coming of the Son of man. The interpretation of the parable of the thief in the night and related parables seems to deserve this criticism. The revision of the book consists of

minor alterations and additions. The new preface relates the book to the "new quest of the historical Jesus," with the remark that "the parables, critically treated, become one of our most important sources for a knowledge of the historical career of Jesus Christ." A curious typographical error: on p. 86 *comparationis* becomes *companationis*.

4. St. Paul

Johannes Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*. John Knox Press, 1959. 351 pp. \$6.50.

The thesis of this book, by a distinguished Danish scholar who teaches at Aarhus University, is that modern Pauline studies have never properly recovered from the baleful influence of F. C. Baur and the Tübingen School. For Munck, Paul was not first a theologian who then went out to propagate his theology of Paulinism in opposition to narrow Judaizing Christianity. He is rather to be understood entirely in terms of his apostolic call. Paul is the central figure in the story of salvation. His task is to go to the Gentiles to preach the Gospel so that this hindrance to the coming of Christ and final salvation shall be cleared away. Paul sees his final journey to Jerusalem as bringing the converted Gentiles, symbolized by their voluntary gifts for the Jerusalem community, back to Jerusalem so that the Jews, stirred up to emulation, will accept salvation in Christ. When it turns out that a different kind of *zelos* has been aroused in the Jews, leading to his arrest, he appeals to Caesar, and this is done not merely as a last attempt to escape, but as a final act in fulfillment of his apostolic call: he regards his testimony before the emperor as the completion of his preaching to the Gentiles. It would seem that Munck has tried to replace Baur's oversimplified Hegelian conflict between

Pauline universalism and Jewish Christian particularism with another oversimplification. To try to explain *everything* by making Paul's response to his apostolic call the center of the history of salvation leads him to force some of the evidence, especially in the Acts.

5. The Dead Sea Scrolls and Christian Apocrypha

Edmund F. Sutcliffe, S.J., *The Monks of Qumran*. Newman Press, 1961. xvi-272. 4 pp. of plates. \$5.50.

Matthew Black, *The Scrolls and Christian Origins. Studies in the Jewish Background of the New Testament*. New York: Scribner's, 1961. xiv-206 pp. 12 pp. of plates. \$3.95.

Robert M. Grant with Noel Freedman, *The Secret Sayings of Jesus*. With an English translation of the *Gospel of Thomas* by William R. Schoedel. Doubleday, 1961. 206 pp. \$3.50.

By concentrating on the men of Qumran as a religious community and not dwelling on what is already well-known, Father Sutcliffe has succeeded in contributing something new and worthwhile to the enormous literature of Qumran. Many fascinating details are recounted which compensate for the somewhat difficult style of the book. For example, the author's characteristically English interest in flora and fauna adds much interest to the chapter on the site of the Qumran monastery. But the author's own writing takes up only the first half of the volume, the rest of it containing his own translations of the important Qumran text, and translations of relevant sections from Philo, Josephus and Pliny. A chronological summary, a select nine-page bibliography and a collection of helpful indices round out this useful book.

Professor Matthew Black, known espe-

cially for his *Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts*, has provided a study which will interest the specialist more than the general reader. Those who have not the patience or the training to profit by the careful discussion of the main part of the book will find a short summary on pp. 164-172 which clearly outlines its conclusions, both historical and theological. Two contributions of Professor Black which seem to be distinctive are: 1) his identification of the background of the Essenes as Nazirite, linked to the ancient tradition of Israelite Yahwism and related to Christianity through the Hebraists of Acts and the "sects of the Nazarenes" of Acts 24:5; and 2) the suggestion that a sacred meal of the Shew-bread rather than a Passover meal is at the origin of the Christian Eucharist. Information in the sources about Nazirites is not ample, and it is likely that not all scholars will feel that the evidence presented by Professor Black is conclusive. Furthermore, the connection which the Synoptics, John and Paul set up between the Eucharist and a Passover meal seems clear enough to cast doubt on Professor Black's hypothesis. It may be that debatable theological factors are not without influence on this second hypothesis. At any rate, all studies which can shed light on early Christian origins must be welcomed, especially when they are conducted with the care and moderation which Professor Black shows in this book.

Professor Grant's book, which has also been published as an Anchor paperback, deals with the *Gospel of Thomas*. The *Gospel of Thomas* is the most important document of the Gnostic library unearthed around 1945 in Egypt far up the Nile near a small village called Nag Hammadi. The last half of Professor Grant's book is taken up with a translation of the Gospel accompanied by a commentary. The preceding chapters

provide a clear and economical account of its background which manages to say a great deal without presuming on the reader's knowledge. The author makes it quite clear that the "Gospels" found in the papyri are significant principally for our study of early Christian literature and early Church history, and not for what they teach us about the New Testament or the life of Jesus. The commentary illustrates what the early chapters have already pointed out: The *Gospel of Thomas* is a Gnostic document which completely spiritualizes the Christian Gospel and detaches it from historical reality. That is why it never stood a chance of becoming part of the New Testament canon. A select bibliography and an alphabetical subject index increase the usefulness of this well-planned book.

6. Biblical Theology

Jacques Guillet, *Themes of the Bible*. Fides, 1961. x-279 pp. \$6.95.

Dom Thierry Maertens, O.S.B., *Le Souffle et l'Esprit de Dieu*. Desclée de Brouwer, 1959. 144 pp.

J. De Fraine, S.J., *Adam et Son Lignage. Etudes sur la notion de "personnalité Corporative" Dans le Bible*. Desclée de Brouwer, 1959. 319 pp.

F. X. Durwell, C.S.S.R., *The Resurrection. A Biblical Study*. Sheed and Ward, 1960. xvii-369 pp. \$6.00.

Karl Rahner, S.J., *Theological Investigations*. Helicon, 1961. 388 pp. \$10.75.

George Ernest Wright, *The Rule of God. Essays in Biblical Theology*. Doubleday, 1960. x-133 pp. \$2.95.

Father Guillet's book on the themes of the Bible was first published in 1951 and has already been translated into German and Italian. It is an eminently successful example of the *haute vulgarization*

at which French biblical scholars excel. What makes it so successful is that it brilliantly fulfills the basic need of twentieth-century man to be introduced to a way of thinking and speaking altogether different from what he has known since childhood. Unless he can go back in spirit to the ancient East and enter into the mentality of the Hebrew people, his efforts to understand the Bible will never carry him far. Père Guillet has chosen six biblical themes which reveal the essential qualities of Hebrew religion. The themes—of the Exodus, of grace, justice and truth, of sin, of damnation, of hope, of the breath of Yahweh—are unfolded through a study of the developing use of key words through Israel's history and into the New Testament. The treatment of these themes shows the author's intimate and extensive familiarity with the whole of the Bible and his ability to see and explain connections and relations. The scholastic theologian who has been bewildered by the sudden flowering of biblical theology will find this book a godsend. It will help him to see in a concrete way what the biblical theologian means when he warns that words like *justitia*, *veritas*, and *spes* may have a far more complex meaning in the Bible than they would have in a scholastic treatise. The translation is smooth and the format and typeface make an attractive book which is easy on the eyes. It is unfortunate that the index of Hebrew words and roots and the alphabetical subject index were omitted in the English translation.

Dom Maerten's booklet is a shorter example of the same genre. It is in great part a tissue of well-chosen and imaginatively arranged texts which show how the idea of wind and breath gradually gained a deeper and richer meaning through the course of the history of salvation. A short first chapter on the breath of God is followed by a slightly

longer one on the spirit of God, both of which lead to the main and longest chapter on the Holy Spirit. The first two chapters deal with the Old Testament; the third almost exclusively, as one would expect, with the New. This book deserves an English translation.

The subtitle of Fraine's book is, as is often the case, a more precise description of this biblical study than the main title. The idea of "corporate personality," a phrase which the author owes to H. Wheeler Robinson, is first defined and explained. Then it is shown to be present throughout the Old Testament in a variety of ways. Concrete applications are given of the notion in the Old Testament and some examples of it in the New Testament. The author insists that it is a mistake to see communities in the Bible as depersonalized anonymous masses. The group is always centered on an individual concrete person: Adam, for example, or Abraham. Correspondingly the individual never stands isolated; he is always related to a community. Great stress is placed on the realism of corporate personality for the Hebrews, so that the group is somehow completely actualized in each of its members. The two principal theological categories on which corporate personality sheds light are, as the author points out, original sin and redemption. Perhaps a proper grasp of this notion would help toward understanding other problems to which the author does not refer. It might make it more understandable, for instance, why the whole of certain biblical books are placed under the name and "patronage" of a single outstanding personality, although parts of it are the work of others.

Durwell's book has already gone through five editions since it was published in France in 1950, evidence enough that the time is ripe for a pre-

sentation of the Resurrection which does more than point to the empty tomb as proof that Christ was really divine. What is needed is an understanding that the Resurrection is the central mystery of the Christian religion, not merely an extrinsic proof of its truth. This is what Durwell succeeds masterfully in doing. The book might almost be called a compendium of Christian theology centered around the Resurrection. It relates the Resurrection to salvation, to the Incarnation, to the Holy Spirit, and, for more than half of the book, to the Church. This is done with consistent respect for all the varied nuances of different New Testament traditions, with particular emphasis on the Johannine and Pauline traditions. The result is a rich and rather complex book which does not make light reading. It is a book which will be properly appreciated only through meditative reading. But it is well worth the effort.

Helicon Press is to be congratulated for bringing out the first volume of Karl Rahner's collected *Schriften zur Theologie*, making some of the work of this outstanding German theologian available to a larger readership. After an opening chapter of *prolegomena* on theological method, which would repay the most careful attention of both philosophers and theologians but which would need far lengthier analysis than is possible here, the next selection offers a detailed study of "God in the New Testament." Rahner stresses that the knowledge of God which God's chosen people had in the Old Testament was not the result of extended speculation but of a continuing experience of Yahweh's personal activity. In the New Testament, God is evident because he has revealed himself, especially in Christ, his Son. What the New Testament is interested in above all is the *personal* God and his concrete activity. So true is this, Rahner

maintains, that "God" in the New Testament never means the indeterminate God of natural theology but always means "Father." "*Theos*" is not just a word used to indicate the Father, but the strict meaning of "*theos*" is "the Father." Rahner warns the scholastic theologian against reading the New Testament as if the words are used with the meaning he is accustomed to give them. The second article deals with contemporary problems in Christology and warns against taking the formulae of Chalcedon or any other Council as an "end of the line." They must always be regarded as "starting-points" towards a fuller grasp of the inexhaustible mysteries which they only incompletely express. The Christological dogma of the Church does not pretend to be an adequate condensation of the teaching of the Bible. It leaves room for a larger theology, and Rahner illustrates what he means with some concrete problems.

Even those who will not agree with all of George Ernest Wright's theology cannot deny that these essays in biblical theology show real theological power and insight. The general title of the book, which is the title of one of the seven essays, shows the author's serious concern for the transcendence of God, and his fear of anything which might threaten his supreme rule over all of human life. It is the prophetic protest against hypocritical ritualism and formalism in religion which strikes the most responsive chord in him. His sense of social justice and community is very strong. This leads him to a criticism—found also from outstanding Catholic liturgists—of the failure of Catholics in the modern period to give sufficient emphasis to the Eucharist as community banquet. It is unfortunate that his insistence on the prophetic and charismatic aspects of the Bible leads him to undervalue the liturgical and sacra-

mental aspects. Who could fail to agree that "the temple is no retreat from life. Worship as substitute for obedience is a lie." (p. 8) But this does not seem to the present author to be a real contemporary problem. Among those personally known to him, both Protestant and Catholic, none show more serious and practical concern for social justice and for religion in life than those who are working for the renewal of liturgy.

7. The Bible and the Church

Christopher Butler, O.S.B., *The Church and the Bible*. Helicon Press, 1960. vi-111 pp. \$2.95.

Charles Burgard, *Scripture in the Liturgy*. Translated by J. Holland Smith. Newman Press, 1960. x-163 pp. \$3.00.

The three chapters of Butler's book were given in 1958 as the Lauriston lectures, and they have kept the chatty rambling style of the spoken word. The problem which is in the background most of the time is the different relationship of Church and Bible for Protestants and Catholics, but in the course of the lectures Abbot Butler skims lightly over a great variety of subjects: the distinctive nature of revealed religion, the problem of the historical Jesus, recent Catholic discussion on the nature of tradition, the nature of inspiration, the importance of literary genres in the Bible, the community—not the individual—as the recipient of God's Word, the importance of the Old Testament for understanding the New, the joining of the spoken and the sacramental Word in the Liturgy of the Church. This rambling style may have suited a set of popular lectures; in any case, a more orderly treatment of a more unified subject would have made a better book.

Burgard's book is a tour through the liturgical year, Bible in hand. Unfor-

tunately the texts are not smoothly woven together and the work of seeing their inner unity is largely left to the reader.

8. The Churches and the Church

Francis Clark, S.J., *Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation*. Newman Press, 1960. x-582 pp. \$7.50.

J. V. Langmead Casserley, *Christian Community*. New York: Longmans, 1960. x-174 pp. \$5.50.

Jean Bosc, Jean Guitton, Jean Daniélou, *The Catholic-Protestant Dialogue*. Foreword by Gustave Weigel, S.J., Preface by Jacques Madaule. Helicon Press, 1960. x-138 pp. \$3.50.

M. J. Guillou, O.P., *Mission et Unité, Les Exigences de la Communion*. Vol. I, 292 pp.; Vol. II, 340 pp. Éditions du Cerf, 1960. (Volumes 33 and 34 of the series *Unam Sanctam*.)

Father Clark's book deals with a very specific problem, but succeeds in shedding light on many other issues on his way toward solving it. The specific problem grows out of the interpretation of the 31st Article of Religion and certain Anglican liturgical documents by Anglo-Catholic theologians who see in them not a condemnation of the traditional doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass, but only a rejection of "late-medieval errors" in Mass theology. Father Clark shows how it came about that these Anglo-Catholic theologians hold this position and then carefully and in great detail shows that such a position will not stand up against the evidence of history. The clear and orderly way in which he has marshalled a wealth of historical evidence makes the book easy reading, despite the complexity of its subject matter. Although it is unlikely that in the handling of such a labyrinth of historical data, some flaws will not be detected

by critics, it is difficult to see how it will be possible any longer to interpret Article 31 and the pertinent liturgical texts as no more than a rejection of "late-medieval errors" about the Mass. The intention in these texts to do away with the traditional Catholic sacrifice of the Mass is too abundantly clear. Fr. Clark's book is a model of Catholic-Protestant theological exchange; it is always calm, and always presumes the sincerity and integrity of those with whom he disagrees, yet there is no trace of a falsely irenic approach. The book is a model of "speaking the truth in love" (Eph 4:15).

Professor Casserley's book on the Church falls into two parts, the first dealing with "The Church of God—Its Grandeur and Misery," and the second with "The Church of Canterbury—Its Promise and Perplexities." The book is extremely well-written, properly seasoned with well-turned phrases and apt illustrations and anecdotes. It breathes that cultured urbanity which characterizes the Anglican tradition at its best. It is the second part of the book, dealing specifically with the Anglican communion, which contains the most challenging observations. He regards the role of Anglicanism in the ecumenical movement as especially significant, and with good reason, but one is entitled to wonder about the plausibility of his assertion that "what Anglicanism needs and must have in order to fulfill itself is definite evangelicals who are also Anglo-Catholics, and thorough-going Anglo-Catholics who are also out-and-out evangelicals" (p. 137). There is an acceptable understanding which Catholics can give to this assertion, and there may even be an acceptable understanding which Protestants can give to it, but if and when this happens, do not these two understandings turn out to be quite different and incompatible? One would wish that this were not so, but differences which

are really basic cannot be simultaneously retained in synthesis.

One of the most attractive qualities of the Bosc-Guitton-Daniélou volume is its unrehearsed style. Many issues are illuminated in the course of the conversations, and the spontaneous way in which the speakers express themselves gives one a "feel" for the different mentalities which characterize the two traditions. The actual dialogues deal with the Church and Incarnation, Authority and Guaranty, the Biblical Revival, the Interpretation of Holy Scripture and the Authority of the Church. They are preceded by a short article by Pastor Jean Bosc on the "The Protestant Point of View" and followed by a concluding article of Père Daniélou called "The Heart of the Problem."

The two volumes of Père Guillou, of the Istina ecumenical center in Paris, which deal with the problem of the union of Christians with special emphasis on the missionary vocation of the

Church, appear at a very timely moment, on the eve of the General Assembly of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi, which will probably see the integration of the World Council of Churches with the International Missionary Council. The volumes treat of mission as it grows out of communion properly understood, but in the course of dealing with these themes, almost all aspects of the ecumenical problem receive attention. The first volume has two parts: first, a study of the Protestant communions and the ecumenical movement and second, a study of the Orthodox Churches as they relate themselves to the modern world and to the other Christian communions. The second volume deals with the Catholic Church and its mission with reference to the separated communions. Few books by Catholics on the problem of the union of Christians show a comparable familiarity with both the Orthodox and the Protestant communions.

DANIEL O'HANLON

AMERICAN CATHOLICISM AND SOCIAL ACTION

1.

Aaron Abell, professor of history at Notre Dame, has placed us in his debt by assembling his studies in the social influences of American Catholicism, several of which had already appeared in the REVIEW OF POLITICS. His book, whose title provides the heading for this note (Doubleday, 1960, pp. 306 \$4.95), provides what the subtitle announces: "a comprehensive study of the Catholic social movement in the United States from 1865 to 1950." Author of *The Urban Impact upon American Protestantism, 1865-1900*, Abell is descriptive rather than analytic and interpretative in his emphasis; the book attempts to make the

reader aware of the complexity of the social reform process, showing "the dynamic interplay of 'charity' or social service, labor associations and state action as the great propulsive influences."

As Abell sees it, the fact that "as chiefly wage-earning immigrants, American Catholics displayed many radical tendencies on the industrial front . . . presented the Church with a double problem: how, on the one hand, to champion the cause of the poor without endangering the public interest or the common good, and, on the other, how to oppose socialism without negating or ignoring the claims of social reform." The ways in which Catholicism attempted to solve the double problem

constitute Abell's main theme. A second theme is the problem of Americanization, which has remained of great importance, and is being faced anew today by the Bishops' Committee for the Spanish-speaking.

The book traces the changes in social concerns of the Catholic social actionists from "welfare" (1865-85), through the battle for "social liberalism" (1884-1901), to anti-socialist "social reformism" (1900-17). As a kind of climax, it studies the Bishops' Social Reconstruction Program, launched in 1919, and soon to be the victim of the anti-liberal, ethnocentric 1920's, as well as, Abell suggests, of internal opposition. He points out that the name of NCWC was changed in 1923 from Council to Conference, thus making clear that participation by local bishops was entirely voluntary. Under fire also at the time was John A. Lapp's *Civic Catechism*, which wed Americanization and social reform. Abell also covers social action during the depression, and the influence of Catholicism on the labor movement up to the "right-to-work" issue of the 50's.

The gamut of Catholic opinion from radical to reactionary is frequently sampled. We meet rebellious priests who became Socialist labor editors and IWW organizers in the 1890's, as well as Conde B. Pallen, who sought to counter the influence of Msgr. John A. Ryan, whom he clearly considered a Marxist sympathizer. Contemporary figures of varied political sympathies are presented at their points of historical origin, and Abell's presentation of their positions always remains studiously neutral.

Abell's book reminds us that Catholic social action has been preoccupied with the "social" or "labor question," probably of necessity. But if the present gen-

eration of American Catholics is to show greater maturity, and, indeed, their proper share in leadership, there remains the need to develop a greater American Catholic self-consciousness, as a necessary step to maturity as Christians, and as Americans. To this end essays of historical judgment in the field of social action, modelled on the recent work of Msgr. Ellis and Prof. Thomas O'Dea, would be important contributions, and can ground themselves on the data Prof. Abell's book has provided.

2.

A Handbook of Christian Social Ethics, by Eberhard Welty, O.P. Vol. 1, Man in Society, Herder and Herder, 1960 \$6.95.

Catechism of Catholic Social Teaching, by Amintore Fanfani. Tr. by Henry J. Yannone. Westminster, Md. Newman, 1960 \$2.95.

Two useful indices to Catholic social thought, the first emphasizing social philosophy and encyclicals, the second encyclicals and papal addresses, are here issued in translations for American use. Both are useful in providing short general answers on various aspects of their subject, but the context is almost exclusively European.

As Fr. Edward Duff of *Social Order* pointed out some time ago, however, the American scene is different from that which the earliest forms of Catholic social action faced, and to analyze the American economy and its social fabric by drawing on Catholic social thought of European origin may result in mere irrelevancy. Neither Fanfani nor Welty, to take one example, have much to say on race relations.

MATTHEW K. CLARKE

RECENT WORK IN PSYCHOLOGY

1.

The Psychology of the Emotions. In modern times, theologians, philosophers and psychologists have become increasingly more concerned and articulate about the central significance in human life of the emotions and man's higher affective responses. This is due, in large part, to the influence of the phenomenological and the existentialist movements in modern philosophy. In the past, allowing for certain outstanding exceptions, the area of affectivity remained either almost entirely neglected or relegated to a comparatively insignificant position. Distortions of its real nature and true significance were common. Most theologians have not as yet really come to grips with the problems of affectivity on the levels of moral and religious experience, except in connection with the effects of the emotions as they can diminish or destroy freedom, make more difficult the struggle against temptations, and help create illusions about the state of one's spiritual life. Too often in the case of the theologian, Christian living is discussed almost entirely in terms of the intellect and the will, together with hidden grace. The situation today is better among philosophers, at least among those who have been influenced by phenomenology, existentialism, and Christian personalism. Scientific psychologists have been occupied with the psycho-physiological character of emotions, and have generally attempted to understand them in terms of their being the effect of physical factors, or at least as being subject to the same type of mechanical causality, transferred to the psychological plane. In some ways, there is nothing more dreary and more contradictory to lived experience and true common sense than much

of what so many admittedly great scientific psychologists in modern times have had to say on the subject of emotions and man's higher affective life. Since the advent of psychoanalysis, however, there is at least no danger that psychologists will underestimate the importance of affectivity, in spite of the fact that their theoretical assumptions and explanations may still distort its true nature and contradict their own clinical experience and insight.

Magda B. Arnold's two volumes, *Emotion and Personality* (Volume I: *Psychological Aspects*; Volume II: *Neurological and Physiological Aspects*; Columbia University Press, Vol. I, 296 pp., Vol. II, 430 pp., \$7.50 each), appear as a breath of fresh air in the stagnant atmosphere of scientific theories of emotion, and as a welcome source of inspiration and sometimes confirmation to the philosopher and the theologian. Her study will undoubtedly be recognized as an original contribution of great value in psychological circles and should remain a standard reference work for some time to come. Its comprehensive scope and painstaking scholarship alone are features to recommend it highly. Professor Arnold critically surveys the most important theories of emotion constructed by philosophers and psychologists (James, Lange, Dewey, McDougall, Freud, Fenichel, Jacobson, Rapaport, Dumas, the behaviorists, Young, Gemelli, Michotte), and then develops her own theory on the basis of a phenomenological analysis, stressing the role of intuitive appraisal of the value of something perceived in the generation of emotion. This is done in Volume I. In Volume II, after a critical survey of neurological theories and a detailed exposition of neurophysiological factors involved in

emotions, the author undertakes to show that her own theory of emotions is supported by the neurophysiological evidence, which she correlates with it in detail. Toward the end of the second volume, she discusses the role of the emotions, as modified in a typically human way by intelligence and will, in personality organization. Here, in addition to phenomenology, the influence of Christian and of scholastic thought is most evident.

It is probably the influence of scholastic philosophy that prevents the author from accepting the modern three-fold division, cognition, affectivity, and conation, and which seems more tenable on a phenomenological basis than the thomistic two-fold division of cognition and appetite. It probably also accounts for her seeing intuitively—appraised values too much in the light of what is good or beneficial and bad or harmful “for me,” placing not enough emphasis on what Dietrich Von Hildebrand calls the “important-in-itself,” when it is a question of the higher affective responses. It also seems that the author would not admit of two distinct levels of emotion as such, the one sensible and the other completely spiritual. Unless this is a misinterpretation, it appears that she understands sentiments and higher affectivity generally in terms of sensible emotions as modified and utilized by intellection and volition. More might also have been said about opposing lower affectivity (basic emotions) with higher affectivity in these cases where an ideal espoused by mind and will has to be fought for against temptations with strong emotional appeal. The facts are clearly stressed, however, that basic emotions in the animal and in man are not to be understood in a univocal way, typically human emotions (higher affectivity) are not the same as basic emotions, and formally personal activity, although able to be

correlated with neurophysiological activity, is in itself unique and spiritual. Professor Arnold's criticisms of theories hitherto prevailing are very pointed and at times appropriately ruthless. Her own position is both penetrating and satisfying. It represents a welcome breakthrough in the field of psychological exploration of the emotions.

2.

Religion and Mental Health. Under the title, *Religion, Culture and Mental Health* (New York University Press, 1961, 157 pp., \$3.50), the Academy of Religion and Mental Health, New York City, has published the Proceedings of its third annual symposium, held at Arden House in 1959. Like its forerunners, *Religion, Science, and Mental Health* (1957) and *Religion in the Developing Personality* (1958), the present volume serves as an excellent witness to the way in which representatives of different intellectual disciplines and clergymen of different faiths can work together harmoniously in the interest of truth and human welfare. Among the distinguished participants of this third symposium were the psychologist, Gordon W. Allport, and the renowned anthropologist, Margaret Mead. The proceedings are divided into four main parts, entitled respectively, “A Sociological Approach,” “An Anthropological Approach,” “A Religious Approach” and “Practical Mental Health Implications.” A valuable feature of this volume is the Appendix of Possible Research Projects, an organized listing of hypotheses and subjects for study suggested in the course of discussion in all three symposia held by the Academy. During the course of the present discussions, the question of values and the subject of criteria of normal mental health frequently recurred. A useful item of information is supplied in the section devoted to the sociological

approach, to the effect that the Bureau of Applied Research of Columbia University has made a bibliographic study which has resulted in an almost complete list, with annotations, of the books published on religion and psychiatry in the last sixty or seventy years, 1,347 books and articles in all. One of the topics of practical import touched upon is whether a person should consult a psychiatrist of his own religious persuasion.

3.

A Third Unconscious. Readers who have not as yet become acquainted with the theories of Dr. Leopold Szondi, who postulates a familial unconscious to supplement the personal unconscious of Freud and the collective unconscious of Jung, will find a good introduction to his thought in his article, "Destin et Liberté." This is one of several excellent essays contained in the twenty-fifth anniversary volume of *Etudes Carmélitaines*, which bears the title, "Structures et Liberté" (Desclée de Brouwer, 273 pp.). Describing a law of "genotropism," according to which "two persons who possess latently similar or related features in their heredity, are attracted to each other unconsciously in the matter of love, friendship and choice of profession," Szondi goes on to maintain, however, that "I. Man is the only creature who, in addition to his history of life, possesses a personal destiny. II. To become fully a man, the individual has to become conscious of all the internal and external possibilities of his destiny and, with the aid of these possibilities, consciously construct his personal destiny. III. In the individual's destiny, two seemingly contradictory portions have to be distinguished, one of which represents constraint and the other freedom. Constraint and liberty together constitute the total destiny of man, destiny

being the complementary integration of constraint and freedom. . . . IV. To be simply a physical or a psychological ego is only the beginning of personal development. The final goal is always the creation of the 'moi-pontifex' (making for transcendence and perpetual participation in the life of spirit). V. In the destiny of the individual, as well as that of the community, freedom depends above all on the degree of proximity or distance of the individual and the collective ego from the 'moi-pontifex'. . . . Only the 'moi-pontifex' possesses the power to be free with respect to heredity and the determinations of the environment."

4.

Psychoanalyse de l'Amour by Ignace Lepp (Paris, Grasset, 1959) is undoubtedly one of the best and most useful manuals on the psychology of love written in modern times. The author is a priest-psychotherapist, Director of the Institut de Psychosynthèse in Paris. Drawing continually on his own experience, offering example after example from cases encountered in his own therapeutic practice, he has written an extremely valuable book on the significant psychological factors affecting different types of successful and unsuccessful, normal and abnormal love-relationships.

The author's treatment of love between man and woman, of marriage, of deviant forms of love, etc., is psychoanalytically orientated. Freudian, Jungian, and other psychiatric notions and interpretations are employed constantly. But the treatment is so sensible, so sane, and so full of real common sense, that even the most prejudiced reader ought to be won over to the author's views. Father Lepp consciously fights against the reductionism and false generalizations commonly found among "orthodox Freudians," at the same time, however, that he avails

himself of the insights and partial truths they often conceal. One might be tempted to call the author "anti-Freudian" in some ways, but never in the sense that would give any comfort to those who approach the subject of human love or the conceptions of modern psychiatry with puritanical prejudices. Nothing the author says is incompatible with Catholic faith and morals, or inconsistent with a sound phenomenological analysis of the nature of love. He writes primarily as a psychologist, however, and with a free mind. His observations are directed to people of all religions and none. His topics include the physical-psychological symbiosis of love, the choice of a partner, platonic love, the Oedipus complex, deviant forms of love, frustrations in love, attacks on love (Sartre's particularly), marriage, divorce, in-laws, chain loves (Don Juan), the death of love, the love of friendship, and mystical love.

5.

This is an appropriate place to call to the reader's attention the existence of an excellent symposium on the sub-subject of sex, constituting a 300-page double issue of *Esprit* (*La Sexualité*, November 1960). The subject is approached in depth from the biological, medical, psychological, sociological, moral and religious points of view. Separate articles are contributed by specialists in the various fields. They are accompanied by pointed questions, comment and discussion.

6.

Christian Humanism and Psychoanalysis. One of the most important eventual requirements of Christian humanism is a relatively definitive synthesis on the theoretical and practical planes of the psychoanalytic and the theological approach to man. To attempt a

final synthesis of a comprehensive and specific nature at the present moment would be premature. The distinction, relative autonomy and general compatibility of these two approaches are, in the abstract, unquestionable. There is a tendency, however, in the concrete, as André Godin pointed out some time ago, for psychoanalysis to become a self-sufficient humanism in its own right. There is also the fact to be reckoned with that there are several competing schools of psychoanalysis in existence. In addition, a generally fluid and eclectic atmosphere understandably prevails in much of today's psychoanalytic theory and practice. In these circumstances, there are some questions still left unanswered, or which at least can be explored further, which many who are genuinely interested in fostering integration between Christian theology and psychoanalysis would like to see discussed in an open and competent manner.

Is Freud's approach primarily empirical or theoretical? Does pathology actually have very much to do with normal psychology, or neurosis with civilization and culture, as Freud supposed? To what extent do psychoanalysts disagree among themselves? Are they open to revision of their opinions? Is not the psychoanalytic approach to art a species of philosophical reductionism? Why is it necessary for the analyst himself to be psychoanalyzed? Are failures in analysis the fault primarily of the analyst or of the patient? Doctors Raclot, Baudouin, Nodet and Leclaire provide interesting and informative answers to these and other questions in the first section—"Men and Techniques"—of a symposium published recently under the title, *Problems in Psychoanalysis* (Helicon, 219 pp., \$4.95).

A second section—"Freud and the Analytic Schools"—contains the observa-

tions of Vladimir Granoff, Andrée Hauser, Roland Cohen and Igor A. Caruso on questions of a different sort. Is there such a thing as orthodox psychoanalysis, in relation to which other schools must be considered heretical? What are the essential differences in the respective systems of Freud, Adler and Jung. What is their respective value from a humanistic and a religious point of view? How does the comparatively recent personalist psychoanalysis of the Vienna Circle differ from the older schools of analysis? How should a believer concretely go about incorporating psychoanalysis into his thinking?

A. Vergotte, Dr. Paul Cossa, Marc Oraison, Louis Beirnaert and Etienne Borne look "Beyond Psychoanalysis" in the third section of the symposium to consider some further questions. What is the connection, if any, between psychoanalysis and phenomenology? Can a psychoanalyst honestly accept the traditional notion of conscience? Is it possible to demarcate accurately the respective roles of psychoanalyst, confessor and spiritual director? Was the religion rejected by Freud the religion of Scripture and the Church, or was it a distorted religion of his own making? Is it possible that Freudian psychoanalysis might actually contain a hidden affirmation of man's spirituality?

Problems in Psychoanalysis is recommended to those interested in being stimulated and informed in a professionally competent way on some important questions relating to the matter of an ultimate synthesis of psychoanalysis and the Christian view of man. (Fr. Oraison's essay appeared in *CROSS CURRENTS*, Fall 1958.)

7.

C. G. Jung. The Bollingen Foundation last year published another volume (Vol. 8) in its series of the collected

works in English of the recently deceased, renowned Swiss psychiatrist, C. G. Jung. The present volume, bearing the title, *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche* (Pantheon, 596 pp. \$6.00), contains works written by Jung at different periods of his life, from 1912 to 1952. They are arranged to convey to the reader a sense of the development of the principal ideas underlying analytical psychology. They conclude with Jung's two essays on his a-causal principle of synchronicity. Neither the works of Jung nor the excellent editorial and translation work of the Bollingen collection requires introduction or recommendation here. Simple notice of the appearance of another volume in the important collection of Jung's works in English undertaken by the Bollingen foundation is sufficient.

Persons interested in the relationship of Jungian psychiatry and religion will find two books recently published on this subject very illuminating. They are David Cox's *Jung and St. Paul* (Association Press, 349 pp., \$5.75) and Father Victor White's *Soul and Psyche* (Harper & Bros., 312 pp., \$5.00). The author of the first book is an Anglican divine, and of the second book a Catholic priest. Both men are deeply appreciative of the depth and value of Jung's ideas, particularly as they relate to both the theoretical and the practical aspects of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. Neither of them, however, refrains from taking sharp issue with many of the details of Jungian observations on religion, or attempts to construct pseudo-parallels or false syntheses. Both books are closely reasoned, detailed investigations. Mr. Cox's concern is to develop in detail the parallels existing between the distinct features of the Pauline doctrine of justification by Faith and those involved in Jung's conception of individuation, at the same time stress-

ing the differences between the two doctrines. He is not concerned with Jungian analysis as a doctrine and technique of psychotherapy, but rather with Jung's development of a "way of salvation" for the normal man on the basis of his analytic principles. Father Victor White does consider the matter of the relationship between Jungian psychotherapy and religion, but he finds it necessary also to wrestle hard and long with Jung's own observations and criticisms of religion, and with certain specific problems posed by some of Jung's "metaphysical" and "theological" conceptions, relating to symbol and dogma, triune and quaternary symbols, the feminine image and the integration of evil. Jung appreciates

the psychological value of the religious symbols and dogmas of Christianity. He also criticizes Christianity as lacking in certain necessary archetypal symbols. Father White undertakes to distinguish clearly the metaphysical and the psychological value of Christian symbols and dogmas, to explain certain teachings he considers Jung to have misunderstood partially, to rebut the criticism and finally to relate Jungian analytic concepts in the appropriate way to Christian theology and life. In all this, he builds upon, yet goes beyond the insights of his earlier *God and the Unconscious*, now happily re-issued as a paperback (Meridian Books, \$1.35).

BERNARD GILLIGAN

HASSIDISM

The new book of Dr. Samuel Dresner (*The Zaddik: the doctrine of the Zaddik according to the writings of Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of Polnoy*, Abelard-Schuman, 1961, \$6), bears eloquent testimony to the vitality of Jewish scholarship, offering a careful study of a central aspect of Hassidism, a subject that has lately won considerable attention among both Jews and Christians, but without receiving, for the most part, scientific scholarly analysis.

The work of Martin Buber has, of course, been widely influential in awakening curiosity in the Hassidic movement, but of greater significance in sustaining this interest has been the continued presence of heirs to Hassidism in Europe, America, and Israel. Such groups, by demonstrating both their loyalty to Judaism and an apparently successful resolution of the tensions of modern living, have won the admiration of many, and the emulation of a few formerly assimilated Jews. What has, perhaps, been most attractive for both

Jews and Christians has been the particular emphasis of Hassidism on the reality of a psychologically rich, inward religious life, its effort to sanctify the commonplace aspects of daily life, and its affirmation of the capacity of troubled men to achieve serenity by holding fast to evidences of the Divine in this world.

The particular strength of Hassidism, as of apostolic Christianity, lay, however, in the unique personalities of its leaders, who, as Professor Gershon Scholem says, "offer us a number of religious personalities of a vitality, a spiritual strength, a manifold originality, such as never to my knowledge appeared together in so short a time-span in the history of religion." Indeed, Professor Scholem points out, in *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, it was less the unique teachings of the early Hassidim that won the hearts of their age than the unique qualities of leadership. Rabbi Dresner has, therefore, seized the central issue of Hassidism in selecting for scholarly inquiry the subject of the doctrine of

the Zaddik (literally, righteous man) of an early and significant Hassidic rabbi, himself the founder of an important Hassidic community. He points out:

These men were saint-mystics of a most practical order. They did not forsake this world for another world. Their goal was to join the two, to build that rarest of phenomena in history, the religious community. They represented a paradox of solitude and communion. He who attained the highest degree of spiritual solitude, who was capable of being alone with God, was at the same time the true center of the community. . . .

Indeed, Christian scholars may gain useful insights by contemplating these saint-mystics, who, however different the substance of their respective doctrines, will doubtless recall the personality of Jesus and the apostolic fathers. Furthermore, they will doubtless find significant structural similarities between Yaakov's doctrine of the Zaddik and the Christology of the apostolic period.

Yaakov Yosef of Polnoy was perhaps the most important Hassidic writer, for he set down and expounded the teachings of the Master of the Good Name (Baal Shem Tov, abbreviated as Besht), who founded the movement. He held that the spiritual crisis of his day, marked by excessive devotion to formalism and religious behaviorism, was to be met not by rededicated study of the Torah, however important that may be, but by prayer, humility, and compassion, virtues to be imparted to the people by particularly qualified, charismatically endowed leaders. He criticized the Judaism of his day, in which the ancient institutions of observance were outwardly formidable, for its failure to endow the religious and communal life with inner devotion. As Rabbi Dresner says, "The body of the tradition remained, but the soul was lacking," having been destroyed by the "chief of all transgressions—

pride." At first, Yaakov Yosef was deeply unsympathetic to the teachings of the Besht, for he was an accomplished Talmudist and a Kabbalist. The Besht, however, came to Yaakov Yosef in his person, and by telling him three stories, converted him to Hassidism.

Perhaps on account of his own conversion, Yaakov Yosef came to see that power to effect the renewal of the community and of the individual lay in the hands of the Zaddik himself, "the foundation of the world." This viewpoint implied that man himself might become a source of holiness, and that the source of redemptive teaching, of Torah, might be a living man, who by his deeds teaches Torah. Indeed, the Zaddik as a holy man was more than a man, but was cast in a cosmological role, moving between heaven and earth. He stands between God and the people, a third force uniting the two opposites into one covenant.

He achieves this end by acting as a channel, drawing strength from above, and teaching by personal example the means of clinging to heaven, of "devekut." His primary quality must be humility, continuing self-criticism, unrelenting service to the least of society. At the same time, he acts as a surrogate for the people, suffering in their behalf, descending to the hell that is earth to be among the people, even undertaking intentional transgression to share the paradoxical existence of the people, and ascending heavenward, bringing the hearts and souls of men with him.

Rabbi Dresner concludes that

The doctrine of the zaddik is . . . a doctrine of concern. He is willing to suffer with them [the people], since they are the limbs of the Shechinah [divine presence in the world]. His life is bound up with theirs, for they are the body of which he is the soul. . . . He strives to save the people, for in each of them, no matter how dark

the pit into which they have fallen, are sparks of holiness which wait to be redeemed. The concern of the zaddik expresses itself best in what is described as his "descent" to the people. For if he is to help the people by raising earth to heaven, he must locate that earth, he must reach out toward the people. . . . Perhaps the zaddik's very proximity to sin and his familiarity with the ways of the world may entice him, and instead of raising the sinner from the dark pit of the world, he himself will be drawn into it. . . . [To prevent this] he must first bind the root of his soul to God, like the man who, before descending into a pit to raise up one who lies at

the bottom, must first fasten a rope about himself and secure it at the top of the pit. Thus even when going out to the people, the zaddik somehow remains bound up with God; and this is the paradox of the zaddik, a paradox of solitude and communion.

One can hardly overestimate the importance of Rabbi Dresner's study, which, in a most delicate area of research, exhibits the indispensable qualities of caution, knowledgeability, and completeness; his essay emerges as a classic description of once-significant and still evocative ideas.

JACOB NEUSNER

RELIGION IN AMERICA

Religion in American Life. Edited by James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jamison. Vol. I: "The Shaping of American Religion." 514 pp., \$8.50. Vol. II: "Religious Perspectives in American Culture." 427 pp., \$7.50. Vol. IV: "A Critical Bibliography of Religion in America." 2 vols., 1,219 pp., \$17.50. Vol. III *Religious Thought and Economic Society: The European Background*, by Jacob Viner, has not yet appeared.

It is a pleasure to report that this ambitious project has been both well conceived and realized. Since it is in great part the fruit of the Special Program in American Civilization at Princeton University, it provides eloquent testimony to the fact that interdepartmental seminars need not terminate in superficial generalizations nor serve simply as a kind of "change of pace" from the "real work" of scholarly specialization.

In a brief but perceptive introduction, the editors make clear their plan and purpose and also show themselves sensitive to the problems and limitations involved in their project. Stated very simply, the thesis of these studies is

"that religion has both powerfully and pervasively affected the complex development of American culture."

Thus each essay is an attempt to demonstrate the ways in which religious concepts, values, and institutions have left their mark on American life. The editors, however, have no illusions about the "completeness" of their work, particularly in those volumes which are composed of the essays. A more comprehensive survey of the subject is suggested in the lengthy critical bibliography.

The latter, prepared by Neslon R. Burr, is not only a fine supplement to the other volumes but will stand for a long time to come as the best and most extensive work of its kind. The first part, an 80-page bibliography of bibliographies, is itself an indispensable guide for any work in this area. The other four parts, amply subdivided for quick reference to particular topics, include connecting notes which "in themselves would constitute, in some measure, an account of American religious development."

The editors wisely specify the sense

in which they are considering religion. When they speak of "religion in American life" they are not concerned with "every tendency on the part of this culture to devote itself to ideal purposes," but rather "with the tendency on the part of our culture to devote itself to ideal purposes which stem from the Judaeo-Christian tradition."

In a work comprised of essays, any evaluation must be based upon the caliber of the individual essays themselves and upon the extent to which they contribute to the purpose and aim of the project. On both counts *Religion in American Life* must be rated very high. All of the essays are informative of their area of concern and taken together they add up to a rich composite picture of "Religion in American Life."

The first volume, *The Shaping of American Religion*, is intended to give a picture of the institutional structure of religious bodies in American and some of the highlights of the history of American religious thought and activities. Though there are essays on Roman Catholicism (by Henry J. Brown), and Judaism (by Oscar Handlin), the editors are aware of the fact that what results is primarily a description and history of American Protestantism. The justification for this is that, in their opinion, "the Jewish tradition, like the Catholic, has attained full partnership in the American enterprise only in the twentieth century." It is understandable, therefore, that the essays of Browne and Handlin are peripheral to the main concern of the volume. Since both these men are obliged to include so much historical detail, their essays, particularly Browne's, do not treat the interaction of religion and American Culture at its deepest levels.

H. Richard Niebuhr, on the other hand, assumes some knowledge of the history of American Protestantism as a background for his essay entitled "Pro-

testant Movement and Democracy." For those who lack such historical knowledge, there are six other chapters in the volume which give a reasonably full description of the history of Protestantism in the United States. Niebuhr's essay can be read alone, and is a masterful presentation of the way in which Protestantism has influenced and has been influenced by historical factors, while still retaining an inner life not reducible to them.

"Religion and Science in American Philosophy," by James Ward Smith, is an exceptionally provocative and discerning treatment of what is perhaps the most crucial question confronting contemporary religion, namely, how to relate itself to science. In a treatment which is analytic and interpretative as well as descriptive, Professor Smith exposes a problem which must be central not only for "religion in American life" but for "religion in life."

In the wake of the "religious revival" of the last fifteen years there has been a fairly widespread rejection of a simplistic scientism and a growing consideration of religion as a serious human undertaking which has not been rendered anachronistic by the scientific revolution of recent centuries. The danger here is that the religiously concerned might be lulled into a state of destructive complacency in virtue of the fact that religion has again become respectable. It would be most unfortunate if the religionist considered his obligation fulfilled by making a courtesy nod toward science while continuing his investigation in a state of spiritual isolation.

It is customary to lament the fact that religion in the past has so often opposed science. Professor Smith implies that even more lamentable was the nature of the accommodation which religion made in reference to science. This accommodation was pitifully superficial so that throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th cen-

turies "the demands of science had never been squarely met by our traditionally religious view of the world." The philosophical revolution of the 20th century, which insists upon taking science seriously, destroyed this "superficial accommodation," but it also resulted in a loss of that cosmic sense which in American philosophy had always been "religious in tone." Professor Smith contends that our "cosmic sense" is again on the increase, but his essay is a warning not to repeat the mistakes of the past but to search out and assimilate those aspects of science which will inevitably have a profound influence on the resulting religious world view.

The second volume, *Religious Perspectives in American Culture*, is comprised of five essays dealing with different ways "in which religion is involved in the social and political life of the nation," and five others concerned with religion and the arts. The essays on music and architecture are basically historical and descriptive, presenting generous samplings of the variety of religious music and religious architecture which has appeared in America. William Thorp's "Religious Novel as Best Seller" presents lengthy quotes and plot descriptions of American religious "best sellers." These rather horrendous examples of religion in literature are offset by excellent essays by Carlos Baker ("Place of the Bible in Fiction") and Richard P. Blackmur ("Religious Poetry in the United States"). These last two expose the more profound and subtle presence of a religious dimension in American literature.

Will Herberg presents an analysis of the changing relations between religion and education and Wilbur Katz describes his "neutrality" interpretation of the Church-State relation. Katz also considers the "bearing of religion on controversial problems of legal policy" with particular reference to the problem of capital punishment. This is an area which has received too little attention and Professor Katz is to be commended for the framework within which he sets the question, and his provocative and well-reasoned solution.

In his "Religion and Political Attitudes" William Lee Miller returns to a theme which he treated in the *Reporter* some years ago. Miller makes a fine presentation of both the positive and negative aspects of the tendency of Americans to "see the world in moral terms." In particular he gives an exceptionally acute analysis of the effects of the "voluntary principle" on American life. While a certain individualism and moralism has characterized much of Protestantism in the past, Miller points out that the notion of changing the world by changing individuals is today also characteristic of Catholicism in America.

For the most part, the essays which appear in *Religion in American Life* are not so much the expression of original scholarship as they are the fruit of cumulative scholarship. They present the best insights and conclusions of the investigations in this field to date and indicate the areas in which future inquiry can profitably be pursued.

EUGENE FONTINELL

THEOLOGY AND IMAGINATION

William F. Lynch, S.J., *Christ and Apollo, The Dimensions of the Literary Image*, New York, Sheed & Ward, 1960. 267 pp., \$5.00.

The special genius of this book is very properly contained in its title: Christ and Apollo. Behind the term "Christ" there lurks the Nietzschean "Dionysus" and Nietzsche's distinction between Apollo and Dionysus, between energy and form, the infinite and the finite, the rational and the vital, the romantic and the classic. The author of this volume proposes that these are vicious extremes. A third term is needed to mediate between the romantic dream and the rationalist (Cartesian) angel "that thinks form can be given to the world by the top of the head alone, without contact with the rest of the self." Christ is that term. He stands for "the completely definite, for the Man who, in taking on our human nature (as the artist must) took on every inch of it in all its density." Ontological questions must arise from this concreteness. This image prevents the escape from actuality (either in art or religion) by drawing us upon and (hopefully) through the finite particularly of things.

This thesis is stated in numerous ways throughout the book, and seeks its confirmation in bold and unusual ways. Saint Ignatius, for example, is set over against Heraclitus in such a way as to give "the upward and the downward way" formula a specifically Christian (and, I should add, existentialist) content. "For the movement is predicated not only upon total involvement, but at the same time upon total freedom—not freedom from involvement, but freedom in and through involvement." The movement is "down into the concrete, up into the unlimited." This "unlimited" is the realm of creative possibility. The ana-

logue for this action is the Christ event. The author points out (and correctly, in this reviewer's judgment) that Barth's failure to grasp the drama of this action is what leaves his theology aesthetically barren. The authentic implications for the human imagination are summed up by way of Newman, for whom the "whole vocation of the human imagination" was: *Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*. Out of shadow and phantasy into truth.

In succeeding chapters this image of the definite is applied to the notions of time, tragedy, comedy, the univocal and the analogical modes of knowing, and to the Christian imagination. The chapters on Time and on Comedy are particularly illuminative. The dramatic movement of life calls for a theory of imagination which is commensurate with it. The imagination does not have as its goal the reaching of "universals," or the task of freezing or immobilizing time in the moment of artistic representation: this is a "fraudulent aping of religion and Christianity." It must penetrate rather the levels of experience, moving from the surface through the "human situation" into the deepest level of tragic or comic pathos. Comedy has many advantages for our time. It is the enemy of the univocal mind which cannot tolerate the "Zigzags and surprises of the actual." It believes that "rock bottom being cannot be hurt," that there is power in it, and that in this recognition lies our deepest hope. Nevertheless the way to it must lie through our predicament. "We enter more and more deeply into man, into the fact of society until we come to that depth or height which is Christ; this we call the Christic point. . . ."

This insistence upon the Christic point is excellent, especially so in view of the author's persuasion that it is this

notion which subverts the whole tradition of thought concerning the imagination. It does so by raising all classical notions "to the level of historical commitment"—thus preventing the escapes either into the romantic infinite or into the classical univocal "universal."

There are many perceptive and sustained critical appraisals of contemporary works which serve to test the author's view. The best of these will be found in the pages devoted to Proust, O'Neill and Eliot. There is also a supplement of some fifty pages of selected judgments from a variety of authors which does not contribute noticeably to the author's own very interesting case. For the author writes with competence and a touch of disarming casualness

which, on the whole, adds zest to the reading, though it occasionally intrudes an accent of self-consciousness upon a train of ideas which would better be left to fulfill its dialectical destiny without this sort of interference.

One question remains: for, Saint Ignatius to the contrary, the orthodox quaternity of four levels of insight—the literal, moral, allegorical, and analogical—comes in at the end and threatens to capsize the Ignatian boldness in the Aristotelian "universal" after all. We should not like to see this book's wisdom scuttled by its orthodoxy; and perhaps it will not be, for the author recognizes that "God is ironic, and He will not be beaten at His own game, and His game is time." STANLEY R. HOPPER

THE MEANING OF THE PRIESTHOOD

The book of Father José Luis Martin Descalzo (*A Priest Confesses*, trans. from the Spanish by Rita Goldberg, Fresno, Calif.: Academy Guild 1960, \$3.95) was largely put together during the year before his ordination, at the age of 23; despite pages where a real poetry flashes forth, it bears unmistakable traces of this youthfulness. It consists largely of personal reflections on the nature of the priesthood, excerpts from letters and diaries, and reminiscences on life during seminary years and shortly following ordination.

Glimpses of a solid spirituality make clear that Father Martin Descalzo is a dedicated, spiritually intense young man. The substance of the book, however, leaves an impression of something wanting. Granted the passionate nature of the Spaniard that renders him so often difficult to interpret to the Anglo-Saxon mentality, it is not an overstatement to say that the book is a tissue of ardent sentimentality. Most of the pages linger over all the non-essential things: the

binder for his hands at their anointing; numbers of masses said by Father X or to be said by himself; the feelings of his sister, father, mother, friends, ex-sweet-heart; his own varied emotional states. It would be revealing to determine how many times he mentions kissing his soon-to-be-anointed fingers.

It is to Father Martin Descalzo's credit that he readily admits and foresees the time when such an overabundance of spiritual consolation might well yield to the onus of routine. In fact, it is to some extent from this point of view, mindful of his own clay, that he first put pen to paper; he felt compelled to *confess* his inadequacy, from the human standpoint, before the awesome mystery of the priesthood. Despite this admirable intent, however, the over-all impression of tarrying too long on non-essentials persists. After all, the theologians and greatest spiritual writers of our era have stressed the idea that feelings in such matters are really unimportant.

Seminarians (and their families) the

world over have tended to emphasize and preserve the memory of the moments surrounding ordination, so it would be unreasonable to expect Father Martin Descalzo to be an exception. But in a book on the meaning of the priesthood it is not unreasonable to note the absence of a strong social sense of the apostolate—a quality not prominent in the Spanish clergy in general since the 17th

century. Concomitantly, one notes the absence of any well-articulated world vision which the priesthood entails in our time, a realization that everywhere—in Asia, in Africa, in America, behind the broken façades, beyond the parochial boundaries—the whole world of nature is groaning for redemption.

JOHN DEVLIN

ISTINA

Among the continental periodicals given over entirely to ecumenical ends, *ISTINA* (25, Boulevard d'Auteuil, Boulogne-Sur-Seine [Seine], 18 NF.) ranks with the very best. Published quarterly by the Dominicans at the "Istina" Center of Studies, it is edited by Fr. C. J. Dumont, O.P., whose *Approaches to Christian Unity* was issued recently in this country by Helicon Press. Although *ISTINA* was originally devoted entirely to the Russian Orthodox Church (and known, initially, as *Russie et Chrétienté*) it has since 1954 broadened its scope to include every area of ecumenical importance. At present it divides its interests fairly equally among four areas: Russia and Christianity, Eastern Christianity (especially the Greek Orthodox Church), Comparative Studies of Eastern and Western Christianity and, finally, Problems of Ecumenicism, a broad classification encompassing Protestantism and the Ecumenical Movement.

One of the main purposes of *ISTINA* (the Russian word for truth) is to make available to Catholic readers important documents, such as the various studies and reports originating at the WCC headquarters at Bossey. Of special note, along with many translated documents pertaining to the Russian and Greek Orthodox Churches, *ISTINA* has reprinted a large number of addresses and re-

ports by various Greek bishops and patriarchs concerning the Ecumenical Movement. Of great value as well are numerous translations of German Protestant documents and studies and, to a lesser extent, English and American ones.

In addition to its attempt to make important documents accessible, *ISTINA* regularly includes important and comprehensive articles and editorials on specific ecumenical problems. While most of the articles are by Roman Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox are well represented. Some of the most significant articles in recent years have dealt with the relationship of scripture and tradition. *ISTINA* in particular helped to make known the work of the important German theologian Fr. Josef R. Geiselmann of Tübingen on scripture and tradition. A 1959 article by Fr. Yves Congar, O.P., provides an excellent summary of the various controversies centering around Fr. Geiselmann's work. Writers like Fr. M. J. LeGuillou and Fr. A. M. Dubarle also contribute regularly.

While *ISTINA* from time to time prepares specific bibliographical studies, a companion bulletin, *VERS L'UNITÉ CHRÉTIENNE* (6 NF), offers the most thorough and useful regular listing of current ecumenical studies throughout the world. It contains an editorial and

occasional articles as well as brief resumés of articles and book of special value.

DANIEL J. CALLAHAN

Reviewers. Reviews in this issue were contributed by Fr. Daniel O'Hanlon, S. J., professor of Theology at Alma College, Calif.; Matthew K. Clarke, education director of the Religion and Labor Council; Bernard Gilligan, pro-

fessor of philosophy at Fordham University; Jacob Neusner, professor of Jewish Studies at University of Wisconsin (Madison); Eugene Fontinell, professor of philosophy at Queens College; Stanley R. Hopper, dean of the graduate school at Drew University; John Devlin, professor of Spanish at Fordham, and Daniel J. Callahan of COMMONWEAL.

FIVE BOOKS FROM HELICON

Yves Conger, O.P., has the habit of asking new questions about old subjects. His new book, *The Wide World, My Parish*, faces squarely a taken-for-granted subject: Salvation. He writes with lucidity and his insights are unforgettable. "Father Conger's explanation of Heaven and its meaning for Christians alone is worth the effort of reading this book." (Virginia Kirkus) \$4.50

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At last Fellerer's *History of Catholic Church Music* is available. The "competents" in this field regard it as the great work on the subject. This first edition in English, translated by Francis A. Brunner, C. S.S.R., also contains a special chapter on the American contribution. All interested in the development of sacred music—and every library—should welcome this landmark book. It also has 200 illustrations, and a comprehensive index and bibliography. \$7.50

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Claude Tresmontant, whose *Teilhard de Chardin* is still regarded as the best introduction to the works of Teilhard, has now written *Toward the Knowledge of God* and tackles the problem from a new angle: the acceptance of reality and an examination of the phenomena of history leads toward a proof of God's existence. \$3.50

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Introduction to the Liturgy written by the French Dominican, Dalmais, is far, far more than an introduction. It is an intellectual treat which scatters the haze which has so often, unfortunately, hurt the American liturgical revival. Father Frederick McManus writes: "An original and creative contribution to a serious appreciation of things liturgical, with a theological soundness that does not inhibit the warmth and enthusiasm of the author. It is the doctrine of the liturgy with a thorough, if brief, application to the history, the forms, and the rites which have shaped our Christian Worship." \$4.50

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The Editor



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